Russia's War Against Ukraine

[ArizonaTank]

Surely this is Russian propaganda.. ;)

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10839637/Father-DUMPS-partner-falling-22-year-old-Ukrainian-refugee-came-live-them.html

[al_infierno]

Just 10 days after meeting Sofiia (pictured) Tony left his partner of 10 years and is planning to spend the rest of his life with her

Jeez, I don't blame him.  Look at her!     Awooga bazinga shabooya etc etc

[Skoop]

It's okay, Jason, at least you weren't talking about a phalanx of massed Gatling guns!

I think a detailed breakdown of the Russian failures in SEAD/DEAD will have to wait at least a year or two after the end of the conflict to be finalized, but if I had to guess, in no particular order, here's my guess as to what happened:

• The initial Russian attacks, while disruptive, probably didn't have quite as detailed or accurate targeting info as is needed to really achieve the desired missions.
• I suspect that the Russian Air Force had little training, and no combat experience, in suppressing even vaguely modern air defense systems from missions flown in Syria, Chechnia, or the Donbas in 2015 (2014?).
• My understanding is that, for SEAD to work, you really have to have suppression craft loitering over the combat zone for much of the time, making sure that as soon as somebody lights up their radar, you're on them.  I don't know that the Russian Air Force ever had the patience or the capability to do that, but they certainly didn't have the will.  The Russian Air Force never really trained for Close Air Support missions, so even if they'd been able to accomplish the SEAD, I'm not sure it would have helped near the front in any event
• I think the NATO allies flooded the country with Stingers in the early weeks of the war, making it perilous for Russian pilots to come down to the deck and do the kind of knife-fighting you really need to accomplish SEAD.  The more sophisticated Russian SAMs seemed to work pretty well in the opening stages of the war, and it's probably also been easier for NATO to train a couple hundred Ukrainian air defense soldiers how to use and support Patriots than it would be to train an entire Ukrainian Armored Division how to use Leopards.
• Given that air drops these days are accomplished by helicopter insertion rather than glider attacks (LOL), the abundance of Russian-made SAMs in the Ukrainian Army on day one made the seizure and reinforcement of air bases dearly expensive (the Russian airborne assault on the Kyiv airport in the first 48 hours of the war was an expensive failure for the Red Army).  That problem only grew worse as more and more Stingers made it to the front.

The Ukrainian Air Force has had more symbolic value to the Ukrainians than military significance, I think.  It's another huge middle finger to the Russians, as portrayed on Ukrainian social media.

The real question that I don't see anybody answering today is whether the Russian Air Force is having any luck disrupting Ukrainian supply flows to the fronts in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.  I'd have to assume that, between plane attacks and missile attacks, they've bombed the crap out of railroad lines leading East in Ukraine.  So most supplies are flowing from Poland to Kyiv, and then eastward, via trucks. 

I assume that the Battle in the East of Ukraine a bit resembles the Allied breakout from the Normandy beach head in 1944.  Both sides are racing to get more units and logistics to the front, and we'll see if the Ukrainians can get enough stuff there in time to drive the Russians back anywhere.  The Russians haven't been able to do much with their aerial superiority due to the robust Ukrainian ground-based air defenses, but they've still got to be able to restrict the flow of Russian supplies as long as they're willing to let combat aircraft loiter over the battlefield.

I think similar reason we haven't seen the T14 armata. Horrible logistics, I've seen reports that Russians have almost no spare parts to service their aircraft and simply can't keep enough combat ready to have the needed effect.  Plus all the other points you guys mentioned.  Like napoleon said, brave men win battles, but logistics wins wars.

The Russians are vindicating why we spend so much on a professional military in the US.  More money, more training, and the best equipment will always get results. 

[GDS_Starfury]

theyve only been able to afford to build less then 20 of them.  L:-)

[JasonPratt]

It's okay, Jason, at least you weren't talking about a phalanx of massed Gatling guns!

Well, no, obviously those would be Navy defenses against any paratroop assault on a carrier!

With or without gliders!

:D :arr:

Now part of my brain is perversely curious, though, about whether gliders might make a comeback in airborne assault. After all, they're relatively cheap; they're probably stealthy to electronic sensors; and sure, they're vulnerable to defensive fire, but that was always true, which is why you suppress or remove air defenses and get air supremacy (at least temporarily) before the airmobile troops arrive.

[JasonPratt]

I assume that the Battle in the East of Ukraine a bit resembles the Allied breakout from the Normandy beach head in 1944.

Or the Bulge. ;)

The loitering capability, or lack thereof, leads me to ask what the current Russian AWACs functionality is like. My distant impression is that it doesn't even exist, though surely I have to be wrong about that...? But if Russian pilots were going to hang around a modern battlespace, to dominate anti-air assets (whether on the ground or in the air), they'd need that functionality. Maybe even to do proper CAS; especially if the (apparent?) alternative is to listen for cell phone calls from BTG commanders asking for firepower dropped onto nearby Uks. ("Zey are in that apartment complex, comrade! Just hit it with some FFARs, and ve vill be wictory!" cellphone footage of warcrimes intensifies)

[ArizonaTank]

With or without gliders!

:D :arr:

Now part of my brain is perversely curious, though, about whether gliders might make a comeback in airborne assault. After all, they're relatively cheap; they're probably stealthy to electronic sensors; and sure, they're vulnerable to defensive fire, but that was always true, which is why you suppress or remove air defenses and get air supremacy (at least temporarily) before the airmobile troops arrive.

I think the short answer is that technology killed the glider. The glider itself may be relatively stealthy, but not the beast of burden that has to tow it. They are also slow. There is also the issue of landing locations...you can't just land them anywhere. The assault helicopter is much more flexible for landing zones, faster, can also be stealthy flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE) and can also be armed. 

Still, I did find the study below, conducted in the early 90s, arguing that there was still a place for gliders...based on cost effectiveness of all things.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA240087.pdf

[Tripoli]

With or without gliders!

:D :arr:

Now part of my brain is perversely curious, though, about whether gliders might make a comeback in airborne assault. After all, they're relatively cheap; they're probably stealthy to electronic sensors; and sure, they're vulnerable to defensive fire, but that was always true, which is why you suppress or remove air defenses and get air supremacy (at least temporarily) before the airmobile troops arrive.

IMHO, One of the reasons for gliders during WWII was that it made 2 things possible: 1) landing heavier pieces of equipment (such as jeeps, light AT guns, etc) and 20 avoided some of the scattering of units.  However, improved cargo aircraft and helicopters, as well  and parachute technology largely eliminated both of these factors, making the glider obsolete.

I think the short answer is that technology killed the glider. The glider itself may be relatively stealthy, but not the beast of burden that has to tow it. They are also slow. There is also the issue of landing locations...you can't just land them anywhere. The assault helicopter is much more flexible for landing zones, faster, can also be stealthy flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE) and can also be armed. 

Still, I did find the study below, conducted in the early 90s, arguing that there was still a place for gliders...based on cost effectiveness of all things.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA240087.pdf

[GDS_Starfury]

The loitering capability, or lack thereof, leads me to ask what the current Russian AWACs functionality is like. My distant impression is that it doesn't even exist, though surely I have to be wrong about that...? But if Russian pilots were going to hang around a modern battlespace, to dominate anti-air assets (whether on the ground or in the air), they'd need that functionality. Maybe even to do proper CAS; especially if the (apparent?) alternative is to listen for cell phone calls from BTG commanders asking for firepower dropped onto nearby Uks. ("Zey are in that apartment complex, comrade! Just hit it with some FFARs, and ve vill be wictory!" cellphone footage of warcrimes intensifies)

they have their awacs up but are only generating between 200 and 250 sorties a day while mostly staying inside their airspace.
the russians are also generating that number in the last few weeks.  IIRC the first night of the 2nd Gulf War the allies put up over 1700.

[GDS_Starfury]

its been a minute but heres the newest map update:



https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892442791256064/photo/1

[GDS_Starfury]

its been a minute but heres the newest map update:



https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892442791256064/photo/1

[W8taminute]

Looks like they're concentrating around Donbass and Luhansk areas.  Guess they've given up on taking Kiev?

[GDS_Starfury]

the takeway for the last week is that a small sized operational maneuver group that seems to be very well supplied and equipped is whats getting the job done for the soviets right now.

this is the topography around Popasna:

[GDS_Starfury]

Looks like they're concentrating around Donbass and Luhansk areas.  Guess they've given up on taking Kiev?

so it seems.  taking most of whats east of the Donets seems to be the plan for a cheap soviet victory.
what I find grimly humorous it that in Iraq and Afghanistan I needed maps to know what was where outside the major cities and towns.
not here, with a library of east front books and maps this is well tread territory.

[GDS_Starfury]

another brace of maps: