Russia's War Against Ukraine

[JasonPratt]

didnt those morons go into this with 150 btgs?

   Well, I thought it was something like that.  Maybe 78 btgs can still exhibit significant signs of orkish cohesion or something.

I lol'd so hard at that I started coughing!  :DD

The "orc" references popping up recently are no doubt meant to call back to Tolkien, but this Warhammer/40K "ork" reference made me start hearing the typical WH "ork" lingo being applied to the Russians now.

When real war is certainly grim darkness, millions dead and millions more displaced and wounded in so many ways, humor sure helps with coping.

[JasonPratt]

russian tank wants to be a subway

Submarine? Wasn't there once a standard for Soviet tanks to be able to cross 1000 meters water to a depth of... 12 meters over the hull or something like that? I know that was introduced with the BT class tanks in WW2, but I don't recall how far it got. (The very extensive floating tank project, which was rather different, got canned after Barbarossa kicked off, and not restarted at anywhere like the original production of nearly 5000 units. The PanzerIish T-76 is the basic tank for the Sovs in Heroes and Generals by the way, and I always enjoyed taking it out on the river to snipe enemies trying to cross bridges at long range. Few players ever figured out where I was either.  >:D )

Back to the photo though: I have to infer that's just the turret blown off and flipped over, but the forensic side of my head is trying to figure out how to account for the barrel strike on the pavement in combination with the clear signs of the barrel coming up partially from the pavement -- not apparently settling into the pavement as might be expected if the turret landed and flipped over from the tip of the barrel first.  ???

[al_infierno]

Maybe 78 btgs can still exhibit significant signs of orkish cohesion or something. 

You sure have a way with words.  If I didn't already have another quote of yours in my sig, I'd add this one!   :clap:   

[GDS_Starfury]

but the forensic side of my head is trying to figure out how to account for the barrel strike on the pavement in combination with the clear signs of the barrel coming up partially from the pavement -- not apparently settling into the pavement as might be expected if the turret landed and flipped over from the tip of the barrel first.

they do bounce you know.

[MengJiao]

Maybe 78 btgs can still exhibit significant signs of orkish cohesion or something. 

You sure have a way with words.  If I didn't already have another quote of yours in my sig, I'd add this one!   :clap:   

  Thanks!  I do some re-writing/editing and sometimes the results are worthwhile.

[Dammit Carl!]

"Tanks not fast enough; PAINT TANKS RED!" - Gen. Onodov Crushkin

[MengJiao]

didnt those morons go into this with 150 btgs?

   Well, I thought it was something like that.  Maybe 78 btgs can still exhibit significant signs of orkish cohesion or something.

I lol'd so hard at that I started coughing!  :DD

The "orc" references popping up recently are no doubt meant to call back to Tolkien, but this Warhammer/40K "ork" reference made me start hearing the typical WH "ork" lingo being applied to the Russians now.

When real war is certainly grim darkness, millions dead and millions more displaced and wounded in so many ways, humor sure helps with coping.

   Well, as has been pointed out, we just happen to be able to see this particular war better than say, what's been happening for years in Yemen or Syria.  Even more strangely, the early 21st Century in terms of war deaths is still a lot lower than most of the 20th century.  So there is all that -- it's just that we are seeing more of the horror.  And I would extend that perception (where possible) to the poor Russians who are also suffering.
   Speaking of the Russians and in particular their current regime, it seems they have gotten themselves into another series of loose-loose dilemmas:  1) they really just want the Donbas 2) but they can't say that can they? 3) they have to go on threatening everybody 4) Turkey has closed the straits 5) they want NATO to back off, but the more they threaten, the more that thwarts their limited objective which is the Donbas and quick!....this all would have been much easier for them if they had done a deal early and said something like "We get the Donbas and Ukraine can join NATO"...this is pretty much where things have actually been going all along and its only in their fantasy world that it was ever going anywhere else.  Now of course they have succeeded in being so threatening (though now working hard to walk back the nuke threats) that they are thwarting even their very limited objectives and instead getting Finland and Sweden into NATO (and effectively Ukraine too since all Europe sees the benefit of loading Ukraine with weapons to pin the Russians down there).  So they can't do a lot of things that would have helped weeks ago: 1) blasting NATO reinforcement routes -- can't do that since that will actually accellerate reinforcement exactly when they would have liked it to be slowing so that they can overwhelm the Ukrainians attritionally.  2) Keeping up the threat to Odessa (straits closed, Moskva sunk
NATO weapons coming in) 3) threatening to use nukes and such (that again would only speed up NATO's reinforcements) This only leaves them with all their usual counter-productive stuff -- 1) drive around with their weird army 2) throw HE at everything 3) act confused about everything

[Tripoli]

A good and brief write up on some of the long-standing Soviet/Russian issues with damage control by Admiral James Stavridis (ret.).  He was a SWO, so his comments regarding damage control carry a bit of weight:
https://gcaptain.com/russias-sunken-warship-warning-to-navies/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-ae234c6adc-170465134&mc_cid=ae234c6adc&mc_eid=28239a3349

IMHO, the key paragraphs are these (reproduced below):

"I have toured Russian ships on several occasions (including in Sevastopol before the Russian invasion), and the surface ships produced in the 1970s and 1980s, like the Slava-class Moskva, have several weaknesses in construction and manning.

The most noticeable deficiency is a lack of the sort of combat compartmentation built into U.S. and other Western warships. Instead of multiple watertight doors that can be slammed shut when a ship is at general quarters (all hands manning their battle stations), Russian ships have little ability to divide up internally — making them far more vulnerable to what is called "progressive flooding," a euphemism for sinking.


Another key shortcoming, which surprised me, is the lack of a strong corps of mid-grade professionals in the Russian navy crews. Called chief petty officers in the U.S. Navy, these are sailors with 10-15 years of seagoing experience who lead the sailors on the deck. They are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and the absence of such a cadre is a major problem for the Russians. (The same weakness — a lack of strong noncommissioned officers — exists in the Russian land forces, a major factor in the problems they are encountering ashore since the Feb. 24 invasion.)

I recently compared notes on the Ukraine sea war with a retired U.S. surface-warfare captain. He reminded me that when he toured a Russian cruiser, the officers wore name tags on their uniforms, while the sailors wore only numbers. This mentality — a reminder that the Russian fleet is in part composed of conscripts — reflects a lack of a coherent chain of command. That can work in peacetime operations, but quickly breaks down in combat.

In the case of the Moskva, we don't have the accurate reporting to fully evaluate the failures, but a couple of points stand out.

Most obviously, the readiness of the ship to defend itself from two incoming Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles (now confirmed by U.S. intelligence) was flawed. Whether that stemmed from a lax "watch standing" — meaning the sailors weren't at proper battle stations — or that the ship's anti-air defenses were technologically insufficient, we may never know. In all likelihood, it was a combination of both.

Additionally, the ability of the ship to take a punch and keep itself afloat, called "damage control" in U.S Navy parlance, was obviously lacking. On an American warship, the crew is organized at battle stations into teams spread throughout the ship that are trained, equipped, and prepared to respond to fires, flooding, loss of electrical power, and other challenges. It appears the Moskva crew not only failed to blunt the incoming attack but could not control the combination of fires and flooding that followed.
...
The death of the Moskva is a vivid reminder of the need for capable anti-air weapons systems, well-honed damage control and tactical choices when operating near hostile coasts. Even as Russia seeks to learn the lessons of the sinking of its Black Sea flagship, the U.S. and its powerful allies need to as well."

[Gusington]

^Great post, again.

In case any of you, like me, are wondering where Russia's Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier is:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/russias-only-aircraft-carrier-cant-attack-ukraine-and-may-never-sail-again/

[JasonPratt]

Admiral Kuznetsov 1939 to the Politburo: "THE SOVIET NAVY WILL BE THE MOST AGGRESSIVE FORCE IN HISTORY!" (His speech is so gung-ho, Stalin immediately vaults him to Central Committee membership without candidate status and promotes him to minister of all Soviet Navy.)

Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier in 2022: can't attack and may never sail again.

This outcome is both ironic and acceptable.  :bd:

[JasonPratt]

Re Tripoli's great source quoting again: I knew that traditionally the Sov/Russian armed forces sucked at sergeants/chiefs (for some obvious ideological reasons -- that's how you'd get grassroot revolutions against tyrannical overlords), but their Navy doesn't even believe in watertight compartments?? 

I was going to say, well, maybe that was true down to the late Soviet Era -- but that's something which could have been rectified for the Moskva during a refit, relatively easily, right?  ???

Part of my brain now wonders if they skimped on this for some doctrinal reason, along the line that their ships have always been intended to operate in a clean-sea environment: no torps, no aircraft, no incoming shells. That sounds insane, especially for a dedicated carrier killer (in theory anyway), but I could see it happening: HOW DARE YOU QUESTION SOVIET NAVY'S ABILITY TO DESTROY ENEMY BEFORE THEY SHOOT?!!? YOU MUST BE ENEMY PROPAGANDA!

[Gusington]

^Agreed. I'm sure Putin is fuming at his inability to get any use out of Kuznetsov too  L:-)

[Tripoli]

Re Tripoli's great source quoting again: I knew that traditionally the Sov/Russian armed forces sucked at sergeants/chiefs (for some obvious ideological reasons -- that's how you'd get grassroot revolutions against tyrannical overlords), but their Navy doesn't even believe in watertight compartments?? 

I was going to say, well, maybe that was true down to the late Soviet Era -- but that's something which could have been rectified for the Moskva during a refit, relatively easily, right?  ???

Part of my brain now wonders if they skimped on this for some doctrinal reason, along the line that their ships have always been intended to operate in a clean-sea environment: no torps, no aircraft, no incoming shells. That sounds insane, especially for a dedicated carrier killer (in theory anyway), but I could see it happening: HOW DARE YOU QUESTION SOVIET NAVY'S ABILITY TO DESTROY ENEMY BEFORE THEY SHOOT?!!? YOU MUST BE ENEMY PROPAGANDA!

A large part of the reason for the lack of damage control fixtures and fittings (including WT compartments) on Soviet ships was their warfighting strategy.  The Soviets planned on conducting the first strike.  Therefore, offensive armament was emphasized at the expense of a lot of other features.  Watertight compartments add weight and cost to a ship.  Damage control takes time, effort and training.  In the Soviet model, these resources were better spent in creating more, and cheaper ships.  As they planned on making the first strike (and didn't count on having the opportunity to reload and make a second strike), things like habitability, range, and defensive armament were all secondary considerations.  Effectively, they built ships for the war they intended to fight.

In contrast, western navies (in particular the US) had to have professional crews, because we didn't know when the first strike would happen.  So the crew had to respond to a first strike, defeat it and then accomplish any assigned mission(s). That takes a professional crew.  Additionally, our ships had multiple missions, so a professional crew needed to be onboard to competently execute all those missions.  This meant we needed to have more habitability, to keep the crew happy.  We also needed more range, because of our global commitments.  This also meant we needed more habitability, as the ships would be at sea longer.  We needed multi-role ships because we didn't know exactly what type of missions they would be on.  This capability is expensive.  So our ships, instead of being disposable, needed to be survivable (that also keeps the well trained and hard to replace crew happy, so they re-enlist).  And because western nations are democratic, their sailors (and their family members) vote, which means that making habitable, capable ships is politically more important than it is in non-democratic nations.  Each of these factors led the western to develop highly capable, balanced and survivable ships, in contrast to the Soviet navy, which developed cheaper, more numerous, less capable but more offensively-oriented ships.

By way of comparison: here is an image of the USS Frank E Evans DD-754 after it collided with the HMAS Melborne in 1969.  After being cut in half, the forward section did not sink, but was towed to Manila.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melbourne%E2%80%93Evans_collision.  That is what watertight compartments and a well designed ship and competent damage control can do.


{Edit: I was wrong: the bow section of the Evans sank, but the stern made it to port.  Here's the stern section:


[Addendum to the Edit: If anyone is interested, the training film "I relieve you, Sir" was produced as a result of the collision.  It goes into some of the epic screw ups by the bridge crew of the Evans.  Back in the day, all junior SWOs watched it.  It can be found here: https://youtu.be/YGJKYUciJsM ]

[MengJiao]

I was going to say, well, maybe that was true down to the late Soviet Era -- but that's something which could have been rectified for the Moskva during a refit, relatively easily, right?  ???

  Well to add a little local color to Tripoli's expositions -- you can't add much in terms of internal divisions once a ship is built.  Moreover, the Black Sea fleet seems to have been the most neglected
of all Russian forces.  There are no guided missile destroyers there.  Most of the more capable frigates were sold to India.  Of six advanced Krivaks set for that Fleet only 3 were built.  There's just not
much in the Black Sea Fleet and instead of building it up before the war, they sent ships out to the Med.  So there wasn't much there but a lot of amphibious ships even before Moskva was sunk.
So apparently nothing was planned but a walk-over at Odessa and some excursions in the Sea of Azov.  The real mystery is why they would have sent Moskva out at all -- maybe as a helicopter carrier
in bad weather?  She wasn't a threat to anything on land.  Other ships in the fleet can carry helicopters but I don't think they have hangars like Moskva did.

[Dammit Carl!]

Would guess that their sending the ship out came down to, "Well, fucking do something! Now!"