Russia's War Against Ukraine

[GDS_Starfury]

this ones for JH, try not to laugh.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1657700493605453825

[GDS_Starfury]

Serious question:  As the Ukrainian command, how hard do you try to win battles that will decimate Russian morale, versus battles that will inflict maximum casualties, versus battles that will maximize liberated territory?

I think if you do the first two then the third is easy.

[GDS_Starfury]

something good

https://twitter.com/i/status/1657607656985468928

[MengJiao]

I'm guessing it'll be another few days before we have agreement on exactly how far the Ukrainians advanced (e.g., whether the map above is still accurate).

Serious question:  As the Ukrainian command, how hard do you try to win battles that will decimate Russian morale, versus battles that will inflict maximum casualties, versus battles that will maximize liberated territory?

It's a balancing act, obviously.  If the Russian morale totally collapses, the other two objectives become MUCH easier.  But, if the Russian morale didn't totally collapse in 1941, and if the "big collapse" last September only yielded 8,000 square miles and the Russians still hold another 40,000 square miles of Ukraine, what is the Ukrainian game plan to try to achieve their stated goals?

My sense is that you strike for a balance of all 3.  I just have no idea how Ukraine gets to the point where it can accomplish its stated goals of liberating all Ukraine.  Maybe the Ukrainian end state for now is to get something akin to the 38th Parallel in Korea, negotiate a ceasefire such that the Western embargo of Russia continues in perpetuity, and then seek membership in NATO?

I think for the Ukrainians, the problem is that they cannot risk losing much of their army.  Meanwhile, the Russians have shown that they can lose army after army and it apparently doesn't make a lot of difference.
So, what to do: the low-risk strategy for both sides is to go on dumping as much HE as possible on the other side.  The Russians are hitting apartment buildings and the Ukrainians are wrecking another Russian army or two.   So the question is: how much longer can the Russians go on losing armies?  And this revolves back to whether a Ukrainian attack will accelerate the destruction of Russian armies.  The dynamic here strongly implies that neither side can afford a ceasefire, so the only possible outcome is the collapse of one regime or the other hence the Russian emphasis on attacking the civilian infrastructure and hence the fact that Ukraine can only undertake limited offensives.  What could change the dynamic is things like billions more support from Germany and the Swiss relaxing their re-export rules.  ie. as soon as the West recognizes there is no workable outcome except the destruction of Russia's last army, the sooner (paradoxically) the Russians might do some serious negotiating.

[SirAndrewD]

I'm guessing it'll be another few days before we have agreement on exactly how far the Ukrainians advanced (e.g., whether the map above is still accurate).

Serious question:  As the Ukrainian command, how hard do you try to win battles that will decimate Russian morale, versus battles that will inflict maximum casualties, versus battles that will maximize liberated territory?

It's a balancing act, obviously.  If the Russian morale totally collapses, the other two objectives become MUCH easier.  But, if the Russian morale didn't totally collapse in 1941, and if the "big collapse" last September only yielded 8,000 square miles and the Russians still hold another 40,000 square miles of Ukraine, what is the Ukrainian game plan to try to achieve their stated goals?

My sense is that you strike for a balance of all 3.  I just have no idea how Ukraine gets to the point where it can accomplish its stated goals of liberating all Ukraine.  Maybe the Ukrainian end state for now is to get something akin to the 38th Parallel in Korea, negotiate a ceasefire such that the Western embargo of Russia continues in perpetuity, and then seek membership in NATO?

From what I've seen they advanced a bit further than the maps showed, but they "stalled" because they're only actually deploying two fresh brigades in the Bakhmut theater. 

They have apparently by all accounts allocated 16 brigades for the coming counteroffensive.  The two brigades fighting on the north and south flank in Bakhmut are not part of that force allocation. 

As to the question of the target, that's a good one.  Napoleon counseled that the target in war should be the army, not the ground (advice he forgot in Russia).  However, there are some very significant gains to be made by the UAF if they think logistically about cutting lines of supply either in the south towards Crimea or the North towards the railheads at Starbolisk. 

In the current case I think they should try to accomplish both as much as they are able.  But again, they must think with logistics in mind above all.  They can't liberate massive territories because, well, they need to actually keep their forces fueled, fed and armed enough to maintain combat effectiveness. 

This is why, in my admittedly armchair opinion, they should try to achieve great success in a powerful counteroffensive in an unexpected direction with fairly limited but achievable goals. 

Sometimes the political victory that's unable to be hidden is greater than what you can achieve on the battlefield.  Ask Giap about that.

[JasonPratt]

Serious question:  As the Ukrainian command, how hard do you try to win battles that will decimate Russian morale, versus battles that will inflict maximum casualties, versus battles that will maximize liberated territory?

I think if you do the first two then the third is easy.

I would even say if you do the second one, then the first and third are easy.

[GDS_Starfury]

related to yesterdays aircraft losses:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/arming-ukrainian-fighters-with-aim-120-missiles-is-a-complex-proposition

[Gusington]

My instinct was to answer 'destroy as much of the Russian Army as possible' but as a few people mentioned above it doesn't really matter because of the Russian numbers.

I don't see morale mattering much either since Russian morale has not been much of a factor since the beginning of the invasion - Russia is basically a giant prison state now.

So how does Ukraine 'win' this? They have fought smarter and better than Russia from the first day but still Russia holds Ukrainian territory. Maybe more and more attacks on Russian territory at the expense of escalation? That doesn't really seem realistic either. None of the past year+ will matter if the Russians lose their minds enough to use nuclear weapons.

I dunno...

[SirAndrewD]

So how does Ukraine 'win' this?

Best question ever and I don't have the answer.

Some like Jordan Petersen and Russel Brand say, surrender and just let Russia dictate terms.

I'm more of the opinion that victory, as awful and costly as it is should be to keep making Russia pay, win local victories, and wait out Putin's increasingly limited lifespan.

I hate it, I hate everything about this war.  I wish it would end because I don't believe in an afterlife, I believe every life lost is wasted. I know I post here and do so objectively and academically and I'm a grog, I'm a wargamer, I play war.

But I know we have people here like Detcord and Jarhead and others that have seen the reality.

There are times, I see our discourse and think on All Quiet on the Western Front and Paul sitting in the pub on leave and seeing the old men talk about Flanders.

I hope we're not like that.  I don't think we are.  Just a moment of pause.  Every life is, to me, sacred.  Every moment we look at a map or see videos, someone who was loved, loved someone, had a life, ended. 

These are the things that keep me up at night.

[GDS_Starfury]

ah Gussypoo, moral means to material and three is to one.  it matters more then just about anything else.

I would also argue that russia does not actually have the numbers.  their demographics are horrid and they still need people to work and run the country.

[FarAway Sooner]

Russia is squandering itself, no doubt.  But they've only sacrificed the tip of the iceberg in terms of manpower they can slaughter on the Altar of Russia's Imperial Dreams.  My sense is that millions of Russian soldiers--maybe more--would have to die before Putin's dream is brought into remission.

In the last century, Russia has been willing to endure untold slaughter and widespread devastation in the name of their sense of nationalism.  The notion that 40,000--or even 200,000--deaths will begin to tighten the noose on Putin's regime seems to have no historical precedent.  I could be wrong, but I suspect the Russians would be willing to subsist on cold potato soup and a few shreds of cabbage for two years before they'd back down at this point.

And that doesn't even begin to imagine how many more civilians might die on either or both sides.

[GDS_Starfury]

this isnt 1941 and they dont have that kind of manpower anymore.

[GDS_Starfury]

snippet from an interesting NYT article:

If Russia detonated a weapon, it would lose that jealously guarded treasure of superpower status. Such an act would constitute an admission that its army has been beaten — a tremendous loss of face.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/opinion/russia-war-ukraine-nuclear.html?unlocked_article_code=vj8CnfGssAy-sr0KJ9R7mTyxMsxxT7DVnQTdew2iwXsYSLLXTdojzu6folr4aLpDNOFl-ifjiukR6iSbOR_DhmYhgR8QNcGM4ta-FXgixNRfDvZHoI-6gNt0qOUF54wfaM_LtR3Ie0zKckiWDIBS5fuUbIWDNv-rpjEXw8jIU2U-WOEzt1DeVa2p9jlKpY6mDJYirzxqnRlDFW7GtEIH8BMrIjipDQBVOiLbU4BjGkHD_rEBOTscET88QEZANF2TRIoZ1mT-SLr-5Yzywksbbvl136FYRgYWLDnaOAbdcHej42FwM7pAbbnRZknFkHDlsm9bhb3pKL29UsAzafqTQ7vLJ_k&smid=url-share

[Gusington]

^Well that is a glimmer of good news.

Morale on the Russian side, except for Wagner Group's morale, still rings hollow to me when Russia is being held hostage by Putin.

[JasonPratt]

this isnt 1941 and they dont have that kind of manpower anymore.

More importantly, they don't have the logistic backfield Stalin had carefully (and murderously) developed in the 15ish years prior to the Nazi invasion. Granted, Stalin had practically killed the Soviet Union to do so, in the sense that he had set up the nation to collapse and die if they didn't get more resources and means of production pronto (not even counting the number of his own people he had killed outright or indirectly condemned to death to get to that point). But Russia hasn't even been doing that since the Soviet government fell (or transitioned one might say).

The comparison does lead to a backhanded thought which will be kind of counter-intuitive at first: Stalin's Soviet Union survived almost unimaginable repeated military disasters (and related economic disasters) for several reasons, but among them was that Hitler substantially reduced (in various ways) the number of people Stalin's regime had to support with food, supplies, etc.

As Ukraine continues to score epic victories against Russia, they're ironically making it easier for Putin to put more of his reserves, such as they are, into the field despite his crappy logistic support. I'm not really worried about Putin mobilizing 5 million, or 3 or even 2 million more troops to throw at Ukraine, because doing so would absolutely wreck his nation due to its lack of ability to support them in the field (including by reducing non-combat backfield support by direct proportion). I've quipped before that I'd like to see him try because that would end the war, in Ukraine's favor, a lot quicker! But if he can dole out his reinforcement in a piecemeal fashion, within the level of his logistic support capability, that's more worrying; and there may be a window (albeit narrow) where whittling down his troops makes it easier for him to support his troops, which in turn is one important component for victory. Whether he has anyone statistically competent to figure that out, much moreso whom he'd be willing to listen to, is another question.

Of course, in that case, he'd be better off downsizing his crew on the front end to something his backfield logistics can support in the field without needing to take large numbers of his civilian support out of support at all, and then work with that -- putting it more broadly, he'd be better off setting things up so that he isn't constantly crippling his own troops' capabilities. But that isn't likely to happen: one main reason they started out crippled already, was (and still is) because of a policy of his regime to keep the military weak and terrorized against rising up to overthrow his regime! This is also why his troops are only good at acting like gangster thugs -- which was good enough to get some areas recaptured in past years, but not good enough to fight more professionally trained and supplied and motivated troops!

Lastly, on the question of whether Russia's population today can and will be able to go on starvation rations to win: I'm not sure, but past comparisons suggest they're willing and able to do that for defensive operations. Will they be willing to do that for conquering enemies? The real Nazis really were a VERY VERY PAINFULLY OBVIOUS existential threat to the Soviet Union and to the people of Russia, and that was a big motivational factor for the Russian people, including for tolerating their own murderous supervillain regime. I think Russia does face an existential threat of its government's own making, but marketing Ukraine as that threat has a lot of built-in problems.