Russia's War Against Ukraine

[Skoop]

The Wall Street Journal went a bit more into the confrence between Zaluzhnyi and NATO that happened earlier this week. 

According to them Zaluzhnyi directly rebuffed NATO suggestions and sources are directly quoting him:

 "You don't understand the nature of this conflict. This is not counterinsurgency; this is Kursk."

This connects with statements made previously by anonymous UAF sources that said NATO, especially American training was completely out of touch with their opinions of the nature of the conflict, and spent a significant amount of time assuming lightly contested breakthroughs followed by urban combat and counterinsurgency warfare, more in line with situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Zaluzhnyi has directly told his NATO advisors that he and the Ukrainian MOD are highly confident that their tactics will produce a breakthrough, and that significant  reserves are being held for that eventuality. 

This reinforces the idea that Zaluzhnyi's goal is a larger general collapse rather than a narrow schwerepunkt cutting the Russian forces in two.

To that end, the UAF has again been widening the gap in their main breakthrough at Robotyne, while only pushing slightly beyond it.  They are also continuing to rotate brigades rather than commit heavily in order to bring sustained pressure, while the Russians are having significant problems relieving their men.

Russian intercepts are making the problem clear.  Local commanders are bemoaning the lack of relief and reserves, and there are indications that they've had to commit most of the third line of defense to try to hold the second.  The first is being rolled up.

Most importantly, Russian intercepts in the south are confirming that the Russian forces around Robotyne are now totally out of armor reserves.

The UAF strategy of using Western armor as standoff, with their superior optics allowing them to destroy Russian vehicles outside of their ability to respond, has degraded the Russian forces access to tanks and IFV's to the point where they are almost totally gone from the Robotyne axis. 

The Russians seem to have committed most of their armor reserves to the stalled offensive in Kupiansk, and the continuing attempt to hold the flanks of Bakhmut. 

When you mentioned this earlier I was thinking exactly what was said here.  Zaluhzny is seeing a totally different picture here. 
Also when has nato ever conducted a breakthrough offensive without air superiority ?

I don't think nato offensive tactics would work for the Ukrainians without local air superiority.
I think zaluhzny is smart to do it his way.
Twenty years from now, we may be celebrating zaluzhny as a tactical genius.

[JasonPratt]

Regarding a comparison of Barbarossa to Putin mobilizing a million-man army to streamroll Ukraine (or do literally anything at all):

let me clarify.
I didn't mean that putin could pull off a Barbarossa.  I ment that a russian army that size today would suffer the same defeats that they did in the summer of 1941.

Again, depends on starting conditions, and what the armies are trying to do. Stalin didn't lose Barbarossa (and somewhat afterward) from being crappy quality. He put in MASSIVELY more pushups than Putin ever did, getting ready to go. Primarily Stalin lost by being caught way out of defensive position, by a hardcore Nazi army who knew how to kick Stalin in the balls repeatedly and keep him stumbling around until they (almost literally) got tired of winning.

Give Putin Stalin's 1941 army in modern terms, with allllllllll the practical advantages Stalin had set up for them, and competent commanders loyal to Putin (or at least willing to prove their loyalty), and I really don't think Ukraine would have stood a snowball's chance in hell.

Except maybe that simply giving that to Putin wouldn't be the same experience as Putin and his crew having grown all that up for about 15 years already. Putin and his crew would be fumbling around unable to figure out what to do with it. They were fumbling around unable to figure out what to do with (compared to Stalin) the tiny fractional forces and support they DID have.

This is related to larger scale morale issues in Russia right now, too. People aren't pining for Stalin again due to the USSR really being a workers' paradise, and certainly not because Stalin got shanked repeatedly for three years by Hitler.

[Con]

The Wall Street Journal went a bit more into the confrence between Zaluzhnyi and NATO that happened earlier this week. 

According to them Zaluzhnyi directly rebuffed NATO suggestions and sources are directly quoting him:

 "You don't understand the nature of this conflict. This is not counterinsurgency; this is Kursk."

This connects with statements made previously by anonymous UAF sources that said NATO, especially American training was completely out of touch with their opinions of the nature of the conflict, and spent a significant amount of time assuming lightly contested breakthroughs followed by urban combat and counterinsurgency warfare, more in line with situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Zaluzhnyi has directly told his NATO advisors that he and the Ukrainian MOD are highly confident that their tactics will produce a breakthrough, and that significant  reserves are being held for that eventuality. 

This reinforces the idea that Zaluzhnyi's goal is a larger general collapse rather than a narrow schwerepunkt cutting the Russian forces in two.

To that end, the UAF has again been widening the gap in their main breakthrough at Robotyne, while only pushing slightly beyond it.  They are also continuing to rotate brigades rather than commit heavily in order to bring sustained pressure, while the Russians are having significant problems relieving their men.

Russian intercepts are making the problem clear.  Local commanders are bemoaning the lack of relief and reserves, and there are indications that they've had to commit most of the third line of defense to try to hold the second.  The first is being rolled up.

Most importantly, Russian intercepts in the south are confirming that the Russian forces around Robotyne are now totally out of armor reserves.

The UAF strategy of using Western armor as standoff, with their superior optics allowing them to destroy Russian vehicles outside of their ability to respond, has degraded the Russian forces access to tanks and IFV's to the point where they are almost totally gone from the Robotyne axis. 

The Russians seem to have committed most of their armor reserves to the stalled offensive in Kupiansk, and the continuing attempt to hold the flanks of Bakhmut. 

When you mentioned this earlier I was thinking exactly what was said here.  Zaluhzny is seeing a totally different picture here. 
Also when has nato ever conducted a breakthrough offensive without air superiority ?

I don't think nato offensive tactics would work for the Ukrainians without local air superiority.
I think zaluhzny is smart to do it his way.
Twenty years from now, we may be celebrating zaluzhny as a tactical genius.

I just finished reading the WaPo article and was racing to post the link here to see that several of you beat me to it.
Also aligns a lot with Phillips OBrien articles and thoughts which I have been following on Twitter (now X?) Twixt?  I think that SirAndrew has some access to other sources of information than open articles like myself but I do agree that Ukrainians' are fighting the war the best way and have both tactical and strategic goals in mind which we are not privy to nor do we have an understanding of what they are seeing on the battlefield.
Con

[Windigo]

Last I checked, this is grogheads. If there is a website, where we should be able to safely opinionate about conflicts from a not in the know standpoint AND to freely speculate wildly... wouldn't that be here?

I mean within the realm of sustantive reason of course, this isn't some reality disengaged spinoff political cult.

[Uberhaus]

Well depending on how the French react we may see kick-off in Niger.  The coup leaders have told the French ambassador to leave and France has refused this request.  https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230825-🔴-niger-s-military-junta-gives-french-ambassador-48-hours-to-leave-country  If the French military is asked to leave they could possibly relocate next door to Chad, as there are no reported deteriorations in relations between the two countries.  France cut off aid to Niger at the end of July, but the US has continued aid and recently confirmed a new ambassador who will continue with diplomacy.  https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/19/politics/niger-ambassador-kathleen-fitzgibbon/index.html

Niger proposed a return to democracy within three years, which was rejected by ECOWAS.  https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230821-west-africa-s-ecowas-rejects-niger-junta-s-three-year-transition-plan
ECOWAS has stated that it is ready to intervene militarily in Niger https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230821-west-african-bloc-says-it-is-ready-for-military-intervention-in-niger-if-order-given 
While, Niger has authorized Burkina Faso and Mali to intervene in the event that Niger is attacked.  https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230824-niger-junta-to-let-burkina-faso-and-mali-intervene-in-the-event-of-aggression 

With the decapitation of Wagner, hopefully the 10 000 mercenaries in Mali will be paralyzed to intervene, should Niger request aid upon being attacked.  Wagner troops in Libya would likely have to transit Algeria by ground while those in CAR would have to transit Chad.  With the probable demise of Prigozhin and Utkin, and other senior leadership, an attempt at revenge for the decimation of the Wagner attack on US Forces in Syria in 2018 is much less likely.  It will also become much less of a priority as the Russian MoD hopes to displace or integrate them  Hopefully, Wagner in Africa will collapse as will the wealth that flows in to fund the war in Africa.  However, the BBC is reporting on the resilience of the organization:  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66604261

Dr Joana de Deus Pereira, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), told the BBC's World Tonight programme that Prigozhin's death would likely lead to "a certain revamping" of the group.

But she said that overall Wagner's operations would probably continue in much the same way as it had under Prigozhin's leadership.

"The organisation will persist in the future probably with another name, but it has already proved it has the capacity to adapt and to morph," she said.

"We have to look at Wagner not only as a single man but as an ecosystem, as a hydra with many many heads and many diverse interests in Africa."

Ruslan Trad, a security analyst with the Atlantic Council, agreed. He told the BBC that Prigozhin's death would likely see someone with connections to Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, installed to lead the group in his place.

But he suggested that the main challenge for Mr Putin may be finding someone with deep enough pockets to fund the paramilitary's operations, while not posing a direct challenge to his regime.

"They will try to find a new financier because Prigozhin was the main person with money there," Mr Trad said.

"I think it will be more difficult to find a new financier because [Wagner] have good commanders, but money is important here. Maybe they will [install] someone from the close circle around Putin.
...

"The commanders stationed in Syria, or Central African Republic or Mali, they already have very good models in place there and they have the freedom to act," he said.

"Local commanders are not impacted because the operations are separately operational, they have different resources for this and even now they are recruiting for Syria and Africa operations."

And he said the group's arms length relationship with Russian intelligence would remain a valuable tool for Moscow, allowing it to operate in the "grey zone" where it could pursue Russia's interests, but allowing officials to deny involvement.

Mr Bringer told the BBC that Wagner was "essential in Africa" in terms of promoting Russian interests. "The structure will certainly continue to exist there, perhaps no longer under the name of Wagner, but with a new head loyal to the Kremlin," he said."

[Uberhaus]

Last I checked, this is grogheads. If there is a website, where we should be able to safely opinionate about conflicts from a not in the know standpoint AND to freely speculate wildly... wouldn't that be here?

I mean within the realm of sustantive reason of course, this isn't some reality disengaged spinoff political cult.

Well, this just might happen to us:  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938538  

The head of French military intelligence, Gen Eric Vidaud, is losing his job after failing to predict Russia's war in Ukraine, reports say.

[GDS_Starfury]

Give Putin Stalin's 1941 army in modern terms, with allllllllll the practical advantages Stalin had set up for them, and competent commanders loyal to Putin (or at least willing to prove their loyalty), and I really don't think Ukraine would have stood a snowball's chance in hell.

its literally the same institutionally inept and corrupt command structure today as it was back then.

points to the Kiev drive

[GDS_Starfury]

[GDS_Starfury]

[ArizonaTank]

Some interesting thoughts from Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal on US guidance for Ukraine's offensive. Although I think the politcal jab they make in the first paragraph may be overblown.

Quote from the article: "There is more than a little irony in the U.S. lecturing Ukraine about underperforming. The U.S. military's strategy for prevailing against such fortified defenses includes air dominance. In Operation Desert Storm, as Fred Kagan and David Petraeus pointed out recently, the U.S. spent weeks on a bombing campaign to weaken Saddam Hussein's defenses before committing ground troops."

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/as-ukraine-advances-biden-faults/ar-AA1fMXmM?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=ENTPSP&cvid=010b0e01fd354a1ab03fa4319c659779&ei=9

Personally, I don't know what to think. On one hand, the US has the best organized and equipped military in the world. On the other hand, the US has no experience in doing what the Ukrainians are having to do without airpower.

So is the US a "power-coach," on the sidelines trying to coax the best performance? or just a meddlesome "back-seat driver?" The truth may be somewhere in the middle.

[Jarhead0331]

You also have to strongly consider US motives for involving itself in the war and what it hopes to gain through Ukrainian, to put it bluntly, sacrifice.

What is driving US strategic analysis and advice. Is it to achieve a rapid end to the war? Is it to minimize Ukrainian human and material loss? Is it to maximize damage and destruction to Russia's military, economy and geopolitical strength?  Whatever it is, it is certainly a major factor in how US military "experts" are pushing Ukraine to manage its war.

I suggest that the advice US military advisors are giving to Ukraine is not based on inexperience or naivete, rather it is based on a preferred calculated outcome.

[Sir Slash]

Well when Pres. Biden was in Helsinki he said, "After a successful Ukrainian Counteroffensive, this war will end by a negotiated settlement", no mention of what a successful counteroffensive would look like. But there was nothing about degrading the Russian military or Putin having to leave office which he did talk about before. So one would assume those 2 issues are off the table.

It's hard to tell who in the U.S. is actually in charge of policy in Ukraine or advising on war strategy. Hopefully their goal is to stop Russian aggression and preserve Ukrainian liberty. As to who's actually running the war in Ukraine, who's in charge, the Ukes or the West, is not clear either.

[Uberhaus]

That preferred calculated outcome would include not provoking a war between the US and Russia as well as minimally a return to rules based international order.  Damaging the Russian military to the point it takes decades to rebuild and making Russia's military adventure so costly as to discourage further attempts to reintegrate lost territories. As to the replacement of Putin, it is highly probable that the current administration wants this, as he continues to prosecute the war.
As to the disintegration of Russia, probably not due to the threat of nuclear proliferation.  Economic and geopolitical dominance?  Which country doesn't want this? 
A rapid end to the war in Ukraine's favour isn't possible without major outrage from Russia, but the Russians won't ever forget foreign interference.
Over simplified and probably naive on my part, and of course the strategists aren't these things, but thanks for letting me speak.

[Gusington]

^Ukraine will never forget foreign interference either 

[FarAway Sooner]

The US is Apollo Creed.  Ukraine is Rocky.  Russia is a mixed-up cross between Drago and Mr. T.