Russia's War Against Ukraine

[JasonPratt]

Hm, at least the Russians will enjoy relatively interior lines of supply and support there. Ludicrously bad by normal standards, but by current local standards more like a dream situation than a nightmare!

Yet.

(So many things the Orks could have done but for political/promotional reasons didn't which I'm just as glad for. Arguably they should have focused their main counter-counter-(counter??)-attack on Karkiv from the beginning even if they had to temporarily cede the area north of Azov and hunker down in Crimea on starvation supply for a while.)

[Sir Slash]

Wasn't Kupiansk the Capital of Ukraine in the old Soviet era? I wonder if this factors into their plans at all, or is it just an important Communications Center? I bet an updated version of Manstein's  'Back-Hand Blow' would work here?

[SirAndrewD]

Wasn't Kupiansk the Capital of Ukraine in the old Soviet era? I wonder if this factors into their plans at all, or is it just an important Communications Center? I bet an updated version of Manstein's  'Back-Hand Blow' would work here?

Kharkov was the first capital of the Ukraine SSR, now named Kharkiv.

There would be significant political capital gained from the capture of Kharkiv of course, as well as strategic and it's still a Russian goal.

Kupiansk's value is strategic as it's the central hub of access over the Oskil Reservoir. 

If Russia wishes to eventually reopen offensive operations against Kharkiv and then Kyiv, the capture of Kupiansk is important as it will allow them to try what they earlier failed to do, encircle Kharkiv and lay siege.

I imagine this, along with the new mobilizations and the training and expansion of the army in Belarus is anticipating a phase in the war in the spring of '24 where they make another attempt to take Kyiv and Kharkiv from multiple directions and end the war. 

[GDS_Starfury]

https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/

[ArizonaTank]

So because of the chaos Putin has caused with the ruble, Russia is now on the cusp of issuing a digital version of the ruble. I would guess this is a digital fiat currency. What could go wrong in a country run by cyber criminals?  ;) More to come I am sure:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/russia-says-it-will-halt-foreign-currency-purchases-and-launch-a-digital-ruble-to-keep-the-currency-from-spiraling-further/ar-AA1f67gm?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=5db149e962aa46268aeb3ee32dba594d&ei=48

[FarAway Sooner]

I'm not too worried about Ukraine's lack of forward progress per se so far: the Russians have been throwing rear-line reserves to the front defensive line pell mell to keep Ukraine from cracking it, and they're rapidly running out of reserves (not even counting refusals to go to or back to the defensive line).

I'm more worried about Ukrainian troop losses, but they're playing to minimize those as much as possible under the circumstances.

I guess there's no way to know whether stuff going on around Verbove is a pinprick or more of a crack in the dam.  That seems to be the million dollar question.

For the Russians at this time, a pinprick through the defense could easily become a crack in the dam.

I hope you're right.  That's certainly the narrative that's being provided by the more optimistic pro-Ukrainian sources these days.  However, a pinprick that's not become a crack after more than two weeks seems unlikely to be cracking. 

As is often the case in war, even the folks on the ground don't know when a breakout is happening until a day or two after it's started.  And, if you have good OpSec, nobody else finds out for another few days after that.

The Russian Army of today isn't the Red Army of WW2, but it does seem like Russia has a long history of throwing poorly equipped, poorly trained troops into the meat grinder for years on end and still surviving.  They might not have as many troops as they did 80 years ago, but if their army is falling apart, I've not seen proof of it on any battle maps in the last nine months.

My concern is not so much that the Ukrainians are losing as that they don't seem to be winning either.

I can't recall at the moment, but how's the crossing far south into Crimea itself going? I got the impression that it's mainly for 'demonstration' purposes, and not meant (or supported) for going very far other than establishing and holding a beachhead -- for now -- and that the Russians were scrambling around in the area unable to put together a sufficient response (for now). But I don't recall hearing anything more in recent days.

I have the same sense as you.  Again, it's hard to know how much of this is the pro-Ukrainian media sources exaggerating a minor tactical victory for PR and click-generating purposes, and how much of it is just good OpSec.

[SirAndrewD]

I hope you're right.  That's certainly the narrative that's being provided by the more optimistic pro-Ukrainian sources these days.  However, a pinprick that's not become a crack after more than two weeks seems unlikely to be cracking. 

As is often the case in war, even the folks on the ground don't know when a breakout is happening until a day or two after it's started.  And, if you have good OpSec, nobody else finds out for another few days after that.

The question I and some others have is, "Are the Ukranians actually trying to break the lines and launch a drive towards the sea before the snows?"

I'm not sure the answer is yes. 

Zelensky's "Too little too late" speech from a few weeks ago is a insight into his thinking and after the failed frontal assault after multiple delays at the start of the Counteroffensive, it does not seem as if the strategy of the UAF has been what many in NATO and the western media expect it to be.

The end result of the losses of Western Equipment was in the long run minor, only three Leopards were unsalvageable and most Bradley's are being repaired. However the short term result is that the UAF seems to have felt that its heavy brigades were too valuable to be risked in battle after sustaining such losses on the first day. 

I'm beginning to suspect, and some others are in agreement, that the UAF's strategy is simply to break lines and demine, gaining more advantageous positions for future operations after more NATO equipment, especially F-16's and Leopard I's and M1's arrive. 

The UAF seems to favor delay over decisive but risky action.  This is potentially being shown live in the Verbove valley where after they breached the lines, they halted and awaited the inevitable counterattacks, surrendering initiative and allowing their initial gains to be, albeit temporarily, lost.

Since those counterattacks were finally pushed back the UAF has not been seizing initiative back, instead they've consolidated.  They've widened the breach but they're giving the Russians a lot of time to lay mines and dig new works.

If that is indeed what's happening, I'm not sure of the effectiveness of that strategy.  While the UAF may be stronger next Spring, the Russians will have an entire fall and winter to further dig in and prepare, and yes, lay more and more mines. 

Overpreparing for an offensive expecting your opponent to not take advantage of the interval is a mistake the Germans made against the Russians at Kursk. 

Hopefully that mistake of the past is not being made again on a larger scale.

[Uberhaus]

They also don't want to squander all of their brigades on attacks that wouldn't succeed.  Obviously, use them to exploit when a breakthrough occurs but if one doesn't occur, Ukraine will need them in 2024 for a future offensive that Putin fantasizes for.  Damned if I can find the article with this dissenting view.

More optimistically, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/09/russian-tanks-depleted-stock-heavy-losses-ukraine/  Has a nice graphic of the vanishing tanks from a Siberian outdoor tank park.  Hopefully, Star is right and we'll see nothing but T-34s very soon.  Medvedev's claim of thousands of tanks produced a year is laughable.

Also, optimistically, the raid over the Dnipro: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2023 

A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian command recently redeployed a "prepared grouping" of Russian airborne (VDV) personnel from the Kozachi Laheri area to Zaporizhia Oblast and replaced them with mobilized fighters from an unspecified unit, thereby weakening Russian defensive power in this area.[

Hopefully, this is indicative of a severe manpower problem.  Hopefully, when Putin and his ilk call up more Russians in the fall for 2024, the Russian people will finally have had enough.

[SirAndrewD]

They also don't want to squander all of their brigades on attacks that wouldn't succeed.  Obviously, use them to exploit when a breakthrough occurs but if one doesn't occur, Ukraine will need them in 2024 for a future offensive that Putin fantasizes for.  Damned if I can find the article with this dissenting view.

That's fair and kind of what I am leaning towards.  The UAF can roll up the works and clear defensive positions with careful combined arms attacks, but there's limited room for a great breakthrough considering Russia's access to a near infinite supply of mines and zero compunction to use them regardless of the humanitarian costs or costs to their own side.

[Uberhaus]

So you feel they won't make it to the Sea of Azov with this offensive?  I have my doubts but I hope the Ukrainians succeed in cutting the land bridge and be in a strong position come what may.

[GDS_Starfury]

Im still hoping for a sudden rupture again.  the soviets sent a lot of shit north so the Kherson region isn't as strong as it was.  it's still shit terrain to fight across.  theres not a lot of news coming out from my perspective.  mostly small UAF pushes in the along the southern front and back and forth in the north. 
as for the Sea of Azov, at the moment no.  if the UAF can get to Tokmak I'd be happy from my middle aged armchair.

[GDS_Starfury]

quite interesting how pervasive real time intel has slowed warfare.

[MengJiao]

They also don't want to squander all of their brigades on attacks that wouldn't succeed.  Obviously, use them to exploit when a breakthrough occurs but if one doesn't occur, Ukraine will need them in 2024 for a future offensive that Putin fantasizes for.  Damned if I can find the article with this dissenting view.

That's fair and kind of what I am leaning towards.  The UAF can roll up the works and clear defensive positions with careful combined arms attacks, but there's limited room for a great breakthrough considering Russia's access to a near infinite supply of mines and zero compunction to use them regardless of the humanitarian costs or costs to their own side.

  I would think that what the Ukrainians want to avoid above all is losses.  Paradoxically, this lets them in for a lot of attrition BUT if they can steadily and significantly degrade the Russians at all levels -- maybe they are hoping for a point where they can roll forward with relatively low losses.  Or, to look at it another way, if they can count on steady support from the West and they keep their losses low, they might reasonably suppose that sooner or later they will be able to advance with relatively low losses assuming they are significantly degrading the Russians across the board (economically, logistically, in troop strength and quality, weapons, artillery,equipment etc. -- that is systematically degrade the Russians in every way possible -- while keeping losses low)   

[SirAndrewD]

So you feel they won't make it to the Sea of Azov with this offensive?  I have my doubts but I hope the Ukrainians succeed in cutting the land bridge and be in a strong position come what may.

I don't think they're trying to make the Sea of Azov right now.  What MengJiao said in the post above is what I largely agree with is their current objective. 

That's not to say that if the opportunity presents itself that the situation might change, but the offensive's priority right now seems to be to degrade the Russians, gain stronger positions for the future, and preserve their combat power.

[Sir Slash]

Exactly. As I said a little over a month ago, and got some push-back for it, I don't see how Ukraine without control of the air, a significant advantage in arty or numbers, superior tech, or some other advantage is capable of a Major Military Victory over the Russkies and a drive to the Azov or Black Seas. I used the 'S' Word to describe it (Stalemate) and I still don't see it any differently today, unfortunately. It's just basic military principals. Cluster Munitions, Leopards, shaping-the-battlefield, and degrading the Russian Army didn't lead to victory.

However, I refuse to be so pessimistic and defeatist as I see here.     My gut tells me the whole thing about the evacuations by the Ukrainians around Kupiansk might be a clever ploy to lure the Bears out of their fortifications into the open where the UAF can get at them. Draw them away from their arty and helicopters and then beat on them in open ground. And smash all that support when it tries to move-up into new positions. Maybe. Maybe not. The UAF still has time and are advancing in places so there's that. I think we're still in the 3rd quarter here but the clock is running.