Russia's War Against Ukraine

[Pete Dero]

so 1917.

Putin did promise to take the country back to the era of the Tsars.

[Gusington]

Great success! And then once Russia implodes into 1000 pieces they can go back to 917. Endless possibilities.

[Sir Slash]

I'd be careful about taking those Euro's especially the ones with Putin's face on them. And on the back side, the message, 'Turn Back Over To Front Side Or Be Shot'.  ;D

[nelmsm]

Could see savvy Ukrainians alerting front line units with something like, "Hey, tell you what; you tell us where those blocking units are and we'll take 'em out.  You can then retreat to your heart's content."

I'd be encouraging them to surrender instead and reaping the benefit of videos of happy surrendering Russians

[JasonPratt]

A very nice and colorful summary of the Uk vs Orc war over the past month, produced by the Kings and Generals channel (who do some great docs):

[Crossroads]

A rather (long and) interesting article from The Times, with a story as how the war of genocide against Ukraine came about. Behind a paywall, but registered users are allowed an article every now and then. Well worth registration imho,

Based on the coming book Overreach, it describes how isolated Putin came to make a decision to invade Ukraine to make it part of Russian World.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-putin-kept-the-plan-to-invade-ukraine-a-secret-nlw087729

A couple of snippets, for instance

The ideology of late Putinism was the ideology of the institution that formed the men who led it – the Brezhnev-era KGB.

Putin turned 70 last month – three years older than the life expectancy of the average Russian male. However healthy or otherwise Putin might be, to the siloviki, Putin's "men of power", that meant that time was running out to find a decisive solution to the West's aggression. And that meant dealing once and for all with the problem of Ukraine.

Four men – three of whom were former or current directors of the Federal Security Service (FSB) – were to play a central role in leading Russia to war: Putin himself; Nikolai Patrushev, chairman of the Security Council and Putin's KGB colleague since 1975; Putin's old St Petersburg University classmate and FSB head Aleksandr Bortnikov; and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Of the latter three, it was Patrushev and Bortnikov who were the prime political movers, Shoigu the sometimes hesitant executor.

A bit later

From 2019 onwards Putin was accompanied on all his trips by no fewer than nine staff doctors – and among those who spent time with him were a team of neurosurgeons from the Central Clinical Hospital, Moscow, and Dr Evgeny Silovanov, a renowned oncologist specialising in thyroid cancer in the elderly, who spent 166 days with Putin over 36 visits. The Proekt team suggested that Putin may have undergone surgery for cancer in September 2020. In May 2022, the US film-maker Oliver Stone – who interviewed Putin many times between 2015 and 2019 – claimed that Vladimir Putin has "had this cancer" but "I think he's licked it".

However, in July 2022, the CIA director William Burns said that he had found no evidence of Putin's alleged illness – and quipped dryly that Putin was "entirely too healthy".

Putin's personal contact had for years been limited to a small group of no more than three dozen insiders. During Covid that bubble had shrunk far tighter still.

In the "seclusion and inaccessibility" of his Covid bunker, surrounded by "ideologues and sycophants", Putin developed a "deep belief that Russian domination over Ukraine must be restored", according to former Kommersant newspaper political editor Mikhail Zygar. Or as the CIA's Burns would put it in April 2022, "Putin's risk appetite has grown as his grip on Russia has tightened. His circle of advisers has narrowed and in that small circle it has never been career-enhancing to question his judgment or his almost mystical belief that his destiny is to restore Russia's sphere of influence."

Over two years in isolation, Putin developed a longstanding enthusiasm for historical theorising, which would culminate in an essay on Russia and Ukraine published in July 2021. The essay, according to one senior state TV executive, was "entirely [Putin's] own work... the result of much research and deep thought". His companion in that process of deep thought was an old and trusted friend who was willing to put his business on hold and spend time inside Putin's Covid world – Yury Kovalchuk.

If Nikolai Patrushev was Putin's most powerful silovik colleague and ally, Yury Kovalchuk was his most powerful friend from a different stage of his career – the tangled web of business, Communist Party and organised crime interests that Putin navigated with great skill as consigliere to St Petersburg's mayor, Anatoly Sobchak. According to a Russian government official I will call Sergei Ryzhy, Patrushev was for Putin "an ideal of KGB rectitude" and implacable "vigilant patriotism". His relationship with Kovalchuk was different, if no less close. Kovalchuk was "a man of a less exalted world", said Ryzhy, someone whom Putin trusted with the "more mundane matters" of his personal business interests and those of his immediate family.

So much to quote, but let us conclude with this one:

By midsummer of 2021, a "critical mass" of opinion among the innermost circle of Putin's friends and advisers had coalesced around the necessity of landing a "decisive military blow", according to Ryzhy. Exactly what form that blow against Ukraine would take – the creation of a pair of Georgia-style mini-states in Donbas, a Crimea-style annexation or a full-scale strike to decapitate the Zelensky government altogether and install a puppet, pro-Moscow regime – remained undecided. But by late summer of 2021 the "decision in principle" that an invasion was necessary had already, according to Ryzhy, been made by top siloviki Patrushev and Bortnikov. All that remained was to assemble the necessary forces and to persuade Russia's ultimate decision-maker – Putin – to launch the operation.

...and this one, with much more detail in the article covering that puppet meeting in the great hall where Putin barked at this minions just a couple of days before the invasion:

Putin had made his official message clear in the direct and universally comprehensible way he had communicated for two decades – the language of boss–subordinate relations. At its most superficial, he had signalled that recognition of the Donbas republics was right and proper, in the collective and unanimous opinion of Russia's top public statesmen. Subconsciously, but with equal clarity, he had also denoted who was in the inner circle, who was in the chorus, who was on the edges. And most of all, who was the ultimate boss.

But Putin had also signalled something far more profound, something that would ultimately be far more significant for the coming conflict. The most deluded and the most ideologically driven members of Putin's entourage were on the inside, while those with the most detailed real-world knowledge were on the outside. Like King Lear, indeed, Putin showed in his Security Council meeting that he was interested not in debate but in ritual public displays of approval. Dissent was no longer conceivable. There could be no clearer indication that the nature and power dynamics of Putin's court had changed. As had Putin himself. He had become the leader of a nation about to launch a great patriotic war.

An interesting read on hand, but then again the invasion plans were leaked to US Intelligence quite early on. So not sure how small the circle of those in the know was. Looks like an interesting book to read as it comes out:

Extracted from Overreach by Owen Matthews, published on November 10 by Mudlark (£25)

[fran]

Thanks for posting

[Crossroads]

Another long read for your Sunday, if the previous one speculated on how the war came about, here's Lawrence Freedman then making observations how to bring things back to negotiations table. Not so easy, as Putin clearly prefers - and needs - his war-war to jaw-jaw.

https://samf.substack.com/p/why-putin-prefers-war-war-to-jaw?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

Conclusion:

Faced with stark chocies Moscow might suddenly discover a serious interest in negotiations. Until then, however, there is little choice but for Kyiv, with Western support, to persevere with its efforts to liberate territory until a point is reached where a Russian defeat can no longer be denied – or, to use another Churchillian phrase, to 'keep buggering on.'

[fran]

A very nice and colorful summary of the Uk vs Orc war over the past month, produced by the Kings and Generals channel (who do some great docs):

Very good summary for the month of October. Thanks for posting!

[JasonPratt]

Another long read for your Sunday, if the previous one speculated on how the war came about, here's Lawrence Freedman then making observations how to bring things back to negotiations table. Not so easy, as Putin clearly prefers - and needs - his war-war to jaw-jaw.

That article makes abundantly clear (if it wasn't already) that the key problem, even within Russian context, is Putin.

From which follows the famous Stalin quip, "No man, no problem."

[Gusington]

From CNN:

Russians are creating the illusion of retreat from Kherson to lure Ukrainian forces into street fighting in the key southern city, Natalia Humeniuk, a spokeswoman for Ukraine's military, said Saturday.

"Russian troops are trying hard to convince everyone they are retreating but at the same time we are seeing objective evidence that they are staying," Humeniuk said in an interview with Ukrainian media.

"There are military units that were based there, and a lot of military equipment is stationed there, and their battle positions are set there as well. The battle positions that were set on the left bank will be used for the support of the battle positions on the right bank."

CNN has not independently verified Humeniuk's claims.

"We understand that Russians are trying to create an illusion of not being there in order to lure Ukrainian forces into the nearby settlements, and the settlements are usually where tough street fighting takes place," she said.

"This is why we know, we see and we foresee what kind of narrative they are trying to feed us, and we are building up our own strategy accordingly," Humeniuk noted. 

According to Humeniuk, Russians are moving their elite units and officers to the left bank of Dnieper River, leaving the ones on the right bank no way to escape or evacuate. "They are leaving the units on the right bank to fight until their last breath," she said.

Some background: It's been difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground in Kherson this week.

A senior Moscow-appointed official remarked Thursday that Russian troops would "most likely" fall back from positions in the southern city. Ukrainian officials have suggested from the start that the statement could be a trap.

Russia has been evacuating citizens from the city. Moscow portrays the move as vital for public safety. Kyiv has likened the evacuations to forced relocation.

Last month, a resident described the situation in Kherson as tense, with people "emotionally exhausted," the streets empty from mid-afternoon onwards and Russian soldiers often seen in civilian clothes.

[Gusington]

And meanwhile in Korea  :o

https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/asia/north-korea-south-korea-warplanes-friday-intl-hnk/index.html

[Tripoli]

Here's a twitter thread by Michael Koffman, a CNA analyst, who has just returned from a trip to the Ukraine.  Because he is (I believe) a native Ukrainian, and a  professional military analyst, his opinions are worth noting.  See also [PODCAST] SOUTHWARD AND EASTWARD PRESSURE ON RUSSIAN FORCES https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/southward-and-eastward-pressure-on-russian-forces/ (Podcast recorded by Kaufmann after his return from Ukraine):
•   Thoughts on the war by Michael Koffman after a 2 week visit to the Ukraine (CNA analyst) Michael Kofman@KofmanMichael  https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1588160964939096067
•   Nov 3  A few thoughts on the current course of the war, and some impressions after a recent visit to Ukraine with several colleagues from the mil analysis community, including areas near the front in Kherson. /1
•   The general sense one gets is that Ukraine is winning the war & morale is high, but like any military operation, you see friction up close that you can't from a distance. A fair bit of the UA effort is ground up, based on horizontal linkages, volunteers, apps, etc. 2/
•   Russia's military appears at its most vulnerable going into the winter, but UA has seen some modest impact from RU mobilization. Troops are being deployed to try and stabilize Russian lines, and increase force density relative to terrain. 3/
•   The situation in Kherson is clear as mud. Russian forces seemed to withdraw from some parts, evacuated, and drew down, but also reinforced with mobilized personnel. The fighting there is difficult. Despite constrained supply, Russian forces do not appear to be out of ammo. 4/
•   I think this is a fog of war issue right now, with contradictory indicators, but to me the preponderance of evidence points to a Russian decision to steadily retreat from the right river bank and avoid being cut off there, while also trying to exact a high cost. 5/
•   UA folks I spoke to seemed optimistic they can press Russia out of Kherson (west of the river) by the end of the year. There are outstanding questions about the Khakovka dam, and whether RU might sabotage it upon withdrawal. This issue is more salient than talk of RDDs. 6/
•   Still, it remains unclear whether RU intends to fight for Kherson city, perhaps using more expendable or mobilized units while preserving better troops. I'm skeptical RU will abandon all positions on that side without being forcibly pressed out, but could be wrong on this. 7/
•   Forcing a Russian retreat from Kherson's right bank will bring UA systems within range of some ground lines of communication from Crimea. But, it will also give RU forces a large natural barrier, less terrain to defend, and a higher force density to terrain ratio. 8/
•   Overall, it seems unlikely that the war will die down over the winter, even if some months make offensive operations challenging. UA will likely leverage its advantage in range and precision to attrit the Russian military over this period. 9/
•   Strikes across Ukraine are leading to blackouts and electricity conservation. UA is resolving these blackouts quickly, and if anything the bombardment campaign bolsters resolve, but over time the challenges from these strikes could mount, straining equipment and ADS ammo. 10/
•   I've been dismissive of the Belarus vector, despite recent RU deployments there. But the situation merits tracking over the coming months if numbers of Russian troops grow and they are provided heavy equipment. 11/
•   Mobilization, and its potential downstream effect 3-4 months from now introduces a degree of uncertainty. It could extend the war, or make future UA offensives more costly, but I think UA is preparing for a range of possibilities depending on what mobilization yields. 12/
•   On mobilization I largely hold to the thoughts in this earlier thread. It seems RU is taking a staggered approach, throwing some mobilized personnel with little training to stabilize lines, but holding many back to reconstitute units or form reserves. https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1572573108246286336?s=20&t=FIbVVthKhVGQw5BY68ywrQ 13/
•   However, RU mil could use mobilized personnel first to  raise manning levels in currently deployed BTGs, many of which seem at 40-50%. Morale of mobilized personnel might be low, but individual replacements can start filling these units out faster than establishing new units. 14/
•   RU strategy appears to be focused on defense over the winter, hoping that mobilization can rebuild their forces. If the pressure lets up they will use the time to get more equipment out of storage (including from Belarus) & potentially ammo from sources like DPRK. 14/
•   In the east RU forces appear desperate to hold the Troitske-Svatove-Kreminna line and are trying to dig in for the winter. Here a UA breakout could prove significant. In general it seems RU approach is to try and fix a defensible line and hope to maintain over the winter. 15/
•   UA objectives are likely to prevent Russian force reconstitution over the winter, generate additional forces in the interim (which requires more equipment), and acquire air defenses to reduce the threat from the Russian strike campaign against critical infrastructure. 16/

[Sir Slash]

I imagine the Russian High Command is fighting two wars. One against the Ukrainians and another against Putin's meddling. They are playing Chess against Ukraine, but Russian Roulette against Vlad. They can survive losing to the Ukes but cannot losing to Putin and his thugs. The Ukrainians are the lesser of the two threats to them right now. NOT a good place to be in.

[ArizonaTank]

Uncle Vova (Putin) song.

I saw this Russian propaganda video briefly referred to in an NPR documentary...and I had a masochistic urge to check it out.

If the English translation is correct...all I can say is it is pretty sick...real personality cult stuff. Children in military uniforms singing about the "final battle".

"If the Commander in Chief calls for the last battle, Uncle Vova we are with you"

Oh...and the "Samurai" are never to get Sakhalin back...and Alaska is going back to the "homeland"...sorry Anchorage.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrBOxEVducM

The punchline is that this video was first posted in its untranslated Russian version four years ago...

Pardon me while I go throw-up on my shoes.