SPOILER ALERT
I recently picked up the latest DLC for Command Modern Operations. This latest DLC addresses a hypothetical NATO/WP conflict in 1985. This is also the same time frame that I was a young Ensign in the USN, so the topic has some personal interest to me. I will try to play through the whole DLC here (and at the same time finish my Flashpoint Campaign AAR, which features a ground invasion of Germany at approximately the same time).
The First scenario is "the Bedford Incident" based loosely on the movie and book of the same name. The scenario introduction is as follows:
Date/Time: 1st April, 1985/ 08:00:00 Zulu
Location: North Atlantic - Barents Sea
Duration: 1 Day
Playable Sides: NATO
USS Bedford, a US 2nd Fleet destroyer is on patrol near the Svalbard Islands together with HNoMS Narvik, and they have been repeatedly overflown by Soviet aircraft, including low-level passes at main deck level.
Bedford has also had fleeting contacts on sonar, which is believed to be an unknown submarine in territorial waters.
Even though hostilities have not broken out, the Bedford's captain is hell bent on bringing it to the surface – or worse...
OVERVIEW
The increase in tensions between NATO and the Soviet Union has intensified over the last 2 weeks, this has been more so in the Barents Sea region with various intermittant contacts of submarines along the Norwegian coast.
USS Bedford, HNoMS Narvik and a detachment of Orions based in Banak have been conducting round the clock patrols in the vicinity of Svalbard Islands.
ORDERS & CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
USS Bedford and associated air assets are to conduct aggressive ASW Patrols in their allocated areas. Any Submarine contact is to be forced to the surface if detected in the Svalbard Islands TTW. Units are to only fire in self defence.
Soviet MRR Aircraft have been deployed to Greem Bell, Intelligence suggests the Submarine is onroute to RV with a Submarine Support Ship.
ORDER OF BATTLE
Surface Forces
• USS Bedford
• HNoMS Narvik
Banak
• 333 Sqn Det P-3 Orion
THREAT
Surface Forces
Unknown Submarine Support Ship
Sub-Surface
Unknown Submarine
Air
Be-12 Mail MRR
COMMAND & CONTROL
Flagship - USS Bedford
EMCON
Limited Transmission on all sensors
Environmental
The sea state is 3, with light clouds at 20,000 feet. The water is isothermal, with no Convergence Zone.
The ASW conditions are good, so I hope to detect the submarine relatively quickly. My plan is to have the USS Bedford and HNoMS Oslo to work in close proximity to each other for mutual support and to maximize their limited sonar search. This will also maximize their limited AAW capability against any air threat from Greem Bell.
My search strategy will be to use the P-3Bs to quickly develop a surface picture and locate the submarine support(AS) vessel. Once that is located, the MPA will set up a search barrier to detect the SSB as it approaches the AS.
EMCON ALPHA (no emissions) will be the initial setting for the surface ships. If they are detected by Soviet MPA, they can go to EMCON DELTA (unrestricted emissions).
On scenario start, I launch a P-3B from Banak. However, it is over 500 nm to the OPAREA, so it will take 1.5 hours to arrive ONSTA.
At 0815 NATO receives a message report from fishing boats that a large Soviet ship was located near the coastline. See Figure 1. Because the vessel is described as a large Soviet ship it may be the submarine support vessel. I did not expect it to be located at close to Svalbard. The HNoMS Oslo is sent to investigate the contact, and the enroute P-3B is vectored to provide a VID.
Image 1 010849Z April 1985
(https://i.imgur.com/0GjtN7I.jpg)
At 0920, the the HNoMS Oslo VIDs a Primorye-class AGI.
At 0930, fishing boats report a periscope invic 7933N03350E The USS Bedford is nearby and is sent to this location. See Image 2. During this time, Soviet Be-12 MAIL flying boats are detected operating near the USS Bedford, and at 0944Z, one is VID'd. Because the USS Bedford has been detected, it goes to EMCON DELTA. The P-3 is retasked from VID'ing the possible large Soviet vessel and sent to this periscope sighing location.
Image 2 010926Z April 1985
(https://i.imgur.com/DsODJWB.jpg)
At 1016Z, the BEDFORD picks up an underwater contact with its AN/SQQ-23A active sonar. in the vicinity of the periscope sighting. The P-3B arrieves at approximately this time and begins to lay a bouy pattern. There are numerous schools of fish in the area, generating false submarine contacts, but the underwater contact initially detected by the BEDFORD appears to be a submarine, as it is holding a steady 2 knt course at 233 feet depth. The P-3 is retasked to sanitize the area immediately to the west of the BEDFORD, while the BEDFORD establishes a station 1 nm astern of the PROBSUB and begins "Hold Down" ops. At 1031Z, a second P-3B is launched early from Banak to provide additional ASUW and ASW capability. At 1242Z, this second P-3 rigs a surface contact that was in the vicinity of the reported "large Soviet vessel" that had previously been reported at 0815Z. The aircrew VID the contact as a Soviet Don-class submarine tender.
Figure 3 011242Z April 85
(https://i.imgur.com/mFhfqUQ.jpg)
By 1330Z, the OSLO has a visual on the Don AS, and the second P-3 is sanitizing the area to ensure there are no submarines in the vicinity of the Don. The BEDFORD is continuing hold down ops, and the first P-3 has sanitized the area to the west of BEDFORD, and is about to check OFFSTA and return to Banak.
Figure 4 011330Z April 85
(https://i.imgur.com/kYNcdV9.jpg)
At 1346Z BEDFORDs subsurface contact is classified as a CERTSUB and is typeclassed as a GOLF II SSB. BEDFORD continues the hold down ops. A third P-3B is launched from Banak at 1535Z to relieve the second P-3.
By 1700Z, I'm satisfied that the area around the Don AS is clear of submarines, and that the BEDFORD has contact on the only submarine in the area. Because of this, and due to the possible air threat from Greem Bell, I have the incoming P-3s take over surface surveillance operations (SSC) in the western part of the AOR, while having the OSLO rejoin BEDFORD in the hold down operations. Although OSLO has a light air defense capability, it is more capable of defending itself than a P-3.
Image 5 011703Z April 85
(https://i.imgur.com/FijGjQl.jpg)
In the ensuing 9 hours, the OSLO rejoins the BEDFORD and continue to hold down the GOLF II. Numberous MAIL MPA fly in the vicinity of the NATO ships, but none engage. At 020421Z, a Harpoon-equipped P-3 engages and sinks the Don AS, while the OSLO sinks the GOLF AS with torpedoes.
Note: I was a little confused by the victory conditions, which specified that NATO could only attack in self defense. Since I was never attacked, in my first play through I simply sat on the Soviet ships and submarines, with strike ready ships and P-3. However, I scenario end, I had a score of "0", so I could not advance in the campaign. I simply went back to a previous save, and attacked. Possibly the fact that the Don AS was in Norwegian territorial waters was sufficient cause belli
Image 6 020421Z April 84
(https://i.imgur.com/QaJlKiB.jpg)
SPOILER ALERT
Scenario 2: Kobayashi Maru
In this scenario, I'm playing as the Soviet side. Basically, the scenario is a "first strike" on a US CVBG and an Italian CH in the Central Med. The initial scenario and orders from the game are below:
Soviet Union vs. NATO
Date/Time: 1st April, 1985/ 08:00:00 Zulu
Location: Mediterranean - Malta
Duration: 10 Hours
Playable Sides: Soviet Union
Soviet doctrine called for an all-out attack on any American Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) within reach in the first minutes of a conflict. Not only were CVBGs powerful naval forces, but strategic nuclear strike platforms as well.
To accomplish this goal, American Carriers were relentlessly followed from the moment they left port, either with satellites, destroyers or intelligence ships (AGIs) which would follow the carrier battle group wherever it went, always reporting the CVBG's position.
If peace suddenly changed to war, the units shadowing the CVBG would give the other attacking forces the position of the carrier, and if possible also attack it themselves.
With this in mind, an agreement was formulated called the "Incidents at Sea Agreement" between the USA and the Soviet Union: Hostile acts include not only firing weapons, but also locking a fire-control radar onto another vessel.
With such an expansive definition of a "hostile act", what can possibly go wrong?
ORDERS & CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
Since the "Bump and Grinds" in the Black Sea between US and Soviet Naval units last month NATO has increasingly become more aggressive in their operations.Over recent weeks units of the Black Sea Fleet have deployed to the Mediterranean including a "Goodwill Deployment" of a Regiment Su-17 Fitter Attack Aircraft.
The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CVBG has been conducting ASW Exercises with Italian units around the Island of Malta, these units have constantly harassed our peaceful AGI's by trying to ram them on many occasions.The Destroyer Nadezhnyy [Mod Kashin] has been in the forefront of these acts sustaining minor damage in one incident.
Adm Aleksey Mikhailovich Kalinin at Head Quarters in Sevastopol has now issued Orders to the Fleet to patrol areas to counter any threats by NATO.Even though Hostilities have not broken out Rear Adm Vladimir Kalabin of the 5th Eskadra stands ready to turn the Mediterranean Sea in to a Sea of Blood.
CONDUCT
Both Juliett SSG are to close US CVBG at slow speed to maintain missile firing solutions, Land based Aircraft are to be at immediate notice to launch, Badger aircraft based in Tripoli are to launch and patrol designated MRR Patrol Area.
Patrol Area One
• Adm Makarov KUG
• B-213 [Foxtrot Class SSK]
• K-493 [Alfa Class SSN]
• K-53 [Victor I Class SSN]
• Ladoga [Mayak Class AGI]
Patrol Area Two
• Nadezhnyy [Mod Kashin]
• B-40 [Foxtrot Class SSK]
• K-209 [Charlie II Class SSGN]
• K-53 [Victor I Class SSN]
• Alidada [Okean Class AGI]
ORDER OF BATTLE
Adm Makarov KUG
• Admiral Makarov [Kresta II Class CG]
• Marshal Vaslevskiy [Udaloy I DDG]
• Otiichnyy Sovremenny Class DDG]
• Smyshlenny [Mod Kashin]
• Rezvyy [Krivak II FFG]
Sub-Surface Units
• B-40 [Foxtrot Class SSK]
• B-213 [Foxtrot Class SSK]
• K-318 [Juliett Class SSG]
• K-67 [Juliett Class SSG]
• K-209 [Charlie II Class SSGN]
• K-493 [Alfa Class SSN]
• K-53 [Victor I Class SSN]
Dzhankoy Air Base
• Tu-22M-3 Backfire C [12] 30th OMARP
Tripoli
• Tu-16R Badger E [3] 30th OMARP
• Su-17M-3 Fitter H [12] 846th Regiment
Detached Units
• Alidada [Okean Class AGI]
• Ladoga [Mayak Class AGI]
• Nadezhnyy [Mod Kashin]
NATO Threat
Surface
• Eisenhower Task Group
o USS Dwight D. Eisenhower [Nimitz Class CVN]
o USS Wainwright [Belknap Class CG]
o USS Mississippi [Virginia Class CGN]
o USS Coontz [Farragut Class DDG]
o USS Sampson [C.F Adams DDG]
o USS Spruance [Spuance Class DD]
o USS Koelsch [Brooke Class FFG]
o USS E. McDonnell [Garcia Class FF]
o USS Voge [Garcia Class FF]
o USS E. Montgomery [Knox Class FF]
o USS Butte [Killauea Class AE]
o USS Savannah [Wichta Class AOR]
o
• Garibaldi Task Group
o ITS G Garibaldi [CVH]
o ITS Audace [Audace Class DDG]
o ITS Aliseo [Maestrale Class FF]
o ITS Orsa [Lupo Class FF]
Sub-Surface
• USN SSN unlocated
• Italian SSK unlocated
Air
• Eisenhower Airgroup comprising F-14 Fighter, A-6 and A-7 Attack with associatted AEW and ASW fixed and rotary wing aircraft, Garibaldi Airgroup consists of ASW Helicopters.
• F-104 Fighters based in Italy may way be supporting the Garibaldi Task Group.
COMMAND & CONTROL
Sevastopol HQ - Adm Mikhailovich Kalinin Commanding
EMCON
Limited transmission on all sensors
Mission Analysis and IPB
Environment:
Area of Operations (AO): The AO is the subsurface, surface, and air region as designated as AO1 and AO2 in red and shown in Figure 1.
The Area of Interest (AI): The AI is the subsurface, surface, and air region bounded located outside this area.
Figure 1. (https://i.imgur.com/jIxaxyq.jpg)
Significant Characteristics of the Battlespace Environment: The Area of Operations in the immediate expected battle area (AO1) is geographically small. It is near the Soviet airbase in Tripoli, which is less than 300 nm from the US and Italian CVBG boxes. However, it is geographically remote from the Soviet airbase in the Crimea, with the air craft having to fly approximately 900 miles before being able to launch missile attacks on the CVBGs. The no fly areas around Turkey and Italy effectively limit air operations through a narrow corridor at the exit from the Adriatic into the Mediterranean.
Sunrise/Sunset: The entire scenario will almost be entirely in daylight. (Sunrise for Malta is at 0448Z. Sunset is at 1724 and dusk is at 1749Z).
Metrology: The weather should not be a factor in the scenario. Skies are clear, and the Sea State is 0.
Hydrology: Water depths the AO range from approximately 900-1300 feet in the in the eastern portion of AO1, to only 200-500 feet the the western portion. Parts of the Gulf of Sidra are less than 200 feet deep. A layer from 200-500 feet in depth exists throughout the AOR 1. There are no Convergence Zones (CZs) in the AOR. Noise levels are relatively high in the central Mediterranean.
Land Dimension: Not Applicable for scenario purposes.
Maritime Dimension:
The NATO naval forces are engaged in a ASW exercise, so I am expecting them to remain essentially MODLOCKED in the central Mediterranean.
Air/Space Dimension:
Space, electromagnetic and cyberspace dimensions:
Space: Soviet ELINT satellites Will have LOS over the central med for most of the scenario period, so I should have good general location data on any emitting NATO radars. There are no NATO satellites in the game
Electromagnetic and Cyber Dimension: Expected maximum air radar ranges are shown as the white circles in Figure 1 above. However, the radar horizon is limited to only about 150 nm for land-based NATO radars against air targets traveling under 5000 feet MSL.
HF and UHF communications are expected to be unaffected throughout the region
Cyberspace: N/A
Time Dimension: The scenario lasts for 10 hours. This time period is insufficient for additional USSR surface and sub-surface units to deploy to the AOR
Political and Demographic Dimension: Soviet forces can not cross or attack Turkey and Italy proper. NATO forces are presumably unable to fire until they are illuminated or fired on by Soviet units.
Battlespace Effects on Courses of Action (COA)
NATO: The relatively narrow geographical area will limit the ability of the NATO naval forces to avoid identification, localization and targeting by the USSR
USSR: The short scenario time and long transit times for forces based in the Crimea means that there will only be one strike by the Crimea-based Backfires. The NATO sea-based air superiority, combined with the inability to attack the Italian airbase at Gioia del Colle means that NATO will have air superiority over the Central Mediterranean. The relatively small area and the presence of NATO E-2C AWACs aircraft make it highly likely that the Soviet surface fleet will be quickly sunk once hostilities begin. This in turn means that the Soviet must make a coordinated first strike with all units.
2. Initial Positions 010800Z April 1985
(https://i.imgur.com/xBFpt0q.jpg)
The initial positions of the NATO and Soviet forces are shown in Figure 2 and 3. NATO forces consist of the EISENHOWER CVBG located SE of Malta, and the GIBRALDI CHBG located east of Malta. In addition to the CVBG airwing, the Italians have an unknown number of F-104 Starfighters and some Atlantique MPA operating out of an airbase near Taranto. A NATO SSN and SSK are unlocated.
Air assets include a Regiment of 12 Tu-22M BACKFIRE Cs equipped with the AS-4 missile are located in the Crimea, and a regiment of 12 Su-17 FITTER Cs armed with AS-9 ARMs is located at Tripoli. Surface forces include the ADMIRAL MAKAROV Surface Action Group (SAG) consisting of a Kresta II CG, Udaloy DDG, Sovremenny DDG, a Mod Kashin DDG and a Krivak II FFG is located near the suspected GIBRALDI (Italian) CHBG. (Note: in this scenario, the Soviet units are colored light blue, and NATO will be orange until hostilities, then they will convert to red). Two AGIs are tattle tailing each of the NATO battlegroups. In addition, an SS-N-2C-equipped Mod Kashin is tattle tailing the Eisenhower.
Soviet Submarines include two JULLIET SSGs, equipped with the 250nm range SS-N-3. Unfortuately, the JULLIET must surface to fire these missiles. However, there is also a CHARLIE I SSGN equipped with the 80 nm range SS-N-9 missile. The Soviets also have two FOXTROT SS. a VICTOR I SSNand and ALFA SSN class operating in the CENTMED.
The Soviet side is allied with the Libyans in this scenario. However, they are not controlled by the Soviet player. Libya has a Foxtrot SS and a Koni FF in the CENTMED, plus some AS-5/SA-2 and SA-3 SAM sites protecting the Tripoli airbase.
Figure 3 Initial Positions 010800Z April 1985 Detail
(https://i.imgur.com/LaFHU0g.jpg)
My plan for the attack on the NATO forces is intended to accomplish the following:
1) Sink or render Combat-ineffective
2) The EISENHOWER and GIRABALDI battlegroups
3) while minimizing losses to the Soviet combat units.
To maximize the chance of accomplishing these objectives, I will use a simultaneous, first strike on both battlegroups.
The main attack will be made by the BACKFIRE C bombers, supported by SEAD from the Su-17s against the EISENHOWER CVBG. While a multi-threat axis attack is preferable, the range the Tu-22Ms have to fly will make it difficult to create such a threat axis, as they will be limited to attacking the CVBG from the NE. However, the two JULLIET SSGNs and the CHARLIE II SSGN are positioned west, south and east of the CVBG, so a coordinated strike with these assets and the Su-17s , in conjunction with the BACKFIREs will provide a multiple threat axis attack, significantly complicating the USN defensive problem. See Image 4.
Simultaneously, the Soviet SAG, supported by 2 elements of Su-17s providing SEAD will strike the GIBRALDI CHBG.
There are several problems with this plan. First, the coordination will be difficult, due to the disparity of the weapon ranges involved. More critically, the Soviets have to launch the first effective strike, which means that the BACKFIRE bombers can not take very much attrition from F-14 or F-104s before they reach their launch points. I plan to minimize the possible BACKFIRE losses by minimizing warning time by having the Tu-22s fly part of the route below the radar horizon of the NATO radars in Turkey. I calculae that by stepping down from 24,000 feet to 12,000 feet altitude enroute to "Waypoint 1" (See image 4 below), the Tu-22M's can remain below the radar horizon of the NATO radars in Turkey. At Waypoint 1, they will climb to 36,000 feet for fuel conservation, as the NATO radars in Italy will be able to pick them up at any altitude they could fly that would give them suffiecient fuel to reach their launch point. While not ideal, this flight profile will limit NATO's warning. Further, I will have the Su-17s approach the CVBG from from the south will hopefully divide up the CVBG CAP.
Image 4. Attack Plan
(https://i.imgur.com/LXCBtOl.jpg)
Love the AAR
I always looked at the Radar range symbols as if the map was flat and not curved. Does the game take the altitudes and distance for curvature of the earth in its calculations (ie I always set my altitude at <2000 feet as soon as I was within the radars range).
Con
Quote from: Con on November 05, 2021, 08:05:23 AM
Love the AAR
I always looked at the Radar range symbols as if the map was flat and not curved. Does the game take the altitudes and distance for curvature of the earth in its calculations (ie I always set my altitude at <2000 feet as soon as I was within the radars range).
Con
CMO does take into account the curvature of the earth in calculating the radar horizon. If you want to go "old school" you can use a nomograph to calculate the radar horizon. (see below) If you want to go web based, this site will give you good numbers: https://www.translatorscafe.com/unit-converter/en-US/calculator/radar-horizon/ However, be sure to zoom in on the map for the radar facilities to see what elevation they are at. Additionally, the mast height is given in the database for the radars, so add that to whatever the terrain elevation is. Generally, you are safe by adding 30 meters, but if it is crucial, be sure to check the actual database for the mast height.
Initial Strike Planning (0800-0900Z)
Because my orders are to wait for higher headquarters to strike the NATO forces, I begin to position the Soviet assets to conduct a strike when ordered. At 010810Z April 85 the MAKAROV KUG (Korabelnaia Udarnaia Gruppa ) (note: equivalent to the USN Surface Action Group) is directed to close possible GIRABALDI CHBG. The DDG SMYSHLENNY (Mod Kashin) ordered to proceed 10 nm ahead of MAKAROV KUG to put GIRABALDI CHBG within its 45 nm range SS-N-2c weapons envelope. The Sovremeny DDG , with its 70nm range SS-N-22 will remain with the main body. The KUG's Helix helicopters beginsurface search to ensure there are no threats to the KUG/SAG. Meanwhile, the NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG) is ordered to close USS EISENHOWER, and begin Tattletail duties NADEZHNYY is currently 17 nm from USS EISENHOWER. USN CVBG is in EMCON B, with only sonar emissions are detected.
To minimize the chance of detection the CHARLIE II SSGN and JULLIET SSG are ordered to go deep and contact HQ in 2 hours.
At 010838Z April 85 Two F-14 pass 23nm from MAKAROV KUG at 1500 feet. This likely indicates that the KUG has been detected. I'm also concerned that if the USN has a CAP station (CAPSTA) this far out, it could potentially interfere with an attack from my BACKFIREs. See the figure below:
Sitrep 010832Z April 85
(https://i.imgur.com/oqXo142.png)
At 010900Z April 85 Sevastopol HQ directs an attack pre-briefed targets at 1200Z, and to continue engagement until targets are sunk. With the 1200Z TOT (Time on Top) time, I can now begin actual flight planning. The draft plan is below. The chief problem is the NATO radars at Koufyvoun and Chortiatis, Turkey. My plan is to have the BACKFIRES "step down" from 25,000 feet at Waypont 1 (WP1) to only 6,000 feet at Waypoint 6 (WP6) to stay below the radar horizon. At waypoint 7 the BACKFIRES will climb to 36,000 feet for fuel conservation, as the radar sites in Italy will make further detection avoidance impossible. At the IP, the raid will split into three sections to get as wide threat axis as possible. While I would like to have a 90 degree threat axis, I don't know that the BACKFIRES will have sufficient range to accomplish that. The three launch points (LP 1-3) are 200 nm from the current CVBG position. Flight time to launch point will be 125 minutes.
BACKFIRE Flight Plan
(https://i.imgur.com/uN8vSX3.jpg)
A couple of points about this airstrike. Historically, BACKFIRE regiments had some jamming and tanking aircraft as part of the regiment. In this scenario, they are absent. To provide jamming support, I considered using my BADGER E, which has an SPS-1 offensive jammer. However, this was a bit of 1950's era technology, so it wouldn't have been too much use against the USN. Consequentially, the BACKFIREs will be going in without any ECM support aircraft.
Another issue is the release distance. I'm planning on releasing at 200 nm. Soviet doctrine actually envisioned a weapons release at around 160nm for the AS-4. See image below taken from Vego, Milan N. Soviet Naval Tactics. Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst Press, 1992, pg. 216. However, I'm concerned about the F-14 CAPSTA that may be located approximately 215 nm the the NE of the CVBG. With only 12 BACKFIRES and 24 AS-4s, I believe I will have to have few, if any losses in order to get a decent chance of sinking the EISENHOWER. As a result, I am planning on releasing at approximately 200 nm.
Soviet ASM Strike
(https://i.imgur.com/QltXGEd.jpg)
Surveillance will be performed by the BADGER E aircraft. The BACKFIREs will illuminate with their DOWN BEAT radars at the last minute to minimize alerting the CVBG until the last possible moment. Airspace surveillance will be preformed by the KUG, which will also attempt to engage any NATO fighters that are operating near the BACKFIRE LPs.
As I noted in an earlier post, SEAD will be performed by the Su-17/AS-9. However, these will have to approach within 65 nm of the CVBG, so I can expect their losses to be relatively heavy. Additionally, the CHARLIE II SSGN and JULLIET SSGs will attempt to open up several other threat axes. However, coordinating the TOT of the 650 knot SS-N-2, SS-N-3 and SS-N-7s fired from 45, 70, and 220 nm away will be somewhat problematic, at least doing so without giving away the element of surprise.
:clap: :clap: :clap:
SITREP 011022Z April 85
Soviet Operations-Air
The 12 aircraft of the BACKFIRE strike launched from the Crimea beginning at 0943. Currently, they are over Romania. They will hit BINGO fuel approximately 15 minutes after reaching their launch point. This gives a small amount of reserve fuel that I can use for a supersonic sprint for the last 50 nm to the LP, if necessary.
The Su-17s at Tripoli are preparing to launch at approximately 1100Z.
Soviet Operations-Surface
The MAKAROV KUG has a single unit (CG Admiral Makarov) radiating air and search radars. The KUG is within SS-N-22 range of the GIRABALDI CHBG, and the DDG SMYSHLENNY (Mod Kashin) is almost within SS-N-2c range of the GIRABALDI CHBG
The NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG) has established a Tattletail station 1 nm from the USS EISENHOWER.
NATO Activity-Air
NATO activity is relatively quiet. At 010920Z April 85 Two F-104s were detected by ESM in the Gulf of Taranto. If they remain flying at this CAPSTA, it will place them within intercept range of the Tu-22s as they fly south from the IP.
At 010930Z A USN E-2C was detected operating 80nm NE of CVBG. Presumably this is the AEW station. This is sufficiently close to the CVBG, limiting it's coverage of the threat axis. Since 0838Z, there have been no F-14s detected near the MAKAROV KUG. Hoperfully, this indicates the F-14 CAPSTA are relatively close to the CVBG.
NATO Activity-Subsurface
010940Z April 85 FOXTROT SS PL-641 reports POSSUB subsurface contact. Foxtrot is ordered to evade for one hour, then resume anti-CVBG patrol
NATO Activity-EM
The EISENHOWER CVBG remains in EMCON ALPHA (modified), using only active sonar.
(https://i.imgur.com/Egjqmgd.jpg)
I love your AAR. Thanks for sharing. \m/
I have also played the 1975 campaign and boy do you notice the difference with technology 10 years later. If you get the chance try it for comparison. I've just started mu own Red Tide campaign and so far am having a really immersive time.
Quote from: Boggit on November 13, 2021, 09:57:26 PM
I love your AAR. Thanks for sharing. \m/
I have also played the 1975 campaign and boy do you notice the difference with technology 10 years later. If you get the chance try it for comparison. I've just started mu own Red Tide campaign and so far am having a really immersive time.
If people are interested, I might do a similar AAR using the "Northern Inferno" DLC. As you point out, the differences in technology were striking between 1975 and 1985.
At 1100Z, I finalize the attack plan. Contrary to (what I believed I instructed), the CHARLIE SSGN has not regained contact. Because of this, I can't plan on using it to attrite the CVBG's AAW screen. Instead, I will target the USS MISSISIPPI with the NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG), which is currently tattletailing the battlegroup. My logic is that it will be impossible to coordinate the missile ToT with between the Tu-22Ms and the Tattletail, so it is more advantageous to attrite the USN AAW/anti ASM capability, thereby improving the chance of the AS-4s getting through. To minimize alert time and maximize the chance of at least one slow SS-N-2c getting through, the NADEZHNYY will launch at minimum (5 nm) range. Assuming all Tu-22M launch their missiles, all but 2 of their missiles will be directed to the USS EISENHOWER. 2 AS-4s will be assigned to the USS COONTZ, just to keep it occupied.
Integrating the two JULIETTE SSGs into the plan is also problematic. Because they have to surface to launch, and because their 670 knot SS-N-3a is considerably slower than the 2300 knot AS-4, it will be impossible to have their missiles arrive at the same time as the BACKFIRE-launched AS-4s. The only way to fix this problem is to have the JULIETTE's launch approximately 12 minutes ahead of the BACKFIRE launch. However, the USN E-2C would detect this launch, which would give the USN the opportunity to attrite the BACKFIREs. As they are crucial to sinking the EISENHOWER, I can't risk giving that much warning. Accordingly, I will use the JULLIETs as a second-strike, hopefully in conjunction with the CHARLIE II (should it ever chose to re-establish contact with HQ) >:(
The Su-17s will execute their SEAD mission by approaching the CVBG from the SW-SE sector, attempting to divert the USN CAP to the south, away from the BACKFIREs. 2 elements of 2 Su-17s will be sent towards the GARABALDI CHBG to conduct SEAD there and after firing their AS-9s, will attempt to shoot down the E2C AWACs that is operating in that area.
The MAKAROV KUG will engage the GARIBALDI CHBG with SS-N-22 and SS-N-2c. A second strike will be made with SS-N-14 in Surface to Surface mode. The primary target for the first strike will be the GARIBALDI. Additionally, the Otomat-equipped FFG ITS ALISEO is a threat to the KUG, so it will be a primary target in the initial salvo.
The FOXTROT SS will be used to attack whatever USN vessels survive the AS-4s.
Between 1030-1130Z the Soviet forces get into position. See Image 8 for a view of the Central Med, and Image 9 for a zoomed in view of the engagement area at 1130Z. A Battlelog is included below
Image 8. 011130Z Situation
(https://i.imgur.com/LtvrDOZ.jpg)
Image 9. 011130Z Situation (Close Up)
(https://i.imgur.com/xEWHU4u.jpg)
011052Z April 85 Launched Tu-16R BADGER E from Tripoli
011054Z April 85 BACKFIRES begin climb to 36,000ft and turn toward IP. They will soon be detectable by NATO radars.
011100Z April 85 GIRABALDI CHBG is EMCON ALPHA radiating SS/AS and FC radars
011100Z April 85 Both JULLIETS SSG are in communications with HQ and receiving targeting data.
011107Z April 85 FOXTROT SS is in in communications with HQ and receiving targeting data.
011112Z April 85 Launch 2 Su-17 from Tripoli
101115Z April 85 Received Msg from SEVASTOPOL HQ directing the KUG to engage and neutralize the GIBRALDI CHBG at 1200Z, and then transit to Libyan waters
011115Z April 85 Launch 2 elements of 2 Su-17 from Tripoli
011128Z April 85 Launch 3 elements of 2 Su-17 from Tripoli
011128Z April 85 USN Permit-class SSN detected trailing Libyan Foxtrot SS AL BADR.
011128Z April 85 NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG) Tattletailing EISENHOWER CVBG. Activates DON KAY and HEAD NET C surface and air search radars for air and surface picture. Begins to position itself to 5 nm from USS MISSISSIPPI.
Wow
Cliffhanger
Very well written and planned. Puts my tactical planning of let's throw lots of different crap in the air at the same time and roughly pointing in the same direction to shame. I am waiting anxiously to see how it plays out.
Con
Me too. Damn, that looks like a whole lot of things to keep up with. :hide:
WARNING: SPOILER ALERT
The next few posts will give away some of the scenario design. Don't read any further if you want to play the scenario. You have been warned.... C:-)
Between 1130Z and 1153Z, the various strike elements begin to converge. The Battle log below gives some idea of the events:
011128Z April 85 NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG) Tattletailing EISENHOWER CVBG. Activates DON KAY and HEAD NET C surface and air search radars for air and surface picture. Begins to position itself to 5 nm from USS MISSISSIPPI.
011133Z April 85 Minor adjustment to Tu-22M course to release point to avoid GARABALDI SAM envelope
011133Z April 85 USN CVBG remains in EMCON A (modified). Currently not emitting radars. Until that changes, the AS-9s will be unable to engage.
011137Z April 85 Several probable merchant surface contacts are identified near the area around the possible JULIETTE SSG launch positions. Tu-16Rs are directed to VID contacts. Contacts confirmed to be civilian/no threat.
011138Z April 85 F-14s intercept several of the Su-17s, but break off, presumably after VID'ing them.
011143Z April 85 Helix from MAKAROV KUG goes active with its S/S radar to assist in targeting the GARABALDI CHBG. MAKAROV KUG is only active with a single air search (A/S) and surface search (S/S) radar. No fire control (F/C) radars emitting.
011144Z April 85 Italian F-104 closes to 7 miles of BACKFIRE flight #3 (the rear-most flight). F-104 does not engage.
011152Z April 85 BACKFIRES are approaching weapons release point. Weapons release confirmed for 011155Z. NADEZHNYY (Mod Kashin DDG) turns clear its SS-N-2c battery.
011153Z April 85 No contact with CHARLIE II SSGN, so will conduct the attack without him.
011153Z April 85 BACKFIRES activate DOWN BEAT fire control (F/C) radar for targeting.
and all hell breaks loose.....
The USS EISENHOWER begins the festivities by machine gunning with 7.62mm (!) gunfire the OKEAN-class AGI that was following it. Admittedly, I had driven the AGI pretty close to the CVN. ;D But still, that is such an uninspired way of beginning a World War....
With everyone now hostile, Libya and the USN begin firing missiles at each other. I, the Soviet commander, had been dutifully filling out my battlelog when various machine gun and missile warnings erupted from my computer. Hurriedly returning to my main screen, I had the NADEZHNYY go active with its F/C radar and engage the USS MISSISSIPPI, while the MAKAROV KUG went active and engaged the GARABALDI CHBG. In the next 7 minutes, I didn't do much battle management, as number of missiles in the air were far beyond my ability to track (indicidentally, confirming why most ship defenses are fully automatic. It really is hard to track what is happening when the missiles start flying) The attached game log shows the violence of the battle. In the next 26 minutes, the following ships are sunk. I will try to distill the action in the next post. I am also preparing a video of the action:
LOSSES:
-------------------------------
1x A 5327 Stromboli
9x A-6E Intruder
23x A-7E Corsair II
1x AB.212 ASW [SH-212A]
1x CG 27 Josephus Daniels [Belknap]
1x CVN 69 Dwight D. Eisenhower [Nimitz Class]
1x D 550 Audace
1x DDG 2 Charles F. Adams
1x DDG 37 Farragut
3x E-2C Hawkeye Group 0
4x EA-6B Prowler ICAP II Baseline
1x F 564 Lupo
1x F 570 Maestrale
16x F-14A Tomcat
1x FF 1040 Garcia
1x FF 1052 Knox
4x KA-6D Intruder
9x S-3A Viking
2x SH-2F Seasprite
6x SH-3H Sea King
EXPENDITURES:
------------------
56x 127mm/38 HE-PD [HiCap]
211x 127mm/54 HE-CVT [HiFrag]
5x 127mm/54 OTO Melara Compact HECVT
4x 20mm/85 Mk15 Phalanx Blk 0 Burst [200 rnds]
14x 40mm/70 Twin Breda Compact Burst [32 rnds]
1x 7.62mm MG Burst [20 rnds]
21x 76mm/50 Twin HE Burst [2 rnds]
6x 76mm/62 Compact HE Burst [4 rnds]
2x AGM-62B Walleye II ER/DL
1x AGM-84A Harpoon IP
16x AIM-54A Phoenix
14x AIM-7F Sparrow III
1x AIM-9L Sidewinder
57x AN/SSQ-53A DIFAR
66x AN/SSQ-62A DICASS
32x Aspide
17x Generic Chaff Salvo [5x Cartridges]
14x Mk171 RBOC Chaffstar Chaff
18x Mk182 SRBOC Chaff [Seduction]
4x Mk48 Mod 4
4x Otomat Mk1
12x Otomat Mk2 Mod I
2x RGM-84C Harpoon IB
15x RIM-66A SM-1MR Blk IV
48x RIM-66C SM-2MR Blk I
26x RIM-67B SM-2ER Blk I
11x RIM-7E Sea Sparrow
8x RIM-7H Sea Sparrow
12x SCLAR Chaff
SIDE: Soviet Union
===========================================================
LOSSES:
-------------------------------
1x BPK Kashin Mod [Pr.61M]
1x SSV Mayak [Pr.502, Intelligence Mod]
1x SSV Okean
6x Su-17M-3 Fitter H
EXPENDITURES:
------------------
10x AK-630 30mm/65 Gatling Burst [400 rnds]
24x AS-4 Kitchen A Mod 3 [Kh-22N ASM]
8x AS-9 Kyle [Kh-28]
11x Generic Chaff Salvo [4x Cartridges]
6x PK-2 Chaff [TSP-47]
3x SA-N-1b Goa [M-1M/P Volna-M/P, 4K91 / V-601]
14x SA-N-4b Gecko [9M33M3]
42x SA-N-7 Gadfly [9M38]
8x SS-N-22 Sunburn [P-80 Zubr]
8x SS-N-2c Improved Styx [P-15M]
SIDE: Libya
===========================================================
LOSSES:
-------------------------------
1x 211 Dat Assawari [Vosper Mk7]
1x 416 Ziyad [Pr.1234E Nanuchka II]
1x S 311 Al Badr [PL-641 Foxtrot]
EXPENDITURES:
------------------
1x 114mm/55 Mk8 HE(MP) HE
2x AK-725 57mm/80 Twin HE Burst [6 rnds]
2x Aspide
4x Otomat Mk2 Mod I
2x PK-16 Chaff [TSP-60U]
28x SA-5c Gammon [5V28M5]
8x SA-N-4b Gecko [9M33M3]
4x SS-N-2c Improved Styx [P-15M]
Before I post any more in the AAR, I wanted to give readers an idea of the type of damage an SS-N-22 does to a ship. The AS-4 will do roughly the equivalent damage. This is a Russian SINKEX using an SS-N-22. Forward to the 0:35 mark to see the hit.
https://www.military.com/video/guided-missiles/antiship-missiles/russian-supersonic-missile-blows-away-vessel/4156566704001
Here is a video of the actual attack. I would appreciate any comments on how to make these videos more interesting, as I am pretty new/inexperienced at this:
Summary of action
As previously detailed, the Soviet strike was hamstrung by the premature initiating of hostilities by the USN, which began shooting as soon as the DOWN BEAT targeting radars went active. That meant that the Su-17s were not properly positioned to support the strike with their ARMs. Additionally, the lack of communication with the CHARLIE II SSGN deprived the strike of its SS-N-9 missiles. However, by 1215Z, the USS EISNEHOWER has been sunk, and only the ITS GARABALDI remains of the Italian CHBG. My game experience in this scenario is consistent with the historical exercises by the Soviet navy. In "Soviet Naval Tactics" (pg. 262) Milan Vego noted:
"The most difficult type of joint action to plan and execute is one involving Soviet multipurpose submarines, naval aircraft, and surface ship, especially in distant ocean areas. Such actions could probably be successful only at the very outset of a war, when the Soviets would carry out surprise massed missile strikes against US CVBGs and other Western ship forces. ...
In theory the Soviets stress the importance of delivering a massive, concentrated, and coordinated initial strike by composite forces against enemy surface combatants. The strikes are carried out along different axes. The time interval between successive missile strikes must create the maximum potential for target destruction. This is especially true for the strikes organized against US CVBGs.
Despite the impression to the contrary, there seems to be no coordination among strikes by aircraft, surface ships, and submarines in most of the Soviets' peacetime exercises. The reason is that the sheer number of Soviet platforms and their diversity complicate greatly any massed, coordinated strike..."
[Commentary: Thus far, in this scenario, I had difficulty in coordinating the submarines, aircraft, and ships. Also, the widely varying capabilities of the SS=N-9, SS-N-2c, and AS-4 and AS-9 made getting a simultaneous ToT effectively impossible. Nevertheless, the NATO forces have been seriously damaged (albeit, largely because the BACKFIRE strike was unopposed by either the Italian F-104s or the F-14s. I'm deeply skeptical that a BACKFIRE raid like I used in this scenario would have not been intercepted 200+ miles away from the CVBG. ]
After a bit of a hiatus, I've had some time to finish this AAR:
1215-1400Z
As my earlier posts indicated, the Soviet Tu-22M strike decimated the USN CVBG and the Italian CHBG. However, the ITS Garibaldi remained afloat. The MAKAROV KUG proceeded to close the Garabalidi and at 1245 sank it with SS-N-14s in the surface-to-surface mode.
This left the remaments of the USN CVBG, consisting of several frigates, a Suprance, and a CG as well as both of the auxilliaries afloat. With the Italian CHBG destroyed, the VICTOR and ALPHA SSNs are directed to make a high speed run to intercept the USN battlegroup. The FOXTROT SS sank the frigate USS Edward McDonnell at 1253, but then had to dive deep to avoid the counterattacking SH-2 helos. However, the long- absent CHARLIE II finally established radio contact at 1255, not to coordinate an missile attack with the two JULLIET SSGs, but to announce it had fired its SS-N-9s-all of them-at the USS EDWARD MCDONNELL. Overwhelmed, the MCDONNELL was hit and rapidly sank.
Since a coordinated strike with the JULLIETS was now impossible, I had both of them surface and launch their SHADDOCK missiles at SAVANNAH, BUTTE, SPRUANCE, MISSISIPPI, with a coordinated Time on Top. (Image 11). The CHARLIE II was then ordered to go deep and proceed to intercept the USN ships and engage with torpedos.
Image 11. SS-N-3 attack
(https://i.imgur.com/ODTNLu4.png)
Unfortunately, I forgot about the F-14s. The AIM-54 missile was designed not only to shoot down bombers, but was also designed to engage large, relatively slow missiles like the SHADDOCK. The F-14s in the area engaged the incoming missiles, and shot down most of them before they reached the USN ships, with the USS MISSISIPPI accounting for the remainder. In retrospect, I should have waited another hour, after the F-14s had BINGO'd to Italy.
Meanwhile, at 1358, the FOXTROT attacked and sank the USS SPRUANCE with a torpedo. At 1602, either the FOXTROT or the CHARLIE II engaged and sank the USS Savannah with multiple torpedoes, and hit the USS BUTTE with one. However, SH-2s then swarmed the area and located and sank the CHARLIE II.
Red Tide Scenario 3 "Unwanted Visitors"
Mission and Analysis:
In this scenario, I'm playing as the commander of NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). My mission is to
"detect and destroy Soviet Units heading for the GIUK Gap." I interpret this to mean that Soviet naval units are not to penetrate the GIUK gap into the Atlantic.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace:
Environment:
Area of Operations (AO): The AO is the subsurface, surface, and air region as shown in Figure 1. The AO does not include the territory of Sweden, Finland, or the USSR.
The Area of Interest (AI): The AI is the subsurface, surface, and air region bounded located located outside this area.
Figure 1-Area of Operations and Axis of Advance (AOA)
(https://i.imgur.com/oO86G12.jpg)
Significant Characteristics of the Battlespace Environment: The Area of Operations is geographically large, resulting in 1-2 hour long transit times for MPA. Water Depths outside the immediate coastal environment range from approximately 900 feet in the Iceland-Greenland straits to over 10,000 feet in the Greenland Sea.
Oceanography
North of 70° latitude the water is isothermal (ie, no layer). A weak layer between approximately -131 to -240 feet begins south of 70°latitude, gradually strengthening and deeping moving south. Convergence Zones (CZs) average 21-42-63-84 nm ( ±5%) in the AOR.
Weather: The Sea State is 3. Surface temperature is 7° C throughout the AOR. Moderate middle cloud cover from 7-16,000 feet with moderate rain predicted for the duration of the operation.
The weather should have only moderate effect on expected ASW operations, with the primary effect being a minor reduction in acoustic detection range due to the sea state.
Land Dimension: The ASW airbase and radars in Norway are geographically close to the USSR, making them vulnerable to being struck by air and/or SSM strikes. In contrast, the P-3C base at NAS Keflavik is outside the strike range of any Soviet aircraft in the scenario. Sweden and Finland are "No Fly Zones" for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This will help channelize Soviet aircraft flights over the North Cape.
Maritime Dimension:
Choke Points: See Figure 1. There are three major choke points that may affect operations in the AI. Naval vessels transiting from the Greenland Sea into the North Atlantic must take one of two avenues of approach (AOA): the Iceland-Greenland Gap (AOA 1), or the Iceland-Faroes Gap (AOA 2). Ships transiting from the Norwegian Sea have two possible AOAs to the North Atlantic: The Iceland-Faroes gap, (AOA 2) or the Faroes-Shetland gap (AOA 3).
Air Dimension: The major factors impacting air operations are the distance between bases and the expected operating areas. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from NAS Keflavik and Andoya AB must transit approximately 300nm to reach their expected patrol areas. (Figure 2) These transit times will reduce on-station time to approximately 6 hours.
The long distances from Soviet airbase to the operating area and the lack of AEW aircraft will make it difficult, but not impossible for Soviet fighters to effectively operate in the AOR outside of Norwegian airspace.
Figure 2-Transit Distances (AOA)
(https://i.imgur.com/vRJneB1.jpg)
Space, electromagnetic and cyberspace dimensions:
Space: Soviet ELINT satellites are expected to transit the AOR ten or more times per day, significantly impacting the ability of NATO forces to emit radars without detection. Imaging satellites are expected multiple times per day in the AOR. There are no Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSAT) in the scenario, minimizing the Soviet ability to target ships at sea that remain in EMCON A.
NATO has no satellite reconnaissance capability in the scenario.
Electromagnetic: Expected air radar ranges are shown in Figure 3. Both NATO and USSR aircraft operating at altitude over Norway and the Kola Peninsula will likely be detected by NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. NATO enjoys superiority in radar coverage in the maritime regions of the AOR near Iceland. However, there is no coverage of the AOR outside of approximately 200 nm of Iceland, Norway and the Faroes Islands. There are no NATO AWACs in the AOR, so there are significant gaps in NATO air radar coverage in the mid- Atlantic north of the Arctic Circle. There is no known USSR air radar coverage of the AOR.
HF and UHF communications are expected to be unaffected throughout the region.
Figure 3-Radar Coverage (AOA)
(https://i.imgur.com/vRJneB1.jpg)
Acoustic: NATO has excellent acoustic coverage throughout the AOR through the SOSUS network, and should receive good cueing on most Soviet submarines.
Cyberspace: N/A
Time Dimension: For scenario purposes, 18 hours is allotted to achieve the victory conditions.
Political and Demographic Dimension: Sweden and Finland are "No Fly Zones" for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This will help channelize Soviet aircraft flights over the North Cape. No other political effects are expected in this scenario.
Battlespace Effects on Courses of Action (COA)
NATO: The large area and 18 hour time limit the utility of MPA barrier operations. With less than two full squadrons of MPA, there are insufficient forces to cover such a large geographical area using barrier operations north of the GIUK gap. The significant NATO advantage in the acoustic detection using the SOSUS network allows for cuing of MPA on specific targets north of the GIUK gap. Surface barrier operations in the GIUK gap are likely to be more productive, especially with the expected CZs. However, such operations are vulnerable to submarines leaking through the GIUK gap and reaching the North Atlantic SLOCs to the south.
USSR: The large geographical area and remoteness from USSR airbases means that there will be little A/A threat to NATO MPA. NATO acoustic dominance also indicates that Soviet submarines will have to rely on superior numbers to saturate NATO ASW coverage and penetrate south of the GIUK gap. Soviet forces will also have difficulty in locating the NATO surface units and must transit through Norwegian air defenses before they can detect and attack NATO surface units.
IPB (Continued)
Evaluate the Enemy
Armed Forces
Relative Combat Power: The USSR and NATO forces are listed in Table 1 below. According to the OPTASK ASW, at least eight submarines including SSK and SSN, as well as five (5) DDGs
Table 2 USSR and NATO Force Comparison
(https://i.imgur.com/A6coJrb.jpg)
USSR Force Capabilities
The ASUW power of the USSR forces lies largely with the surface fleet and the ASCM equipped BADGER strike aircraft. Although formidable, the submarine force has no missile capability, requiring them to close to torpedo range and potentially risking attack from MPA or shipborne helicopters.
USSR Force Location and Disposition
At scenario start, there is no indication of location of Soviet assets in the AOR. All Soviet airbases are in the Kola Peninsula.
USSR Force Capabilities
The ASUW power of the USSR forces lies largely with the surface fleet and the ASCM equipped BADGER strike aircraft. Although formidable, the submarine force has no missile capability, requiring them to close to torpedo range and potentially risking attack from MPA or shipborne helicopters.
USSR Force Location and Disposition
At scenario start, there is no indication of location of Soviet assets in the AOR. All Soviet airbases are in the Kola Peninsula.
USSR Force Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
The chief capability of the Soviet forces in this scenario are the stealth of the submarine force and the firepower and range of the ASCM and SSMs of the Soveremenny DDG. However, absent targeting info, these units will lack the ability to strike NATO surface units. While the Soviet satellite capability is significant, these satellites are all ELINT-types, so they can be neutralized by NATO remaining in EMCON. Soviet long range reconnaissance assets must transit through Norwegian air defenses, where they can be attrited before they can conduct any reconnaissance. However, the embarked helos onboard the Udaloy and Sovremenny DDGs are equipped with the long range MUSHROOM search radar, and so they can provide OTH cuing and targeting for both the Soviet SAG and AS-4 equipped BADGER aircraft. Because of this, targeting the Udaloy and Soveremenny and Badger J recon aircraft is a priority.
USSR Objective
The Soviet forces are estimated to have one of two objectives: 1) the penetration of the GIUK gap by one or more submarines to threaten the Atlantic SLOCs or 2) the destruction of significant number of NATO surface units to assist the penetration of the GIUK gap to follow on Soviet submarines.
NATO OOB
Task Unit 603.01.01 [SAG Alpha]
• HNLMS Jan Van Brakel
• BNS Wielingen
• USS Richard E. Byrd
Task Unit 603.01.02 [SAG Bravo]
• HMS Brilliant
• HNoMS Stavanger
Task Unit 603.01.03 [SAG Charlie]
• FGS Hamburg
• HMCS Skeena
Task Unit 603.01.04 [UNREP Group]
• NRP Comandante Roberto Ivens
• FGS Spessart
NAS Keflavik
• VP-26 - P-3C Orion [8]
• 351st ARS - KC-135A Stratotanker [4]
• 57th FIS - F-4E Phantom II [18]
Bodo
• 331 Sqn - F-16A Falcon [14]
Andoya
• 333 Sqn - P-3 B Orion [3]
Banak
• 338 Sqn - F-16B Falcon [6]
• 336 Sqn - F-5 Tiger II [12]
My plan is to set up a barrier using the P-3Cs 1 CZ (about 30nm) from the surface task forces. This will hopefully give me contact up to 30-60 nm on any submarine approaching the surface ships, well before they enter into torpedo ranges. This barrier will cover AOA 1 and half of AOA 2. I will have to rely on SOSUS cuing for coverage of AOA 3, as there are no ships in that area. The USN P-3s have an excellent APS-115 radar, so I will also use them to do SSC and identify potential threats to the STAFORLANT units. The Norwegian F-16 will have priority targets any Soviet BADGER aircraft to prevent them from conducting recon in the Atlantic. EMCON for STAFORLANT ships is ALPHA, all other land based radars are DELTA.
I have a CAP barrier placed approximately 150 nm down the threat axis from the NATO ships, with a tanker refueling box mid-way between the CAPSTA and the NATO ships. From here, the F-4Es should be able to intercept any reconnaissance or ASCM aircraft before they are able to detect the NATO SAGs. Because of range and limited number of F-4s and I won't have CAP aircraft in the CAPSTAs until after BADGERs are confirmed to have leaked out of the Norwegian North Cape air defenses.
Aside from prosecuting any unknown subsurface contacts, the priority NATO targets will be the Sovremeny and Udaloy DDGs, as their OTH targeting and SS-N-22 missiles are a significant threat to the surface ships. Because the SS-N-22 largely outranges most of the ASUW systems on the NATO destroyers, HARPOON-equipped P-3s will be used to attrite these high priority targets.
(https://i.imgur.com/TRTr994.jpg)
Excellent
Are your Icelandic sea tractors positioned?
(https://i.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/original/002/349/274/46a.jpg)
Con-I'm not sure it will be that easy in this scenario. The problem for me is to prevent the Soviets from getting any targeting on my ships, as they are all DDGs with minimal air defense capability. If the Badgers get off an AS-4 strike, the NATO ships are toast. Technologically speaking, 1985 was just about when the west was fielding enough technologically superior systems (along with the strategy and doctrine to extract the maximum capability of the systems) to begin to overcome Soviet advantages in numbers. This scenario "feels" to me to be pretty closely balanced. We'll see how it goes as I play through it. ;)
AAR Unwanted Visitors SPOILER ALERT
IAW my air plan, I launch 2 P-3s from Keflavik and 1 from Andoya for ASW and SSC ops. Almost immediately, Norwegian radars pick up eight probable fighters or ground attack aircraft. While I do not want to scramble my entire complement of ready F-16s, I am forced to, as I can not risk losing my radar sites to an airstrike, as that would significantly impact NATO's ability to intercept any reconnissance aircraft. The BOGIEs are subsequently determined to all be MiG-23P's, and four are shot down without loss. At 0849Z ESM detects two probable Tu-16RM aircraft departing Severmorsk, and F-16s sent to intercept them over Norway. At 0859 VP-26 P-3 picks up a possible radar hit on a snorkling submarine, but it is at such extreme range that I have my doubts. See Battlelog below:
DTG Event
030800Z April 85 STARTEX
030805Z April 85 Launch P-3B from Andoya for SSC
030805Z April 85 Launch 2 P-3C from KEF for ASW Barrier ops
030808Z April 85 8 incoming BOGEY from Severmork. Scrambled all (4) ready F-16B from Banak to intercept.
030843Z April 85 BOGEY VID'd as MiG23P FLOGGER G
030843Z April 85 Flight 1967 engage MiG23P FLOGGER G with AIM-9L. 2 FLOGGER Splashed
030846Z April 85 Flight 1968 engage MiG23P FLOGGER G with AIM-9L. 2 FLOGGER Splashed
030848Z April 85 Flight 1967 reports 6 AIM-9 remaining. Flight 1968 reports 5 AIM-9 remaining. 13 AIM-9L expended.
030849Z April 85 New BOGEY launched from Severmorsk
030851Z April 85 New BOGEY launched from Severmorsk
030859Z April 85 Flight 1987 and 1986 RTB to Banak AB (Note: this was against my intention. Not sure what happened)
030859Z April 85 Flt. 1969 (2 F16A) directed to intercept BOGEY off North Cape.
030859Z April 85 POSSSUB radar contact from TRIDENT 5 (P-3C2.5) Possible snorkling sub? VP-26#5 retasked to investigate, goes to EMCON A.
030903Z April 85 VP-26# 4 ONSTA ASW Box 1
SITREP 0903Z
(https://i.imgur.com/OaIYrni.png)
Situation 0900-1000
At 0912, NATO issues a warning of possible TEL strikes on NATO facilities in Norway. Unfortunately, I have no locations for the TELs, so I can't use the F-5s at Banak to pre-emptively strike them. So my F-5s sit un the runway..... Meanwhile, the Norwegian F-16s continue to attrite the Soviet MiG-23Ps, shooting down four more. In the North Atlantic, the SOSUS gives a high quality contact on a possible diesel submarine. The Norwegian P-3 is retasked to begin localization. The VP-26 P-3 gets another radar hit on the possible submarine, and beings prosecution, quickly establishing contact on a DIFAR buoy.
However, a ESM hit on a MUSHROOM radar invic Jan Mayen Island shows the Soviets are trying to locate the NATO ships. Based on the location of the ESM hit, the Soviets are too far away to detect my surface units, but they may be close enough in a couple of hours, so all is well for now. Until the Soviets land a brigade of naval infantry at Varabgebotn....
030903Z April 85 VP-26# 4 ONSTA ASW Box 1
030912Z April 85 Received intel report of possible TEL strikes on NATO facilities in Norway/ North Cape. I would like to have F-5 aircraft at Banak take off, as this appears to be the most exposed of the AB. But I have no targets to send them to.
030913Z April 85 Flt. 1969 (2 F16A) engage 2 fighter-aircraft with AIM-9L. 2 splashed. 6 AIM-9 remaining.
030918Z April 85 333 Sqn P-3B retasked to investigate GOBLIN 135. This contact is based on a single, very good SOSUS hit. The initial quality of the hit implies a high level of noise, so it is possibly man-made.
030922Z April 85 Flt. 1969 (2 F16A) engage FLOGGER G fighter-aircraft with AIM-9L. 1 splashed.
030925Z April 85 ESM hit on MUSHROOM radar near Jan Mayen Island. Possible HORMONE or HELIX helo. Likely Soviet surface vessel invic this area.
030928Z April 85 Flt. 1969 (2 F16A) engage FLOGGER G fighter-aircraft with guns. 1 splashed.
030928Z April 85 VP-26#5 goes radar active, detects POSSSUB snorkling 18nm away. Begins prosecution.
030930Z April 85 333 Sqn P-3B check in ONSTA for GOBLIN 135 prosecution.
030932Z April 85 Launch 2 F-16B from Banak for CAP
030940Z April 85 2nd ESM hit on MUSHROOM radar near Jan Mayen Island. Likely Soviet surface vessel invic this area.
030942Z April 85 VP-26#5 detects POSSSUB via DIFAR buoy.
030944Z April 85 USSR is reported to have landed at VARANGERBOTN
SITREP 0930Z
(https://i.imgur.com/RoWAwxo.png)
With the Soviets landing at Varangebotn, at least one of my dilemas is solved. Since the intell report about possible SSM strikes on ground facilities, I've been concerned about the F-5s on the ground at Banak. The landing at Varangebotn gives the F-5s a potential target. Although there are no landing ships showing up, I'm sure some worthy targets will turn up. All the ready F-5s are launched at 0945, with the intent of engaging targets of opportunity invic Varangebotn.
Meanwhile, the VP-26 P-3 ID's its submarine contact as a FOXTROT-class SS. It is attacked and sunk. Another P-3 locates a 3 ship SAG lead by a Mod KASHIN DDG to the west of Jan Mayen. This is a bit of a surprise, as the MUSHROOM contact is to the east of Jan Mayen, indicating that the Soviets have divided into two SAGs. The P-3 also detects a number of vessels near Jan Mayen. These are all VID'd as fishing vessels. However, until it is completed, this effort takes the P-3 away from its mission of working the ASW barrier. At 1143Z, the second SAG, led by the Sovremeny, is located by a P-3 east of Jan Mayen. See image below.
At 1000, the Soviets unleash a barrage of SSMs targeting Banak AB and the Norwegian radar network. Four F-5s are lost. Additionnaly, several radar sites are destroyed. Despite the loss radar sites, the North Cape area still has 100% radar coverage. However, there is no redundancy. A reattack on the remaining sites will create holes that the Russian LRB can use to penetrate into the Atlantic.
In the air, the Soviets continue to try to penetrate the Norwegian air defenses with MiG-23Ps and Badger reconnaisance aircraft. 8 Mig-23Ps and 3 Tu-16RM are destroyed in air to air combat with the F-16s, without loss.
In the ground war, the F-5s attack and destroy approximately one company of mechanized troops invic Varangebotn. However, the Soviet Naval Infantry brigade makes it ashore, and elements engage Norwegian army forces. A second Soviet mechanized company is destroyed in exchange for the loss of a reinforced platoon of M-48 tanks.
(https://i.imgur.com/9DIHofn.jpg)
030945Z April 85 Launch 2 F-16 B, F-5 Strike package for Varangebotn
030955Z April 85 GOBLIN 149 classified as CERTSUB. Classified as FOXTROT class SS. VP-attacks with Mk-46
030956Z April 85 Mk-46 hits FOXTROT class SS.
030958Z April 85 P-3 C2.5 "Trident 4" detects probable Kanin-class DD, Mod Kashin class DDG NW of Jan Mayen Island.
031000Z April 85 Missile strike on Banak AB. 4 F-5s lost.
031000Z April 85 Missile strike on GLOBUS I
031000Z April 85 VP26 VIDs commercial fishing boat
031031Z April 85 VP26 VIDs commercial fishing boat via IRDS
031034Z April 85 Tu-16RM detected departing Kilpyarv. Two possible bandits detected east of Varangebotn
031034Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert 5 F-16B from Banak to engage Bandits.. Vector ONSTA CAP to engage the Tu16RM
031041Z April 85 F-16B from Banak engage Mig-23P. 2 Mig-23P shot down
031049Z April 85 Tu16RM engaged with 3 AIM-9. Tgt destroyed
031059Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert 5 F-16B from Bodo for CAP
031059Z April 85 Bogie Possible Tu-16RM detected departing Kilpyarv.
031104Z April 85 Bogie confirmed Tu-16RM from Kilpyarv
031109Z April 85 6 possible fighters detected inbound from Severmorsk
031116Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert 5 F-16B from Banak
031125Z April 85 ESM indicates 6 possible BOGIES are fighters based on AA radar hits
031123Z April 85 Tu-16RM engaged and destroyed by F-16
031134Z April 85 F-16B from Banak engage 2 Mig-23P with AIM-9. 2 MiGs destroyed.
031141Z April 85 F-16B from Banak engage 2 Mig-23P with AIM-9. 2 MiGs destroyed.
.
031143Z April 85 ESM from P3 Trident 4 indicates UDALOY and SOVEREMNY are NE of
031145Z April 85 Bogie Possible Tu-16RM detected departing Kilpyarv
031148Z April 85 P3 Trident 4 locates UDALOY and SOVEREMNY NEof Jan Mayen Island via APS 115. PosID via ESM
031155Z April 85 F-16B from Banak engage 2 Mig-23P with AIM-9. 2 MiGs destroyed
031156Z April 85 Tu-16RM engaged and destroyed by F-16
031157Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert 5 F-16B from Bodo for CAP
031158Z April 85 F-16 shot down by MiG-23P with AA-7
031159Z April 85 F-16B from Banak engage 2 Mig-23P with AIM-9. 2 MiG-23 shot down
031200Z April 85 Est. Mech company destroyed invic Varangebotn. NATO losses were 1 Plt M-48 and a TOW section.
Following intently. :notworthy:
SITREP 1200-1400Z
The battle against the Soviet brigade that landed near Varangebotn devolves into a frontal attack against the Norwegian battalion. Although it inflicts a 3:1 loss rate on the attacking Soviet brigade, it is gradually ground down and forced to begin to withdraw toward Banak.
In the North Atlantic, an ESM hit on a MUSHROOM radar approximately 150 nm south of the SOVREMNY SAG shows that the Soviets are using their embarked helos for SSC. Although the Ka-27 doesn't have the range to detect the STAFORLANT ships patrolling north of Iceland, it could do so in about four hours if the SOVREMNY SAG moves south. Because of this threat, I launch 2 F-4E with a heavy AAW missile load, and one KC-135A tanker. My plan is to use the F-4E to shoot down the Ka-27, and use the tanker to keep in on station for an extended period (3 cycles/6 hours). In the North Cape area, the Norwegian F-16 A/Bs continue to attrite the Soviet Air Force, shooting down 4 MiG-23P and 3 Tu-16 RMs for the loss of 2 F-16As.
As the Norwegian P-3B was nearing BINGO and carrying four Harpoon IPs, I used it to attack the MOD KASHIN SAG. I considered using it against the SOVREMENY SAG, but I estimated that the four AIM-84s it carried had little chance of getting past the SA-N-7 SAMs. Using a USN P-3 to provide targeting, the P-3B launched the HARPOONs at 50 nm at the Mod Kashing DDG, which I evaluated as likely being the HVU for the formation. Unfortunately, I used a poor attack angle on the attack, allowing both the Mod Kashin and Kotlin SAM DDG to take shots at the incoming missiles. The Soviet defenses shot down three of the four AIM-84s, but the one remaining missile hit the Mod Kashin DDG, likely in an engineering space and slowed it down to 9 knots. However, ESM shows that the radars were undamaged by the hit.
To eliminated the SOVREMENY threat, at 1356Z I launch three P-3s armed with HARPOON missiles, and one element of 2 F-4Es armed with WALLEYE ASMs. My plan is to approach the SOVREMMENY SAG at 300 feet and launch the 12 Harpoon missiles along the same threat axis at 35nm to minimize reaction time and overwhelm the SOVREMMENY fire control radars on the engaged side of the ship. Hopefully a couple of the missiles will get through. The F-4E are for clean up. I really don't want them to close an undamaged SOVREMENY, as their AN/ALQ-119 jammers are unlikely to be effective against the SA-N-7.
1318Z April 85 Attack on the Mod Kashin SAG
(https://i.imgur.com/S4Qc19M.jpg)
031204Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert 5 F-16B from Bodo for CAP
031222Z April 85 The detection of a helo near Jan Mayen Island. This is concerning, as it is 150 nm from UDALOY SAG. This indicates it is being used for SSC to locate NATO ships.
031226Z April 85 Launch 2 F-4E from KEF for CAP duties
031235Z April 85 Tu-16RM engaged by F-16A with Guns. Tu-16 destroyed.
031249Z April 85 2 MiG-23P engaged by 4 F-16A. 2 MiG-23P shot down, 1 F-16A lost.
031151Z April 85 Bogie confirmed Tu-16RM from Kilpyarv
031152Z April 85 Launch 2 P-3C from KEF,
031309Z April 85 Tu-16RM engaged and destroyed by F-16A with AIM-9L and guns.
031313Z April 85 2 MiG-23P engaged and shot down by 3 F-16A with AIM-9L
031315Z April 85 Launch 2 Alert-5 F-16A from Bodo to replace the 3 F-16A
031318Z April 85 Norwegian P-3B launches 4 Harpoon vs. Mod Kashin DDG. VP-26 provides targeting info
031321Z April 85 1 Harpoon likely impacted Mod Kashin DDG. Target observed to slow to 9 knts after time of impact. The PEEL GROUP FC radar is still active, but the reduction in speed indicates the Mod Kashin is damaged.
031326Z April 85 Tu-16RM detected departing Kilpyarv
031335Z April 85 F-16A directed to intercept Tu-16RM
031341Z April 85 F-16A attacks Tu-16RM with AIM-9 and guns. AIM-9 and guns hit.
031341Z April 85 F-16A shot down by Tu-16RM (tail gun).
031343Z April 85 Tu-16RM crashes
031356Z April 85 Launch KC-135, 1 P-3C U2.5 from KEF, 1 P-3CB from Andoya
Note: I'm a bit torn here. These P-3C are needed to replace the P-3 that are doing ASW/SSC work. However, the dispersed Russian SAG needs some attention. Currently, their embarked helos are only around 120 nm from being able to discover the NATO ships, so they need to be eliminated soon. My plan is to use the current airborne P-3B to attrite the western MOD KASHIN SAG, while I will hit the SOVREMENNY SAG with 2 Harpoon-equipped P-3C from KEF and one Harpoon-equipped P-3B from Andoya 12 AGMs should be enough to ensure a mission kill on the SOVREMENNY and UDALOY. They will then transition to ASW duties. While I could use F-4Es, the HARPOON will do the same job without risking any US aircraft.
SITREP 1400-1730Z Attack on the SAGs
At 1426Z, I launch a strike package on the MOD KASHIN SAG of 4 F-4Es armed with GBU-10 B/E PAVEWAY II 2000 lb. LGMs and AGM-65 MAVRICK EO-guided missiles. Part of the reason for the launch now is that I want the strike to occur in daylight, as the AGM-65 is a daytime only system. Sunset is at 1918L, so that should give ample time for the strike. The onboard AN/ALQ-119 jamming pod should be able to deal with the SA-N-1 missiles of the SAG. Because of the distance for target, a KC-135 is launched to refuel the F-4s both inbound outbound the target area. My plan is to to a high speed/low altitude (300 foot) ingress to minimize warning time.
At 1500Z, another volley of Soviet SSBMs hit the S-266/244 site at the North Cape, and the S-600 Gapfiller radar. Fortunately, the strike missed the Gapfiller, but the North Cape facility was badly damaged. The Norwegian AD network still has radar coverage, but anymore damage will result in a gap(s) in the coverage.
Missile strike on the Norwegian Radar Network
(https://i.imgur.com/gzTmwF6.jpg)
At 1558Z, the P-3C/P-3B Harpoon strike begins it run in. One P-3C at altitude provides targeting information via its AN/APS-115 radar on both Soviet SAGs, while the remaining P-3s approach the launch point "stepping down" to 200 feet to remain below the radar horizon. (Image 2). At 35nm, all P-3s launch their missile along a 45 degree threat axis (Image 3) . I chose this relatively narrow axis instead of a multi-axis attack to overwhelm the FRONT DOME F/C radars on a single side of the ship. Hopefully, that will lower the rate of fire of the SA-N-7, and allow some of the Harpoon missiles to penetrate the Soviet defenses. Of the 12 AGM-84s available, 10 are directed at the Sovremenny DDG, and 2 at the Udaloy DDG (Image 3)
Image 2 1558Z P-3 Attack Begins
(https://i.imgur.com/4aWjiMn.jpg)
Image 3 1618Z Harpoon Launch
(https://i.imgur.com/sLkvNdY.jpg)
The result of the attack was that one of the 12 Harpoon missiles hit the Sovremenny DDG, which slowed to 12 knots, indicating a hit in the engineering spaces. The Udaloy was undamaged. All the P-3s exited the target area without being engaged. Hoping that the Sovremenny was crippled, i sent in the 2 AGM-65 equipped F-4Es. Unfortunately, the Sovremenny was not crippled, and shot both of them down, without inflicting any additional damage. Because the SOVREMENNY was not sunk, to minimize the threat of being detected, I have the F-4E on CAP engage the Ka-27 helo that is doing SSC. This is shot down at 1631Z. With only 1 remaining Ka-27, the Soviet SSC capability has been hurt.
Meanwhile, the four F-4Es assigned to strike the MOD KASHIN SAG refuel from the Kc-135 and begin their run at 1700Z. The attack is partially successful, with two AGM-65 hits on the Mod Kashin DDG, which slows to 4 knots, indicating it may be a mission kill. Two GBU-10s hit the Kanin DDG, which immediately sinks. However, two F-4Es are lost to the SA-N-1s. The two surviving F-4Es egress, refuel from the KC-135 and RTB to Keflavik.
031426Z April 85 Launch 1 KC-135, 6 F-4E armed with AGM-65B or GBU 10 to hit the MOD KASHIN SAG. This will give me barely enough time to do a re-strike if necessary. There should be sufficient daylight to make the strike, which the EO sensors on the AGM will need.
031437Z April 85 F-4E refuel from KC-135
031449Z April 85 F-4E complete refuel from KC-135
031500Z April 85 Probable SSBM launch detected by S-266 radar.
031501Z April 85 BDA: SSBM 1 S-244 and S-266 radar destroyed.
031544Z April 85 2 F-4E w/AGM-65 complete refuel from KC-135
031545Z April 85 2 F-4E w/GBU10 complete refuel from KC-135
031557Z April 85 Good radar hit on Sovremenny SAG via APS-115
031558Z April 85 P-3C and P-3B push to IP. The plan is to launch at 300 feet at 35nm to minimize time for the SA-N-7 to engage.
031558Z April 85 2 F-4E w/AGM-65 complete refuel from KC-135
031618Z April 85 Launch 12 Harpoon Missiles at SOVREMENNY SAG.
031620Z April 85 1 Probable hit on SOVREMENNY DDG.
031522Z April 85 2 F-4 E pushed to attack SOVREMENNY
031558Z April 85 2 F-4 E shot down.
031631Z April 85 F-4E CAP engages Ka-27 with AIM-7. Ka-27 destroyed
031645Z April 85 Launch 2 F-5 with CBU for targets of opportunity invic Varangebotn
031701Z April 85 4 F-4E attack Mod Kashin SAG
031702Z April 85 Mod Kashin DDG hit by AGM-65B
031703Z April 85 Kotlin SAM DDG hit by AGM-65B
031703Z April 85 F-4E shot down
031706Z April 85 Mod Kashin DDG hit by AGM-65B
031706Z April 85 Kanin DDG hit by 2 GBU10 and is sunk
031708Z April 85 Attempted re-attack on Mod Kashin SAG. 1 F-4E shot down by SA-N-1. F-4s RTB
1730Z Air Battle over Finnmark
The loss of four F-4s without significantly attrite the SOVREMENNY or MOD KASHIN SAGs means that it will be up to HARPOON equipped P-3s to finish the job. In fact, a restrike with the F-4s is impossible, as there is insufficient time to rearm them before the end of the scenario. Additionally, nightfall means that the EO seeker on the AGM-65s will be useless. This is just as well, as the AN/ALQ-119 jammers are incapable of dealing the the Soviet SAMs. My plan is to rearm one Norwegian P-3B with the remaining HARPOONs at Andoya AFB and send it against the MOD KASHIN SAG. As the Mod Kashin DDG has slowed to 4 knots and appears to be crippled, four AGM-84s should be sufficient to sink both it and the escorting Kotlin SAM DDG. For the SOVREMENNY SAG, I will rearm four P-3Cs with HARPOONs and repeat my tactic of flying low to within 35 nm of the SAG before releasing. That should overwhelm the defenses and sink both the Sovremenny and Udaloy DDGs. I expect the USN P-3s to depart around 2230, leaving just enough time to execute the attack before the scenario ends.
Image 1SITREP 1730Z
(https://i.imgur.com/1lHKCx3.jpg)
While the P-3s are rearming, what appears to be a large formation of approximately 20 Soviet aircraft begins to form over the USSR. (Image 2) I scramble all six of the F-16Bs at Banak AFB, joining the 2 F-16A that are already on CAP. At 1750, the NATO aircraft engage the Soviet formation. However, unlike the previous engagements against MiG-23s, the Soviet formation is guarded by MiG-27S FLANKER Bs. The ensuing melee lasts 25 minutes. At the end, 4 F-16Bs and 2 F-16A are lost in exchange for six FLANKER Bs and one FENCER D, with two more FENCER Ds damaged. Effectively, the NATO squadron at Banak has been virtually destroyed. Interceptors will now have to fly from Bodo AFB. A KC-135 is diverted from Iceland to provide tanking services in Norway.
As a note, the AA-10 ALAMO A SARH AAM was the reason for the increased F-16 losses. The AA-10 has almost the triple the range of the AIM-9. That, and the number of Soviet aircraft overwhelmed the defending F-16s
Image 2 SITREP 1738Z
(https://i.imgur.com/XXeEbUe.jpg)
Battle Log
031730Z April 85 The spectacular failure of the F-4s to significantly damage the SAGs will require me to use the HARPOON equipped P-3s. All USN P-3s are switched over to arming with HARPOONs. The Norwegian P-3B only has one more load out of AGM-84s, so I will load it out and use it to hit the Mod Kashin SAG.
031737Z April 85 4 U/I air contacts detected by radar ESE of Varangerbotn over Norway/USSR border, heading NW at 480 knts.
031738Z April 85 4 additional U/I air contacts detected by radar SE of Varangerbotn over Norway/USSR border, heading NW at 480 knts.
031738Z April 85 Launch 2 F-16B from Banak. Vector 2 F-16A from CAPSTA to intercept
031738Z April 85 4 additional U/I air contacts detected by radar SE of Varangerbotn over Norway/USSR border, heading NW at 480 knts
031739Z April 85 Launch 2 F-16B from Banak.
031742Z April 85 4 additional U/I air contacts detected by radar SE of Varangerbotn over Norway/USSR border, heading NW at 480 knts
031745Z April 85 F-4E strike refuels from KC-135 after Mod Kashin strike and RTBs.
031745Z April 85 KC-135 diverts to Norway for taker support ops.
031750Z April 85 F-16s engage Su-27S. 2 Su-27 shot down with AIM-9L
031751Z April 85 F-16B shot down
031751Z April 85 Su-27 shot down with AIM-9L
031752Z April 85 F-16B shot down
031753Z April 85 F-16B shot down
031755Z April 85 Su-27 shot down with AIM-9L
031758Z April 85 Su-27 shot down with AIM-9L
031759Z April 85 F-16A shot down
031759Z April 85 F-16B shot down
031759Z April 85 Su-24M shot down
031800Z April 85 F-16A shot down
031803Z April 85 Su-27 shot down with AIM-9L
1800-2130Z Airstrike on the MOD KASHIN SAG
The Norwegian P-3B takes off from Andoya AFB at 1914Z to attack to MOD KASHIN SAG. Enroute it relocates the SOVREMENNY SAG. For some reason, the SOVREMENNY SAG does not activate any of its radars, despite the P-3B overtly approaching within 45 nm of the SAG. After re-localizing the Sovremenny, the P-3 continues on to the MOD KASHIN SAG, and attacks it at 2132Z, sinking both the Mod Kashin and Kotlin SAM DDGs.
At 2000Z, ESM indicates the SOVREMENNY SAG has launched another SSC helo. The F-4E on CAP engage and shoot it down. This effectively blinds the Soviets, making in impossible for them to locate the NATO ships before the end of the scenario.
During this time frame, the Soviet airforce is inactive over northern Norway. This is extremely positive for the NATO forces there, as they are down to only a handful of F-16s. To stretch out the defenders, a KC-135 is sent to orbit nearby, and refuel the F-16s on CAP, while the remaining F-16 rearm at Bodo.
(https://i.imgur.com/DQZdOY2.jpg)
Battle Log
031914Z April 85 P-3B w/AGM-84A depart from Andoya to attack Mod Kashin SAG
032000Z April 85 Possible MUSHROOM radar detected. F-4E on CAPSTA vectored to investigate.
032015Z April 85 P-3B detects probable SOVREMENNY SAG at 714515N000323W Course: 294/11knt
032016Z April 85 VP-26 P-3C2.5 OFFSTA ASW Barrier 1 and is RTB
032018Z April 85 F-4E detects helo. 1 AIM-7M fired. Ka-27 destroyed. F-4E resumes CAP.
032025Z April 85 Norwegian F-16A tank off of KC-135 Det 1.
032030Z April 85 Launch 2 F-4Es for CAP from KEF to replace aircraft ONSTA CAPSTA C. (note: the F-4Es at CAPSTA C have been airborne for 8 hours. Their crews would be up for the IRONPANTs award by this time. :) )
032030Z April 85 Launch 1 KC-135 for refueling duties in Norway
032100Z April 85 Norwegian P-3B reports detecting likely MOD KASHIN SAG invic 730056N0102414W Course: 289/4
032110Z April 85 KC-135 Det 2 is OFFSTA.
032118Z April 85 F-4E ONSTA CAPSTA C
032123Z April 85 Norwegian F-16A tank off of KC-135 Det 1. KC-135 is now RTB.
032132Z April 85 P-3 launches 1 AGM-84A against probable Mod Kashin DDG, 3 AGM-84A vs. Kotlin SAM.
032133Z April 85 One Harpoon hit Mod Kashin DDG, sinking it. 2 Harpoon hit Kotlin SAM DDG, sinking it.
:clap:
SITREP 2130
After sinking the Mod Kashin and Kotlin SAM DDGs, the Norwegian P-3B is vectored back to the suspected SOVREMNNY SAG to perforem SSC duties. The USN P-3Cs have a significant targeting problem with the SOVREMNNY SAG. The issue isn't so much identifying the SAG, but in identifying the individual ships in the SAG so the HARPOON missiles can be properly allocated. This is because the SA-N-7 armed Sovremenny DDG is by far the most capable AAW ship, and required 12 HARPOON missiles to overwhelm its defenses and achieve a single hit. The extent of its damage is unknown, so to ensure another hit, 12 of the 16 available HARPOON missiles will again be targeted against it. The difficulty is in identifying exactly which ship is the Sovremenny, as after the first attack, all the aircraft left the area, dropping the contacts. Therefore, either SKUNK could be the Sovremenny. The easiest way to determine which is the Sovremenny is via ESM. However, when the P-3B first revisited the SAG enroute to attacking the MOD KASHIN SAG, the SOVREMENNY SAG did not emit, depriving NATO of a hull-classification.
To solve this problem, I will use a couple of strategies. First, I will push the P-3B to within 30nm of the SAG, in an attempt to get it to radiate. If that doesn't work, I will send the two F-4Es on a supersonic sprint directly at the SAG, while radiating, breaking off at 24 nm. Hopefully that will cause the SAG to radiate. Finally, if that doesn't work, I will send a single IIRDs-equipped P-3C in low and try to get a infra-red ID on one of the ships. Because the F-4s on afterburner will use a lot of gas, I launch the Alert 5 KC-135 for tanker support.
Fortunately for NATO, these alternative search plans are not necessary, as the SAG begins radiating its FC radars at 0002Z, allowing NATO to identify the western most contact as the Sovremenny DDG. The strike group of P-3s will approach at 300 feet from the west along a single axis to overwhelm the Sovremenny's FC radars, repeating the first tactics of the first attack. To divert attention away from the attack, I have the Norwegian P-3 shift to the south and continue radiating its radar. I also have the F-4E make a supersonic run towards the SAG. (Image 1 below). All 16 AGMs are launched, with 12 aimed at the Sovremenny DDG and 4 directed at the Udaloy DDG:
Image 1 040050Z April 85 Harpoon attack on the Sovremenny SAG
(https://i.imgur.com/cnw8WRe.jpg)
Battle Log
032141Z April 85 Four P-3C 2.5 with AGM-84 launch from NAS Keflavik
032220Z April 85 P-3B on SOVREMENNY SAG Bird Dog station. SAG is not emitting
032216Z April 85 6 F-5Bs depart Banak AFB for ground support mission
040002Z April 85 SAG emits FC radars. Sovremenny and Udaloy DDGs ID'd.
040010Z April 85 Norwegian P-3B moves to the south of the SAG to divert attention away from the USN P-3Cs attacking from the west. USN P-3s drop below radar horizon.
040050Z April 85 VP-26 P-3C launch 16 HARPOON missiles at SOVREMENNY SAG from the west. 12 AGM-84 vs. Sovremenny DDG, 4 vs. Udaloy DDG. F4E begin a supersonic run towards SAG from the south to divert attention from the strike.
040052Z April 85 The Sovremenny shoots down the first 3 HARPOON missiles, and successfully deceives the fourth. The fifth and sixth AGM-84D hits, sinking the Sovremenny DDG. The Udaloy fairs no better. Although one of its AK630 gatling guns shoots down a AGM-84, the remaining three missiles hit, sinking the ship.
Aftermath
At this point, the scenario ends with a major victory. Total losses for the Soviets are the Sovremenny, Udaloy, Mod Kashin, Kanin, and Kotlin SAM DDGs, a Foxtrot SS, 1 FENCER D, 6 FLANKER B, 6 BADGER D and 22 FLOGGER Gs. NATO losses are 5 F-16A, 4 F-16B, 4 F-4E and 4 F-5Bs, as well as several radar sites.
While fun, I don't believe this particular scenario was reflective of Soviet doctrine. The Soviet submarines never appeared to break out through the GIUK gap. Consequentially, the NATO P-3s could concentrate on sinking the Soviet SAGs.