160 Years ago Today: Stonewall's 2nd fiasco starts

Started by MengJiao, January 01, 2022, 10:33:51 AM

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MengJiao


  I'm reading Peter Cozzen's monster opus on things in the Shenandoah in 1862.  It starts with the surreal nightmares of Jackson's earliest independent efforts.  for example:

A setback more chilling than the weather froze Jackson to Unger's Store for the next five days. As he shepherded his scattered command toward the crossroads hamlet on the night of January 7, Jackson learned from a dispatch rider that two thousand Federals from Romney had overwhelmed the seven hundred militia and cavalry stationed at Blue's Gap, the only Confederate outpost on the Northwestern Turnpike (Romney Pike). In taking the gap, the Yankees had marched fifteen miles in six hours under the same conditions that had slowed Jackson's march column to a crawl; there was no reason to doubt they could cover with similar speed the twenty-three miles that now separated them from Winchester—especially as not a single Southern soldier stood in their path.14

Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862 (Civil War America) (p. 85). The University of North Carolina Press. Kindle Edition.

Anyway, Jackson did set off on this nightmare on Jan 1, 1862 from Winchester.  Things did not go well for Jackson early on.

ArizonaTank

I really like the author, but haven't read this book.

Even though 1862 may start off slow for Jackson, he makes up for it by spring. Pretty much put Union general Nathanial Banks in a deep, dark place.

I once had the opportunity to do a deep dive into the Spring of '62 campaign. Had access to a copy of the "Official Records" (it's online now, but having access to a physical copy at the time was a big deal). Reading Banks' telegrams, I could feel the rising level of panic that Jackson put into him. Banks was poster child for why picking "political generals" did not work. Banks had been Governor of Massachusetts and Speaker of the US House before the war; not good prep for meeting a professional soldier like Jackson.

As a side study, I do recommend perusing the Official Records regarding operations in Shenandoah...at first, the organization of the OR makes it a little difficult to find what you are looking for...but after a while it does kind of make sense.   

Here is the link to the Official Records:
http://collections.library.cornell.edu/moa_new/waro.html
Johannes "Honus" Wagner
"The Flying Dutchman"
Shortstop: Pittsburgh Pirates 1900-1917
Rated as the 2nd most valuable player of all time by Bill James.

Tripoli

Quote from: ArizonaTank on January 01, 2022, 02:46:53 PM
.....at first, the organization of the OR makes it a little difficult to find what you are looking for...but after a while it does kind of make sense.   

That is the understatement of 2022 (in the Civil War Geek Category)  :)    I have the OR on a searchable disk, which makes it a little bit easier to  navigate.  But it is still difficult to find your way around.
"Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?" -Abraham Lincoln

MengJiao

Quote from: ArizonaTank on January 01, 2022, 02:46:53 PM
I really like the author, but haven't read this book.

Even though 1862 may start off slow for Jackson, he makes up for it by spring. Pretty much put Union general Nathanial Banks in a deep, dark place.

I once had the opportunity to do a deep dive into the Spring of '62 campaign. Had access to a copy of the "Official Records" (it's online now, but having access to a physical copy at the time was a big deal). Reading Banks' telegrams, I could feel the rising level of panic that Jackson put into him. Banks was poster child for why picking "political generals" did not work. Banks had been Governor of Massachusetts and Speaker of the US House before the war; not good prep for meeting a professional soldier like Jackson.

As a side study, I do recommend perusing the Official Records regarding operations in Shenandoah...at first, the organization of the OR makes it a little difficult to find what you are looking for...but after a while it does kind of make sense.   

Here is the link to the Official Records:
http://collections.library.cornell.edu/moa_new/waro.html

  In the Cozzen's book, spring kicks off with the first battle of Kernstown.  Banks was away and Shields was wounded so Federal command devolved onto Kimball who did a crude but effective job of completely trashing Stonewall Jackson.  Kimball had twice as many men and cavalry that was at least well-armed.  Supposedly some of Turner Ashby's troopers rode barebacked and carried clubs and apparently a lack of sabers was a problem for the cavalry of the south for the whole war.
Kernstown was a crushing defeat for Jackson tactically, but it is usually credited with triggering the weird command structure set up where three "Departments" (Banks, Fremont and McDowell) were supposed to protect Washington and chase Jackson.  Actually, the real problem seems to have been McClellan as usual and the "Departments" were Lincoln's way of detaching troops from McClellan as Lincoln took over supreme command de facto, at least in Cozzen's view.
  In any case, the stage was set and Jackson (on interior lines with good communications and in a aggressive frame of mind) was about to face Federal forces moving into the Shenandoah from three sides.

MengJiao

Quote from: MengJiao on January 02, 2022, 08:06:25 AM



  In the Cozzen's book, spring kicks off with the first battle of Kernstown.  Banks was away and Shields was wounded so Federal command devolved onto Kimball who did a crude but effective job of completely trashing Stonewall Jackson.  Kimball had twice as many men and cavalry that was at least well-armed.  Supposedly some of Turner Ashby's troopers rode barebacked and carried clubs and apparently a lack of sabers was a problem for the cavalry of the south for the whole war.
Kernstown was a crushing defeat for Jackson tactically, but it is usually credited with triggering the weird command structure set up where three "Departments" (Banks, Fremont and McDowell) were supposed to protect Washington and chase Jackson.  Actually, the real problem seems to have been McClellan as usual and the "Departments" were Lincoln's way of detaching troops from McClellan as Lincoln took over supreme command de facto, at least in Cozzen's view.
  In any case, the stage was set and Jackson (on interior lines with good communications and in a aggressive frame of mind) was about to face Federal forces moving into the Shenandoah from three sides.

 


  But I guess not quite.  In the valley so far Jackson has sort of lost every battle tactically while strategically (since otherwise there are only southern defeats) doing well.  The battle at McDowell on May 8 was definitely a tactical victory for the outnumbered Federals:

  A number of factors accounted for the low Federal losses. First was the superior range of the Enfield rifled muskets, which most of the Ohioans carried. Second, the Southerners, in firing downhill, tended to overshoot. They also fired fast, as they were exposed from the waist up when they delivered their shots. Crouched among boulders and brush and aiming upward, the Yankees presented smaller targets. (Said Lt. McHenry Howard: "Uphill shooting is more accurate than down, which is apt to overshoot the mark, as every sportsman knows.") Third, the Confederates fired into the setting sun, while the Federals aimed into a clear, deep-blue horizon. Finally, Jackson was unable to employ his artillery. It "was not brought up," he explained in his report, "there being no road to the rear by which our guns could be withdrawn in event of disaster, and the prospect of successfully using them did not compensate for the risk."34 That Jackson imagined any risk of defeat at the hands of a vastly weaker foe (and Jackson could easily see all the Union forces on the field and across the Bull Pasture River) speaks well of Schenck and Milroy's tactics. They had accomplished their stated purpose of delaying an enemy attack and had inflicted heavy casualties in the bargain. By any reasonable calculation, McDowell was a tactical Union victory. But in a larger sense, the fruits of victory rested with the Confederates. Jackson was not prevaricating when he told Richmond the next morning, "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday." The battle was of no strategic consequence to the Federals. But for the Southern people, who had come to know only defeat after defeat, Jackson's perceived tenacity at McDowell, and his subsequent pursuit of Schenck and Milroy, was a tonic they imbibed eagerly.

Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862 (Civil War America) (pp. 273-274). The University of North Carolina Press. Kindle Edition.

Jarhead0331

#5
I'm not quite sure if the author is trying to be critical of Jackson. That seems to be the case. I'm also not sure why Kernstown is described as a "crushing" defeat. It was certainly a tactical loss, but it was pretty much the only one suffered by Jackson in his entire career and it certainly wasn't "crushing" enough to have any negative impact on the campaign. I'm hard pressed to imagine any serious historian that would describe Jackson's maneuvers in the Valley as anything other than audacious and brilliant.

There is plenty of criticism to go around for Jackson, who was very flawed in several different ways, but as far as his acumen as a battlefield tactician, he is fairly beyond reproach. Am I missing something?
Grogheads Uber Alles
Semper Grog
"No beast is more alpha than JH." Gusington, 10/23/18


twitter3

In the Valley, Jackson can be described as audacious and brilliant. I completely agree with that. His timidness during the Seven Days battles is hard to explain given he had just displayed his audacity. I (not being a professional historian) believe he may not have enjoyed not having independent command during that campaign.

Kernstown should not be labeled a "crushing defeat" for him personally as he wanted to attack at 2:1 odds. His orders to hold were not followed (right or wrong) by one of his commanders - and only then when that portion of his army had run dangerously low on ammunition.

MengJiao

Quote from: Jarhead0331 on January 02, 2022, 06:15:46 PM
I'm not quite sure if the author is trying to be critical of Jackson. That seems to be the case. I'm also not sure why Kernstown is described as a "crushing" defeat. It was certainly a tactical loss, but it was pretty much the only one suffered by Jackson in his entire career and it certainly wasn't "crushing" enough to have any negative impact on the campaign. I'm hard pressed to imagine any serious historian that would describe Jackson's maneuvers in the Valley as anything other than audacious and brilliant.

There is plenty of criticism to go around for Jackson, who was very flawed in several different ways, but as far as his acumen as a battlefield tactician, he is fairly beyond reproach. Am I missing something?

  Kernstown is very odd.  Jackson thought the Federals were much weaker and withdrawing, possibly the Confederate spy system was somehow miss informed.  In the ensuing fighting Jackson's army was close to being wiped out and it was essentially out of action until reinforced by Ewell.

MengJiao

Quote from: twitter3 on January 02, 2022, 08:15:33 PM
In the Valley, Jackson can be described as audacious and brilliant. I completely agree with that. His timidness during the Seven Days battles is hard to explain given he had just displayed his audacity. I (not being a professional historian) believe he may not have enjoyed not having independent command during that campaign.

Kernstown should not be labeled a "crushing defeat" for him personally as he wanted to attack at 2:1 odds. His orders to hold were not followed (right or wrong) by one of his commanders - and only then when that portion of his army had run dangerously low on ammunition.

  Apparently he was unaware that he was outnumbered 2:1 and Gretton's withdrawal probably saved Jackson's army.  I'm sure he was audacious and reasonably shrewd, but his early days in the valley seem to have been a very mixed bag.

Jarhead0331

#9
Quote from: MengJiao on January 02, 2022, 08:40:43 PM
Quote from: twitter3 on January 02, 2022, 08:15:33 PM
In the Valley, Jackson can be described as audacious and brilliant. I completely agree with that. His timidness during the Seven Days battles is hard to explain given he had just displayed his audacity. I (not being a professional historian) believe he may not have enjoyed not having independent command during that campaign.

Kernstown should not be labeled a "crushing defeat" for him personally as he wanted to attack at 2:1 odds. His orders to hold were not followed (right or wrong) by one of his commanders - and only then when that portion of his army had run dangerously low on ammunition.

  Apparently he was unaware that he was outnumbered 2:1 and Gretton's withdrawal probably saved Jackson's army.  I'm sure he was audacious and reasonably shrewd, but his early days in the valley seem to have been a very mixed bag.

Not true at all.

1.  Jackson was ordered by General Johnston to prevent Union forces in the Valley from moving east to reinforce General George B. McClellan's offensive against Richmond. However, to accomplish this task, Jackson had barely 4,000 under his command. That is 4,000 men against the 20,000 of General Nathaniel Banks. He had no choice but to withdraw South until reinforcements could arrive.

2. Colonel Turner Ashby, commander of the 7th Virginia Cavalry reported to Jackson that most of Banks' force was leaving the Valley and that only a small number of Federal troops remained in Winchester. Jackson, taking initiative to strike back and potentially accomplish what General Johnston had ordered immediately moved his division back north after having withdrawn to the south. However, Ashby's information was wrong and Winchester was still occupied by General James Shields's division of nearly 8,000 men.  This was incorrect intelligence. How can Jackson be seriously blamed for this?

There is nothing in the Valley campaign about Jackson's actions that can be considered a "mixed bag". I seriously have never read any credible claim to the contrary. Indeed, all sources that i have reviewed describe his performance in the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign as nothing but "remarkable".
Grogheads Uber Alles
Semper Grog
"No beast is more alpha than JH." Gusington, 10/23/18


MengJiao

#10
Quote from: Jarhead0331 on January 02, 2022, 09:39:12 PM
Quote from: MengJiao on January 02, 2022, 08:40:43 PM
Quote from: twitter3 on January 02, 2022, 08:15:33 PM
In the Valley, Jackson can be described as audacious and brilliant. I completely agree with that. His timidness during the Seven Days battles is hard to explain given he had just displayed his audacity. I (not being a professional historian) believe he may not have enjoyed not having independent command during that campaign.

Kernstown should not be labeled a "crushing defeat" for him personally as he wanted to attack at 2:1 odds. His orders to hold were not followed (right or wrong) by one of his commanders - and only then when that portion of his army had run dangerously low on ammunition.

  Apparently he was unaware that he was outnumbered 2:1 and Gretton's withdrawal probably saved Jackson's army.  I'm sure he was audacious and reasonably shrewd, but his early days in the valley seem to have been a very mixed bag.

Not true at all.

1.  Jackson was ordered by General Johnston to prevent Union forces in the Valley from moving east to reinforce General George B. McClellan's offensive against Richmond. However, to accomplish this task, Jackson had barely 4,000 under his command. That is 4,000 men against the 20,000 of General Nathaniel Banks. He had no choice but to withdraw South until reinforcements could arrive.

2. Colonel Turner Ashby, commander of the 7th Virginia Cavalry reported to Jackson that most of Banks' force was leaving the Valley and that only a small number of Federal troops remained in Winchester. Jackson, taking initiative to strike back and potentially accomplish what General Johnston had ordered immediately moved his division back north after having withdrawn to the south. However, Ashby's information was wrong and Winchester was still occupied by General James Shields's division of nearly 8,000 men.  This was incorrect intelligence. How can Jackson be seriously blamed for this?

There is nothing in the Valley campaign about Jackson's actions that can be considered a "mixed bag". I seriously have never read any credible claim to the contrary. Indeed, all sources that i have reviewed describe his performance in the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign as nothing but "remarkable".

  After Ewell arrived and Jackson took over some local commands, yes, he did get rolling, but things did not go well up until then.  The battles of very early 1862 did not go as well as the later battles.  Cozzen describes how Jackson pulled all that together and it wasn't easy and it took a lot more effort and insight on Jackson's part than simple audacity.  So the events were a mixed bag, but Jackson gradually got control of things and things began to go his way more often than not.  Of course, as Cozzen points out repeatedly, even the tactical defeats tended to work in Jackson's favor since on all other fronts the Confederacy was going down hill fast in early 1862.

Jarhead0331

Quote from: MengJiao on January 03, 2022, 07:33:45 AM
Quote from: Jarhead0331 on January 02, 2022, 09:39:12 PM
Quote from: MengJiao on January 02, 2022, 08:40:43 PM
Quote from: twitter3 on January 02, 2022, 08:15:33 PM
In the Valley, Jackson can be described as audacious and brilliant. I completely agree with that. His timidness during the Seven Days battles is hard to explain given he had just displayed his audacity. I (not being a professional historian) believe he may not have enjoyed not having independent command during that campaign.

Kernstown should not be labeled a "crushing defeat" for him personally as he wanted to attack at 2:1 odds. His orders to hold were not followed (right or wrong) by one of his commanders - and only then when that portion of his army had run dangerously low on ammunition.

  Apparently he was unaware that he was outnumbered 2:1 and Gretton's withdrawal probably saved Jackson's army.  I'm sure he was audacious and reasonably shrewd, but his early days in the valley seem to have been a very mixed bag.

Not true at all.

1.  Jackson was ordered by General Johnston to prevent Union forces in the Valley from moving east to reinforce General George B. McClellan's offensive against Richmond. However, to accomplish this task, Jackson had barely 4,000 under his command. That is 4,000 men against the 20,000 of General Nathaniel Banks. He had no choice but to withdraw South until reinforcements could arrive.

2. Colonel Turner Ashby, commander of the 7th Virginia Cavalry reported to Jackson that most of Banks' force was leaving the Valley and that only a small number of Federal troops remained in Winchester. Jackson, taking initiative to strike back and potentially accomplish what General Johnston had ordered immediately moved his division back north after having withdrawn to the south. However, Ashby's information was wrong and Winchester was still occupied by General James Shields's division of nearly 8,000 men.  This was incorrect intelligence. How can Jackson be seriously blamed for this?

There is nothing in the Valley campaign about Jackson's actions that can be considered a "mixed bag". I seriously have never read any credible claim to the contrary. Indeed, all sources that i have reviewed describe his performance in the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign as nothing but "remarkable".

  After Ewell arrived and Jackson took over some local commands, yes, he did get rolling, but things did not go well up until then.  The battles of very early 1862 did not go as well as the later battles.  Cozzen describes how Jackson pulled all that together and it wasn't easy and it took a lot more effort and insight on Jackson's part than simple audacity.  So the events were a mixed bag, but Jackson gradually got control of things and things began to go his way more often than not.  Of course, as Cozzen points out repeatedly, even the tactical defeats tended to work in Jackson's favor since on all other fronts the Confederacy was going down hill fast in early 1862.

I agree that "the events" early on in the campaign can be described generally as a "mixed bag" for the Confederacy. However, this is a much different assertion than what was suggested earlier on in this thread, which was that Jackson's leadership and performance was mixed. It is this claim that I believe is without any recorded historical support, and which is totally contradicted by the record.

Thanks for the thread and interesting discussions. Brings back memories of my college days when I was obsessed with all things Civil War!
Grogheads Uber Alles
Semper Grog
"No beast is more alpha than JH." Gusington, 10/23/18


Tripoli

Question: This topic might be worth an AAR.  If anyone would like to play Kernstown using Tiller's "Campaign Shenandoah" system, we could post the moves for critique and analysis by the community, using the discussion thus far as a jumping off point.  I would be happy to play either side.
"Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?" -Abraham Lincoln

Jarhead0331

Quote from: Tripoli on January 03, 2022, 09:40:37 AM
Question: This topic might be worth an AAR.  If anyone would like to play Kernstown using Tiller's "Campaign Shenandoah" system, we could post the moves for critique and analysis by the community, using the discussion thus far as a jumping off point.  I would be happy to play either side.

Great idea. Wish I had that title. It might be the one obvious battle where I'd prefer to fight from the Federal side.   :DD
Grogheads Uber Alles
Semper Grog
"No beast is more alpha than JH." Gusington, 10/23/18


ArizonaTank

Quote from: Tripoli on January 03, 2022, 09:40:37 AM
Question: This topic might be worth an AAR.  If anyone would like to play Kernstown using Tiller's "Campaign Shenandoah" system, we could post the moves for critique and analysis by the community, using the discussion thus far as a jumping off point.  I would be happy to play either side.

I'm up for it if you are still looking for a sparing partner. I have the WDS 4.00 version installed. Since you have no preference, I can take Jackson.
Johannes "Honus" Wagner
"The Flying Dutchman"
Shortstop: Pittsburgh Pirates 1900-1917
Rated as the 2nd most valuable player of all time by Bill James.