German WW2 Tank Fetish in Wargames

[ArizonaTank]

Came across this interesting counter-point to the German WW2 tank fetish that was prevalent among 1970s-90s wargamers. Thankfully this has abated over the years, but I still see pockets of Maus worshipers from time to time.

Interested in hearing thoughts on this.

The passage below is from the book intro to "Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941–1942: Schwerpunkt"(by Robert Forczyk, Pen & Sword Books).

Popular Mythology

The Russo-German War in general, and armoured combat on the Eastern Front in particular, have remained popular subjects in English-language historiography of the Second World War for the past six decades. However, much of what Anglo-American readers know or think they know about armoured warfare on the Eastern Front has been shaped by self-serving memoirs such as Guderian's Panzer Leader or von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles, or popular wargames such as SPI's Panzerblitz (1970) and a new generation of computer wargames. A cult of German tank-worshippers has arisen and its members are now firmly entrenched in their belief that all German tanks (meaning their beloved Tiger and Panther series) were better than any Soviet tanks and that the Red Army's tank forces only prevailed because of numerical superiority. There is a grain of truth in this argument, which was fostered by German veterans seeking to perpetuate the Third Reich's propaganda-line that the victory of the Red Army's 'barbarian hordes' was due to mass, not skill. However, the quantity over quality argument ignores a variety of critical factors encompassing the opposing war-fighting doctrines, strategic miscalculations and terrain/weather that significantly influenced the outcome of armoured operations in the East. Key facts, such as the German inability to develop a reliable diesel tank engine while the Soviets had one in production before Operation Barbarossa began, are often just ignored – even though it had a significant impact on the outcome of mechanized operations on the Eastern Front. Yet material factors were not the only influences upon armoured warfare on the Eastern Front. Napoleon's dictum that, 'in war, the moral is to the material as three is to one,' proved quite apt on the Eastern Front of 1941–45, with a host of moral and non-material factors influencing the outcome of battles and campaigns.

Looking across a hexagonal grid super-imposed over a two-dimensional map sheet, cardboard counters or plastic miniatures representing German Panthers or Tigers look so much more impressive than the opposing Soviet T-34s. The German tanks' strengths – long-range firepower and armoured protection – carry great weight in these kinds of simulations, while their main weaknesses – poor mobility and poor mechanical reliability – are only minor inconveniences, if depicted at all. For example, the oft-repeated canards about the Panther's 'teething problems' at Kursk are fobbed off as a temporary issue, costing a wargamer a few movement points, without realizing that the Panther had persistent mobility issues throughout its career that prevented it from conducting the kind of wide-ranging mobile operations required by German maneuver warfare doctrine. The main strengths of the Soviet T-34 – reliable mobility over vast distances on its own tracks and suitability for mass production – are factors that lie outside most tactical-level simulations. Consequently, two generations of Anglo-American history buffs have been presented with numerous simulations that emphasize the superiority of German tanks and the cannon-fodder nature of Soviet tanks. The Cold War also played a role in shaping perceptions, with a large number of German veteran accounts that were often viewed uncritically, while there was a dearth of useful accounts from the Soviet side. When available, Soviet accounts were routinely discounted as lies or propaganda. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, fifty years after the onset of Operation Barbarossa, this ingrained Western perception began to change as previously unavailable historical material emerged from Soviet-era archives, but the balance of Eastern Front historiography in English is still heavily biased toward the German perspective. This book hopes to contribute to redressing that imbalance.

[Jarhead0331]

I think it is a very complex issue and a difficult one to balance due to the involvement of so many different factors, many of which revealed themselves in different ways over the course of the war. If I could boil down these factors into a handful of categories, they would be as follows, in no certain order:

Technology (ie. system design, weaponry, armor, communications)
Training (ie. curriculum for crew members and quality of the training/schooling program)
Logistics (ie. supply of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, replacements, etc.)
Manpower (ie. ability to replace losses caused on and off the battlefield)
Doctrine/Strategy (ie. ideology and methodology for employing formations on the battlefield)
Leadership (ie. the skill, capability and experience of those making decisions at the tactical, strategic and operational levels)

On top of these core categories, you have others that influenced the ebb and flow of the war, including weather, events on other fronts, repercussions of the Stalinist purge, capability and commitment of allies, etc. Some of these categories and factors favored one belligerent over the other, but even the scales on this shifted depending on the timeline. I think some of this is subject to debate and opinion.

I like the points above about perceptions being driven in part by self-serving post-war German narratives, but that is only a small piece of the big picture. I think anti-communist rhetoric of the west, hatred of Bolshevism/Communism in general and even prevailing racism played and continues to play a role in the myth of overwhelming German superiority and not going to lie...German gear and weapon systems just look really cool, so I think this plays a role too.

Its certainly a very interesting topic.

[Gusington]

I dare say that weather and racism are even bigger factors/influences than they are typically given credit for.

[Redwolf]

Well, the same can't be said for airplanes. Maybe German planes don't look that cool compared to US and British. I guess the Soviet creations are out except for the IL-2.

[Gusington]

I dunno I kinda like the Yak-3.

[Silent Disapproval Robot]

Well, the same can't be said for airplanes. Maybe German planes don't look that cool compared to US and British. I guess the Soviet creations are out except for the IL-2.

I dunno.  There are a lot of sweaty Stuka-weebs out there.

[ArizonaTank]

Well, the same can't be said for airplanes. Maybe German planes don't look that cool compared to US and British. I guess the Soviet creations are out except for the IL-2.

No WW2 airplane beats a P-51D for sexy IMHO Well, possible exception is the Mossie.

[Silent Disapproval Robot]

The Lancaster is best.  There is no debate.

[Phantom]

The Lancaster is best.  There is no debate.

Yeah! real heavy metal! 
On the tank issue reliability & mobility are very underrated. I think after action studies show many immobilised German tanks being abandoned - if your tank stops it doesn't take many clangs on the outside of the hull (regardless of actual chance of penetration) to persuade the crew to bail. This becomes particularly important if you lose the ground after the battle, as the Germans increasingly did in the latter stages of the war - lost ground = lost tanks, even if they'd only shed a track.

[ArizonaTank]

I think it is a very complex issue and a difficult one to balance due to the involvement of so many different factors, many of which revealed themselves in different ways over the course of the war. If I could boil down these factors into a handful of categories, they would be as follows, in no certain order:

Technology (ie. system design, weaponry, armor, communications)
Training (ie. curriculum for crew members and quality of the training/schooling program)
Logistics (ie. supply of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, replacements, etc.)
Manpower (ie. ability to replace losses caused on and off the battlefield)
Doctrine/Strategy (ie. ideology and methodology for employing formations on the battlefield)
Leadership (ie. the skill, capability and experience of those making decisions at the tactical, strategic and operational levels)

On the tank issue reliability & mobility are very underrated. I think after action studies show many immobilised German tanks being abandoned - if your tank stops it doesn't take many clangs on the outside of the hull (regardless of actual chance of penetration) to persuade the crew to bail. This becomes particularly important if you lose the ground after the battle, as the Germans increasingly did in the latter stages of the war - lost ground = lost tanks, even if they'd only shed a track.

I generally agree with the often stated argument that that the T-34 was the best tank of the war, followed by the M-4 Sherman. While the T-34 could best any German tank until the introduction of the Tiger, its real strength was mobility and ease of logistical support. The Sherman was great only because it was a "jack of all trades," and easily produced and supported. Later German tanks by contrast, were expensive and too complex. 

[Jarhead0331]

The T-34 was arguably a war winner, but I'm not so sure that is a result of superior design and capability. Russia produced nearly 55,000 of these tanks, easily the most widely produced tank of the war. This had obvious strategic consequences, which should not necessarily be confused with tactical success or capability. My understanding is that of the 55,000 T-34s produced,nearly 45,000 were lost. That is more than 80% of total production!

The T-34 suffered from several design weaknesses. I think this apparent when considering the average loss ratio of these tanks against German armored vehicles, which often times were weaker and obsolete. I believe on average, for every German tank destroyed, three T-34s were lost. Therefore, there must be design flaws that are not apparent from a cursory analysis of combat power based on armor and gun penetration alone. 

If I had to boil down the T-34's single greatest weakness, it would be its fire control efficiency. It suffered from the same two-man turret syndrome as other Soviet tanks in this period, namely that the tank's commander, gunner and platoon commander (if a platoon leader), were all the same person. Exacerbating this was the fact that the T-34/76 had relatively poor main gun optics quality, no turret basket, a very cramped and low turret (the gun could not depress more than three degrees severely restricting use on a reverse slope or at close range), poor turret drive reliability, no radios, and generally poor target observation and indicator devices (including no turret cupola and only one vision periscope for the tank's commander). In summary, the T-34's inherent fire control efficiency was so bad that even well trained and experienced tank crews were put at a severe disadvantage. For inexperienced tank crews, with no radios and probably no organized combined arms support, it was a disaster.

German tankers noted "T34s operated in a disorganized fashion with little coordination, or else tended to clump together like a hen with its chicks. Individual tank commanders lacked situational awareness due to the poor provision of vision devices and preoccupation with gunnery duties. A tank platoon would seldom be capable of engaging three separate targets, but would tend to focus on a single target selected by the platoon leader. As a result T-34 platoons lost the greater firepower of three independently operating tanks". The Germans noted the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets while the Panzers could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34.

German tanks possessed many refinements, subtleties of design and high quality components that the Soviets omitted from their designs.  Of course, this contributed to a relatively slow production rate for the Germans and the inability to provide sufficient replacement parts and components to maintain the force in the field. Comparatively, Soviet tanks generally possessed rough and ready finishes, and lacked many features which were assumed essential by German tankers and to a large extent, even by their Western Allied counterparts. I think it was these same refinements and subtleties of design, combined with training and doctrine, which gave German tank crews the edge in combat at the tactical level.

I guess the point I'm arguing is that when it comes to considering the contribution of the T-34 to winning the war, there may be a discrepancy between the strategic features of the T-34's design (ease of manufacture, simplicity of design, etc.) and the tactical features of its design (the overall combat power inherent in the individual vehicle).  To put it another way, the T-34 was certainly a 'war winning' tank but it cannot be ignored that at a tactical level, its performance during four years of continuous war was relatively poor. If there was ever a case for not basing a tank's overall combat power on over simplified parameters such as thickness and slope of frontal armor, and penetration of a single round from its main gun, then the T-34's case is it!

  

[Con]

There have been several articles that focused on moving to proven superior and reliable technology like the PZ IV variants in significant mass would have had a much more decisive impact on the war.

[ArizonaTank]

I guess the point I'm arguing is that when it comes to considering the contribution of the T-34 to winning the war, there may be a discrepancy between the strategic features of the T-34's design (ease of manufacture, simplicity of design, etc.) and the tactical features of its design (the overall combat power inherent in the individual vehicle).  To put it another way, the T-34 was certainly a 'war winning' tank but it cannot be ignored that at a tactical level, its performance during four years of continuous war was relatively poor. If there was ever a case for not basing a tank's overall combat power on over simplified parameters such as thickness and slope of frontal armor, and penetration of a single round from its main gun, then the T-34's case is it!

  

Great points! Also timeframe has an effect on the discussion. In '41, against early PzIIIs, Pak36s or Pz38ts, a well-crewed T-34/76 could be a terror for the Germans (although the Russians didn't have very many of them). By mid-'42 the Germans seemed to have figured the '76 out and the weaknesses you elaborate were exploited. Then in mid-late '44 the T-34/85 showed up in numbers and fixed at least one of the issues; a three-person turret. Of course the armor protection was barely adequate by that time.

[Jarhead0331]

I guess the point I'm arguing is that when it comes to considering the contribution of the T-34 to winning the war, there may be a discrepancy between the strategic features of the T-34's design (ease of manufacture, simplicity of design, etc.) and the tactical features of its design (the overall combat power inherent in the individual vehicle).  To put it another way, the T-34 was certainly a 'war winning' tank but it cannot be ignored that at a tactical level, its performance during four years of continuous war was relatively poor. If there was ever a case for not basing a tank's overall combat power on over simplified parameters such as thickness and slope of frontal armor, and penetration of a single round from its main gun, then the T-34's case is it!

  

Great points! Also timeframe has an effect on the discussion. In '41, against early PzIIIs, Pak36s or Pz38ts, a well-crewed T-34/76 could be a terror for the Germans (although the Russians didn't have very many of them). By mid-'42 the Germans seemed to have figured the '76 out and the weaknesses you elaborate were exploited. Then in mid-late '44 the T-34/85 showed up in numbers and fixed at least one of the issues; a three-person turret. Of course the armor protection was barely adequate by that time.

You might be surprised to learn that the data actually seems to support the opposite. That is, the performance of the T-34 early on in the war (1941) was actually worse than it was in subsequent years.  Specifically, the combat results for 1941 show the Soviets lost an average of over seven tanks for every German tank lost.  Of the total of 20,500 Soviet tanks lost in 1941, approximately 2,300 were T-34s. Even if the T-34's loss ratio was better than seven for every German tank, it was still most likely in the region of four or five to one. Frankly, if 2,300 of any new Wehrmacht tank type had been lost within six months of its first deployment, even with a loss ratio of one to one (let alone 0.2-0.3 to one), then most WWII historians would have described the tank's combat record as an unmitigated disaster.

Informed commentaries relating to the T-34's combat performance in 1941 consider factors such as: the T-34 tank crews had little time to train, they had major ammunition supply problems, and the support infrastructures were not in place to recover damaged machines. There is no doubt that a large proportion of T-34s in 1941 fell victim to operational type losses. Additionally, a large proportion of T-34s had little or no armor piercing ammunition in June 1941, although they did in the months that followed. Many T-34s were abandoned and lost due to breakdown, being bogged down or simply out of fuel. The Red Army's tank divisions, already short of tractors, had little to no recovery vehicles or even time to recover these tanks. However, even if we assume a staggering 40-50% of T-34s were operational losses (which is probably a generous estimate), then the T-34's loss ratio in tactical combat is still around two-three to one in the German favor.

I think 1942 is most instructive because it is the year in which the Germans and Soviets were most evenly matched in the operational sense. In this year the most common Soviet main battle tank was the T-34/76. The most common German main battle tanks were Pz IIIs with long and short 50mm guns and Pz IVs, most still with short 75mm L/24 guns. The Pz IV and StuG assault guns with long 75mm L/43 or L/48 guns had only began appearing on the East Front in limited numbers. This gun was capable of destroying a T-34 frontally at around 1,000 meters. However, only 870 Pz IVs and 699 StuG IIIs with the long 75mm gun were manufactured in the whole of 1942, and many of these didn't reach the East Front until 1943. Therefore, for most of 1942 the majority of German tanks were still the older and apparently obsolete types. In addition many experts rate the Pz IV with the long 75mm gun as only equivalent to the T-34/76 in terms of firepower, but still much weaker in terms of armor and mobility.

So, what do the numbers reveal? The Soviets still managed to loose over 15,000 fully tracked AFVs in 1942 including nearly 7,000 T-34s. This meant their loss ratio was almost as bad as 1941. To a large extent it was worse than 1941 because in in '42 almost a full half the tanks destroyed were T-34s, and the large majority of losses were due to direct enemy fire and cannot therefore be attributed to operational losses. There is no doubt that on average German tank crews in 1942 were probably still the best trained and most experienced in the world. However, this does not explain how apparently obsolete and inferior German AFVs achieved a kill ratio of better than three to one against T-34s in direct combat. The T-34 must be the only tank in history rated as the best in the world in the same year it lost three or four for every enemy AFV destroyed.

A Soviet wartime study looked at the principal cause of the destruction of each T-34 from June 1941 to September 1942. Nearly 55% were destroyed by the 50mm long gun! Only 3.4% of kills were from 88s and only 10% were from 75s. Fascinating, isn't it?  Approximately three quarters of T-34s were destroyed by standard issue 1941-42 German tanks and AT guns (excluding 75mm guns). These weapons (20-50mm) would have needed to get perilously close to a T-34 frontally, or hit it in its more vulnerable side or rear armor. The conclusion has to be that the large majority of T-34s were destroyed because their crews could not pre-empt these weapons from getting into a killing position (usually because no crew member was in a position to see the enemy early), and were slow to acquire the enemy target once it became known. This is consistent with my post above noting the very poor Fire Control Efficiency in the T-34/76.

I find this stuff really interesting obviously. The eastern front section of my personal library is every large and distinguished. 

If anybody sis interested in sources for some of this stuff...

T. Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin's Armoured Might, Ian Allan Publishing, London, 2002, appendix, p170. Also, S. J. Zaloga, L.S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1998, p. 181, table 6.3.

G.F. Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill Books, London, 1997. p. 252, table 95.

S. Zaloga , P. Sarson, T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-1945, Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd, London, 1994, p. 40.

[ArizonaTank]

I find this stuff really interesting obviously. The eastern front section of my personal library is every large and distinguished. 

If anybody sis interested in sources for some of this stuff...

T. Bean, W. Fowler, Russian Tanks of WWII-Stalin's Armoured Might, Ian Allan Publishing, London, 2002, appendix, p170. Also, S. J. Zaloga, L.S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1998, p. 181, table 6.3.

G.F. Krivosheev , et al, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, Greenhill Books, London, 1997. p. 252, table 95.

S. Zaloga , P. Sarson, T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941-1945, Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd, London, 1994, p. 40.

Great stuff! and yes, your library is impressive!!