Russia's War Against Ukraine

[Crossroads]

I recall seeing a headline last week above a week-summary posted by a major paper or mag (Newsweek or something), which said the Russians are giving up organizing their troops into BTGs -- but scrolling down through the summary didn't provide any information about the headline. Anyone else see something like that? (Was it posted upthread and I've just forgotten?)

UK Ministry of Defence posted about this a week ago: https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1597482502200983552

ISW, citing the above, reported on this here: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 29 that Russian forces have likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three months.[4] The UK MoD stated that the BTGs' relatively low allocation of infantry, decentralized distribution of artillery, and the limited independence of BTG decision-making hindered their success in Ukraine.[5] ISW assessed starting in April that Russian BTGs were degraded in various failed or culminated Russian offensives, including the attacks on Kyiv, Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, and later efforts to reconstitute these BTGs to restore their combat power have failed.[6] Russian forces have likely since thrown their remaining combat power and new personnel, including mobilized personnel, into poorly trained, equipped, and organized ad hoc structures with low morale and discipline.[7] The structure of BTGs and the way the Russian military formed them by breaking up doctrinal battalions, regiments, and brigades likely deprived the Russians of the ability to revert to doctrinal organizations, as ISW has previously assessed, so that the Russians must now rely on ad-hoc structures with mobilized personnel.[8]

I recall seeing additional comments such as the low number of foot soldiers at 200 or so is too small to both secure their flanks while performing the attacking mission.

Another interesting tidbit somewhere was a comment that while BTG is sort of a mini brigade with brigade level supporting units, artillery etc, the BTG HQ is still a battalion level organization with only 5-6 officers, and they can't handle everything 7*24 themselves.

[Crossroads]

am I incorrect in thinking that the smallest force structure the US uses in the brigade?
IIRC thats what weve been rolling around Europe for a while now.

Afaik most everyone uses brigade as the basic independent manoeuvre unit. To add to my previous post, this article did the rounds a few years back as lessons learnt of the first years of war in  Donbass, comparing a US ABCT to a (single) Russian BGT.

https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/spring/2Fiore17.pdf

While one would assume a brigade gets the upper hand against an enforced battalion, it is yet an interesting study of a single motorised BTG pros and cons. For instance:

Idea in brief

The BTG strategic imperative is to control1 terrain to shape post-conflict negotiations. When possible, the BTG commander will employ his strike assets to cause casualties to pressure his opponent to negotiate a settlement, but he must also preserve his own strength because it cannot be regenerated operationally and casualties are strategically expensive. To preserve combat power, BTGs employ a force of local paramilitary units as proxy forces to secure2 terrain and guard3 the BTG from direct and indirect attack.

Although Russian tactical defeats were uncommon and typically ended in an operational stalemate rather than decisive defeat, Ukrainian regular-army successes exist in sufficient number to suggest that Russian BTGs present tactical vulnerabilities that can be exploited by BCT commanders:

• Shortages in ready maneuver forces, especially infantry, significantly limit Russian maneuver capabilities. BTGs cannot simultaneously mass for offensive operations and maintain flank and rear security, and they struggle to concentrate artillery against attacks on multiple simultaneous axes.
• Command-and-control (C2) limitations require the BTG commander to concentrate mission-command and intelligence assets to direct-fires and EW shaping efforts and strikes. These assets are employed selectively to substitute for offensive maneuvers, are not available across the entire BTG's battlespace and can be overloaded by aggressive dispersion and displacement tactics.
• BTGs cannot quickly regenerate combat power without cannibalizing other units in theater or garrison. Once teams and units are degraded by casualties, they will rapidly lose effectiveness until completely reconstituted. In the face of a credible threat, maneuver and support assets will likely be withdrawn and conserved for future use.

[JasonPratt]

I've generally understood that, in modern armed-force terms, a "division" is the smallest command force that includes all the components normally assigned to an army, which is why brigades are the usual force projection or defense organization (though still with a general command rank). Putting it another way, a "division" is the smallest "army" (roughly speaking) and a "brigade" is the largest non-army force: e.g., a brigade may not have integral air power groups, but a division will.

This goes back at least as far as the combined-arms forces of WW2, but the Germans didn't use brigades per se, although I don't recall whether they had battalions made of regiments or regiments made of battalions (the two containers being often interchangeable in armies up to that time), or even whether they left out one of them, (i.e. only battalions or only regiments). But of course, they eventually (not sure when) started using the famous ad hoc Kampfgruppe force organizations, which.... kinnnnnd of served the same purpose as a brigade, but less permanently.

Russian BTGs could be considered the successor to the Kampfgruppes, but with more of a standardized focus on blitz tactics whereas the KGs could be set up for any mission according to the needs of the moment. Which cost organizational cohesion, something that haunted the Wehrmacht/Heer/SS forces throughout the war, as Eisenhower judged in his Crusade in Europe memoir: in his estimation, the paranoia and competitiveness natural to the Nazi ideology, expressed as C&C inefficiency, was the primary factor that cost Hitler the war.

Which has some bearing on Russia's tactical and strategic failures, too. ;)

[Jarhead0331]

Massive wave of strikes incoming?

[Sir Slash]

I will say it again, it looks like from the video, that the Ukrainians may benefit as much, or more from a temporary Cease-Fire than the Russians. The Orcs probably wouldn't honor it or would ask for the Moon in return but winter can last a long time especially if you don't have heat and water.

[ArizonaTank]

The Ukrainians are claiming that they damaged two of those bombers in a drone strike.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/video-captures-russian-bombers-exploding-in-ukrainian-drone-strike/ar-AA14UE2E?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=9200de1e084142a4bbb10b2136dd0b9c

[JasonPratt]

Hearing some chatter that two or three companies of the Wagruk-Hais got obliterated trying to assault Bahkmut yesterday. Will see if I can get confirmation somewhere about the Wagner Group's fat lady singing (so to speak).

[ArizonaTank]

Hearing some chatter that two or three companies of the Wagruk-Hais got obliterated trying to assault Bahkmut yesterday. Will see if I can get confirmation somewhere about the Wagner Group's fat lady singing (so to speak).

"Wagruk-Hai" ....  good one... :bd:

[Sir Slash]

"Where there's a whip, there's a way".  ;D

[SirAndrewD]

I will say it again, it looks like from the video, that the Ukrainians may benefit as much, or more from a temporary Cease-Fire than the Russians. The Orcs probably wouldn't honor it or would ask for the Moon in return but winter can last a long time especially if you don't have heat and water.

Neither side is going to even consider a cease fire before the rasputitsa.

With their western winterized equipment the UAF feels it will have an advantage when the hard freeze is complete and has offensive ops planned soon, strong rumors indicating them finally opening an assault towards Melitopol.

For the Russians every day they get stronger as they plug in mobilized troops as static formations freeing up regular troops for refit and a probable offensive of their own.   

In the overall scheme of things, the UAF probably benefits the least as the Russians are using the fall lull to fortify and reinforce.

Once the rasputitsa comes the UAF will have an increasingly good reason to ask for one depending on the situation.   The Russians might even agree as it will give them time to prepare for the expected northern offensive that will likely come in the spring. 

[GDS_Starfury]

great day for the Ukraine!

[GDS_Starfury]

a Gerpard shooting down a cruise missle!   :dreamer:

https://twitter.com/i/status/1599810159236112406

[GDS_Starfury]

and a victory dance!   <:-)

https://twitter.com/i/status/1599644738189070337

[JasonPratt]

Shuffle dance? Pikachu dance? Israeli Armed Forces ladies will be jealous!  O0

(....pondering ethical philosophy if she started an OnlyFans page to bring cash support to her company...)

[JasonPratt]

Meanwhile, for some discussion of the Uk drone strike on the bombers, and some video of an impact on the base (which starts car alarms beeping once the wave-front arrives):

This is only a 12:25 video, not one of his 3ish hour ones, don't worry.