Plan Jaune released on 9th Jan and then also FREE for the weekend.

[JasonPratt]

Just got finished reading Forzyc's (can never spell his name) Case Red -- he just released Case White last month or so (and Case Yellow is included as roughly the first half of Case Red). It lacked the low-level accounts I was hoping for, but was super-detailed otherwise.

I don't recall his conclusions too clearly, but broadly speaking it was: lack of French combined arms coordination (from various reasons) plus lack of proper British support (from various reasons), plus something else maybe at the political level (though that would contribute to the other two). That's on the French side; the Germans have an evaluation, too. I'll try to remember to look it up tomorrow.

And look at what it takes to stop the German force mix: reasonable air power, good radio doctrine, good AA, Good AT, operational flexibility, some experience at all levels and reasonable tanks with fully trained crews.

Alternately, having more than sixteen times the number of German tanks helps slow them down enough to wear out their blitz capability. ;)

[Destraex]

I tried to get on before work this morning but their were pages of full servers and queues

[MengJiao]

Alternately, having more than sixteen times the number of German tanks helps slow them down enough to wear out their blitz capability. ;)

   Having a lot more tanks definitely helps, but you also have to work out how to fuel them and communicate with them and protect them from bombers.
I think the allied problems in dealing with  the Germans early on (up til the end of 1942) had a lot to do with just learning how to put all the pieces together for a modern force mix and command control.  In that context, the French problems were much deeper and wider than just not having "combined arms"...not having adequate AA was probably just as bad has not having enough infantry with your tank units, for example.

[JasonPratt]

The Soviets had excellent command and control set up, and very, very detailed combined arms plans, too, with equipment and ammunition and 'soft' supplies all right there ready to go -- on June 21.

On June 22, Hitler ran over all their combined arms and mauled their excellent command and control setup, largely because it was all right there ready to go.  ::) (And the rest of it was scattered for thousands of miles back east on their rail network, trying to get ready to go.)


There's a great story about how Guderian used to go along the riverside at Brest for weeks, dressed in disguise, although the Soviets border guards could figure out generally and sometimes specifically who he was. On the evening of June 21, he and his staff dressed up in full regalia and took the final walk down to the riverbank, because he didn't have a single damn to give anymore about whether they immediately recognized him. He wanted anyone watching to know who was about to kick all their asses.  >:D

There was a Soviet tank division on the other side of the river -- 22nd Mechanized Division, part of the 14th Mechanized Corps, 4th Army, Western Special Military District -- which was set up on the river bank so that Major-General Puganov could sit there with his staff and make plans. (The Soviets preferred to call their armored divisions "mechanized" as though they were tracked infantry according to western standards, so as to avoid giving a clear idea what was in the 'container'.) The night of June 21, Guderian gave explicit instructions where the first cannon shell was going to: straight into that division HQ's front window. And that's where it went. 

[MengJiao]

The Soviets had excellent command and control set up, and very, very detailed combined arms plans, too, with equipment and ammunition and 'soft' supplies all right there ready to go -- on June 21.

On June 22, Hitler ran over all their combined arms and mauled their excellent command and control setup, largely because it was all right there ready to go.  ::) (And the rest of it was scattered for thousands of miles back east on their rail network, trying to get ready to go.)


There's a great story about how Guderian used to go along the riverside at Brest for weeks, dressed in disguise, although the Soviets border guards could figure out generally and sometimes specifically who he was. On the evening of June 21, he and his staff dressed up in full regalia and took the final walk down to the riverbank, because he didn't have a single damn to give anymore about whether they immediately recognized him. He wanted anyone watching to know who was about to kick all their asses.  >:D

There was a Soviet tank division on the other side of the river -- 22nd Mechanized Division, part of the 14th Mechanized Corps, 4th Army, Western Special Military District -- which was set up on the river bank so that Major-General Puganov could sit there with his staff and make plans. (The Soviets preferred to call their armored divisions "mechanized" as though they were tracked infantry according to western standards, so as to avoid giving a clear idea what was in the 'container'.) The night of June 21, Guderian gave explicit instructions where the first cannon shell was going to: straight into that division HQ's front window. And that's where it went. 

   All true, I'm sure, but on the other hand, the Russians knew before June 21, 1941, that they had to completely retool their army and that it was not ready to fight the Germans, which was why they desperately wanted to delay any war with Germany as much as possible which was why the General who had lost to Zhukov in the most recent war games was in charge at the front and Zhukov was involved in getting the Russian army into shape.  Getting into shape had priority over the first round of fighting and of course in terms of trained manpower, the Russians had 20 years of reservists who at least had some training (1.5 million a year or so times 20 years = 30 million) while the Germans had only 5 years of smaller sets = say 5 million at the most.  Once you get your 6 to 1 advantage in trained reserves into a fully retooled army, things are not going to go well for the outnumbered side whether or not Guderian puts on his best uniform or not -- not to mention that even for raw recruits the Russians would have at least 3 times as many even if their clothes were no doubt not up to Guderians standards.

[JasonPratt]

I certainly agree about those reservist proportions, but Guderian's situation was much worse off than that! -- he just didn't know it yet.

I'll have to save discussion of the details for later this year; but to put it over-shortly, Zhukov was done with all the retooling he planned to do for the immediate future. He received orders from the Politburo on June 21 to go take command of combat operations oversight for Southern and Southwestern Fronts (converted from Odessa and Kiev Special Military Districts), and just hadn't left Moscow yet when Molotov walked in with the declaration of war and grievances. On the far north side of the line, the Baltic Sea Surface fleet had already surged from port on June 21, on a combat mission against enemy lines of communications!

The Soviets hadn't fired a shot yet, but they were less than 72 hours away from it, maybe less than 36, when Guderian sent that first cannon shell to go knock on 22nd MechDiv HQ's window. ;)