The "Uber" Command: Modern Air/Naval Ops Thread

[Dimitris]

AMRAAMs - i launched 2 yesterday at a target that id firmed up enough for launch but obviously not enough to hit the target, when the missile got to where the target should be it turned out to be somewhere else, no biggie - something im not understnading i reckon

Your tactical picture can vary signifcantly from the "ground truth", depending on what your sensors are telling you. (A great way to understand this is to play in ScenEdit mode and occasionally activate "God's Eye view". You may be surprised as to the differences).

So when the AMRAAM is launched and its clear it needs a little help with guidance, do i switch on the planes radar to sort out the acquisition or do i switch on the missiles own radar?

The AMRAAM and its brethern (R-77, MICA, PL-12 etc.) employ inertial + datalink mid-course guidance with terminal active radar. For short-range shots it's OK to literally fire and forget, but for medium/long-range shots you almost always have to stick around for a while and provide datalink updates until the radar seeker turns on; otherwise there is a fair chance the target will have moved outside the acquisition box (particularly an alerted and maneuvering target). In Command, aircraft who launch such missiles, unless manually directed otherwise, will try to support them mid-flight by cranking (slowing down and turning sideways while keeping the target tracked).

[Dimitris]

I wasn't aware you had to micro manage missle launch from individual AC in command.  I can say that in other sims like Dcs or falcon, you designate the target with the planes radar then the amram120 will go pitbull (on it's own radar) once it is in range for that.  Most western fighters have sophisticated radars that support track while scan so you can lock up 2 or 3 targets at once and put a 120 down range on each one.  Not sure if this is all modelled in command though, be interesting to see what Dymitrius says about it.

Normally you don't have to micromanage, the aircraft does the whole "rise to optimum speed/altitude, turn on sensors as necessary, launch, crank if applicable, evade if necessary, observe results and re-engage or break off as necessary" story. You can of course take over and handle the whole thing manually (as UCG indicates he is doing) but then you are responsible for seeing it through.

[Dimitris]

i couldnt launch the missiles until a certain amount of resolution was achieved

This is by design (see also the manual p.32, doctrine option "Engaging ambiguous targets").

Notice the tip:

TIP: This setting is of great help if you want to make the AI (both friendly and enemy) conservative & cautious with its fire discipline (fire only under a solid fire control solution), or conversely model a trigger-happy or poorly-trained unit, group or entire side that throws weapons right and left without much caution.

[Dimitris]

While AMRAAMs have their own active radar seeker, it's only activated in the final attack once it is closer to the target.  So the launching craft still needs to guide it to the target much of the distance in long range shots. 

In other words, it still needs radar guidance from the launching aircraft until it goes active and to do so requires a hard radar fix to be effective at anything but short range.  I'm not sure how deeply this mix of semi-active and active-homing is modelled in CMANO but I'm sure the launcher requires it's radar to be active in the game in order to direct the weapon to the activation point.

AMRAAM uses INS/datalink + TARH, not SARH + TARH. The only weapon that uses SARH (time-shared in fact) + TARH is the AIM-54. (And yes, we have a separate guidance mode in Command just for this missile).

[Dimitris]

As a point of interest, what does air doctrine say about a 1v1 BVR missile engagement when both parties fire missiles?  Do you keep your nose pointed at the enemy until your missile goes pitbull, or do you evade?

You crank and hope your shot gets to the target before the incoming shot gets to you. If necessary (in order to evade), you break off completely. In the case of a SARH engagement this usually means your shot is wasted. If you have shot an AMRAAM, depending on how far downrange the weapon is, there is still a fair chance it will acquire. BVR engagements with AMRAAM-class weapons actually resemble torpedo duels a bit.

[Dimitris]

double post

[Dimitris]

If I remember correctly, the Phoenix burned it's fuel pretty quickly, but because of speed and it's path actually being an arc, it could cover the entire range.  Because of burning it's fuel quickly, it didn't have anyway be make the radical turns that a smaller aircraft could make.

Kurt Plummer once had a great piece on the Phoenix (Tomcat fanboys can leave now :) )

Which brings me to the AIM-54. Called the Phoenix but known as the Buffalo,
despite a 'Mach 4 class' (Mach 3.8, AIM-54A Rocketdyne Mk.47 motor) and even
'Mach 5 class' (Mach 4.5, AIM-54C, Aerojet Mk.60 motor) what you have in
this weapon is a 'trainwreck' (or a thundering herd of buffalo, driven off a
cliff) mechanic in which a very slow start and midcourse also employs
terminal dive attacks that (though greatly complicating endgame intercept
geometry for the missile) reenergize it's final approach.

As an example of how bad this 'getting there' deficit can be- In April 1973,
a single Tomcat, flying a standard loiter at about Mach .67 and 25,000ft
(i.e. a preplaced FORCAP orbit), with one AIM-54 Phoenix aboard (minimum
weight and drag) was turned to intercept a BQM-34E which was _itself_
closing at Mach 1.5 and 50,000ft. Starting from initial detection at 132nm,
the F-14 flew an additional 20nm (1 minute) to achieve firing parameters of
Mach 1.5 and 44,000ft. The missile then flew for 2.62 minutes or 157
seconds. To achieve a downrange intercept at a mere 72.5nm. DURING THIS
TIME, average /missile/ velocity, including the parent boost and a specially
tailored (engineers spent all night tweaking the analogue autopilot gains,
something which would never happen in the fleet) profile of 103,500ft
altitude (as near zero-drag vacuum as you can get) was no more than 1,656
knots. Or roughly Mach 2.93.

What happens if, the target turns away? If the target is going slower? If
the target performs a beaming or 'notch' maneuver? If the target postholes
down into the clutter where the Hi-PRF looses it in the clutter? The missile
misses that's what.

In another 'miracle mile' event, an F-14, firing at a BQM-34A with an
initial setup of 10,000ft and Mach .72 vs 50ft and Mach .75 at 22nm
separation showed the weapon intercepted at around 16nm in 54 seconds.
DESPITE being a SARH-PDSTT all the way (no firing lag to account for time
share TWS on multiple missiles) in nominally 'snap down' assisted conditions
for acceleration, where there was no time spent climbing to the loft.
DESPITE the fact that the missile was indeed /powered throughout the
flight/. Average Missile Mach was only 1.88.

In the 'so impressive' 6v.6 engagement, the aircraft _could not_ achieve
'maximum kinetic assist' because, with six Phoenix aboard, it didn't have
the gusto to do more than about Mach 1.2 and could not achieve even this _in
the time available_ to initiate TWS tracking on 'fighter sized' (3-5m
augmented drones) targets. And the crew were pressed so hard already (in
retaining adequate radar scan volume overlay) that, instead of a wall or
conventional shelf, the UT-33 and BQM-34 were arranged in an 'extended card'
type formation with azimuth spacings on the order of 5nm in frontage (three
sets of two for 15nm) and with upwards of 35nm in trail (83 vs. 110nm) yet
only 5,000ft of altitude separation. What this allowed the F-14 to do was
generate a maximum X minimum scan of 120` X 2 bars in a giant pie-slice
sectoring of sky that kept everybody visible with missiles in the air and
with no AWS-27 (E-2) uplink.

Even so, at the outset of engagement, a completely bogus 'orchestration' of
formation behaviors had to occur so that none of the targets drifted out of
the scan volume or steamed right through it so that the initial drones flew
at Mach .6 and the trailing aircraft at Mach .8 while the last was a
'sprinter' coming in at about Mach 1.2 to play catchup. The F-14 initiated
firing at a mere 31nm and continued to do so over a steady-flight period of
38 seconds, opening up on the closest targets /last/ (exposing itself to
their weapons systems) to ensure that 'all missiles impacted within a few
seconds of each other' for a virtual simultaneous seeming engagement. As a
part of this exercise in idiocy, it 'maxxed the dot' (ASE starboard) so that
it could bias it's TWS volume into the target lane while setting the
geometry physically to engage the final AQM-37 (sprint) target coming up the
far right side of the engagement.

/Conveniently/, not only did the drones all arrive at co-pole distance with
the missiles due to their careful range distribution, but they actually
/curved inwards/ to follow the Tomcat (like a drunk crossing lanes into
oncoming traffic) so as to better stay in-volume.

'And So', over a total period of 3.92 minutes (235 seconds, 33 miles at Mach
.9, 55 miles at Mach 1.5, a /veritable eternity/ in fighter vs. fighter ops)
the Tomcat killed all but the furthest-out (lefthand biased) 2 targets,
thereby proving that multi-on-multi _did not_ work. Because even with all
this grooming of the engagement variables, the AWG could not keep everybody
under track long enough to get a missile out to each of them, dumping one
target completely before the AIM-54 could hand off. While the other drone
had its FQ augmentation now so far out of field that the AIM-54 itself could
not maintain the target track at the severe crossing angle.

Keep in mind that NONE of these were 'valid kills' because despite the
nominally /enormous/ LAR or 'Launch Acceptability Region' of the Phoenix
itself, the combination of scan lag and limited PRF ability to handle
various low closure/high crossing angle targets through the Hi/Lo interleave
ensured that TWS was unavailable until a point (roughly 50nm) at which the
structured missile flyout sequencing necessary to get all six targets
challenged the assumption of killing before being killed. And so, regardless
of supposed simultaneity, the entire raid behavior was suspect, not only for
being designed to bring the targets into the Phoenix envelope ONLY as the
weapons came to bear. But rather for what it did NOT require the Tomcat crew
to do so as to avoid threat bypass or direct engagement of the F-14 itself.

This is something which no halfway competent (threat) fighter pilot would
'step into' as he:

1. Doubled the altitude separation so as to force the F-14 RIO to compress
his azimuth scan field to deepen the bar search.
2. Transited the combat area at a MINIMUM 550 knots or Mach .95 to compress
the flyout vs. SARH timeshare problem even more.
3. Maximized his formation frontage densities to make sure the Tomcat had to
open fire at closer to maximum (TWS interleave) of 50-60nm to have a hope of
killing all targets in a very tight separation of missile guidance updates.
For which sudden, drastic, formation changes would leave little or no
ability to adjust final missile update steering into handoff conditions.

All of which leads to the generalized sarcasm of "Ignoring the Phoenix
shots..." among those AF pilots in particular who sparred with the USN
Tomcat community off Rota Spain during the late 70's and early 80's when the
AIM-54/AWG-9 was at the height of its 'mystical' powers (achievement is the
inverse of expectation, the Pentagon Paradox).

Indeed, the saddest element of this story is that no Tomcat has ever flown a
Fleet Defense Bravo loadout of six missiles in active (cruise) service. They
cannot safely recover or (single engine ROC) launch with that much weight.
And further they cannot themselves maintain adequate smash to aggressively
maneuver at altitude to set the geometry vs. fighter targets without going
supersonic which both eats fuel and instantly compresses the fight. Indeed,
most of the squadrons did even not deploy (before 1988 anyway) with the
outboard horn rails because they were draggy as hell and a pain to
mount/dismount in trade for the more common Sparrow or even Sidewinder (6X2
or 4X4) alternate loadouts. Lastly, the USN only produced about 5,000
AIM-54s and of those, only about half were the AIM-54C+ 'ECCM/Sealed'
(either as new or by conversion) which had the seeker, warhead fuzing and
autopilot upgrades to be any good against more than the dumbest threats. The
/total/ number is only sufficient to allow every Tomcat a Fleet Defense
Alpha loadout of 4 missiles. One time. And the actual magazine count during
cruise was never more than a fraction of even this (back when there were
actually two squadrons of 12 Tomcats on every deck).

[Nefaro]

The main mission of the Phoenix was fleet defense against long range Soviet bombers.  They were not effective against small, more agile fighters.  As the Soviet threat went away, so did the need for the missile.  IIRC, it was an expensive weapon as well.

This, in a nutshell.

While it had amazing range, the missile just sucked regarding effectiveness.

[mikeck]

The main mission of the Phoenix was fleet defense against long range Soviet bombers.  They were not effective against small, more agile fighters.  As the Soviet threat went away, so did the need for the missile.  IIRC, it was an expensive weapon as well.

This, in a nutshell.

While it had amazing range, the missile just sucked regarding effectiveness.

Yeah, I didn't understand a thing that article was talking about...but I know that the Phoenix was designed to hit slow lumbering Bear style bombers before they could enter ASM range. Aircraft that- in effect- couldn't really maneuver without bleeding far too much energy

[Skoop]

The info was  enlightening as it seems that the phoenix was overated, the great range wasn't exactly translated into combat capable kills.

But here's a thought in tactics, you don't always have to kill a target to accomplish the mission. I take this way of thinking from dealing with radar in the SEAD role.  When you launch a HARM, it doesn't necessarily mean you kill a radar or SAM unit, but you will force them to turn off their radar, thus suppressing the air defenses. 

So if your in a small mirage aircraft maneuvering to get in range to fire an exocet at a carrier, a tomcat locks you up and sends a phoenix down range.  Your RWR is going to be screaming at you and your gut will be telling you to break off and dive for the deck to hide in the ground clutter.  It would take one extremely disaplined  pilot to just say oh that's just an overated phoenix coming at me it won't hit me, I'll just continue on. 

It's not the first time we put too much weight on missile capabilities, thinking of the original sparrow performance shamfrul dipray in Vietnam, and that they didn't even put guns on the phantoms cuz the joint chiefs though we wouldn't need em.....that changed real quick.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

The info was  enlightening as it seems that the phoenix was overated, the great range wasn't exactly translated into combat capable kills.

But here's a thought in tactics, you don't always have to kill a target to accomplish the mission. I take this way of thinking from dealing with radar in the SEAD role.  When you launch a HARM, it doesn't necessarily mean you kill a radar or SAM unit, but you will force them to turn off their radar, thus suppressing the air defenses. 

So if your in a small mirage aircraft maneuvering to get in range to fire an exocet at a carrier, a tomcat locks you up and sends a phoenix down range.  Your RWR is going to be screaming at you and your gut will be telling you to break off and dive for the deck to hide in the ground clutter.  It would take one extremely disaplined  pilot to just say oh that's just an overated phoenix coming at me it won't hit me, I'll just continue on. 

It's not the first time we put too much weight on missile capabilities, thinking of the original sparrow performance shamfrul dipray in Vietnam, and that they didn't even put guns on the phantoms cuz the joint chiefs though we wouldn't need em.....that changed real quick.

How useful is it if they only have to turn it off for a handful of minutes? I think if you need that route, you need to kill that SAM battery.

With the phoenix, it is still useful if it forces them to turn away. If you can follow up with another type of shorter range missile, loosed with you in control, it is an advantage.

What is the opinion now on guns? Missiles have come so far, I wonder if guns mean much these days. If you have gun fights in the sky, it seems like you have failed in strategy.

[Skoop]

^ The harm is pretty sophisticated, it will remember the location of the emission and continue to that spot and detonate.  The SAM will have to vacate the area or have medium range tunguskas shoot down the harm.  To truely suppress the SAM site it would take several harms launched at once from different trajectories to guarantee hits.  You have to overwhelm them.

Missiles have come a long way, the 120D is highly touted.  Notice they did put guns on F-22s and 35s though.  Heck the next gen will probaly have lasers to go along with its photon torpedoes, always got have something for those in close and personal engagements.

[Nefaro]

You can't jam or decoy a gun.

Also.. there are those pesky minimum range issues with missiles.  ^-^

[OJsDad]

The Phoenix's didn't have to have a great kill ratio.  If they could disrupt the bombers from firing as a group and force them to stagger their fire, it would give the ship defenses a better chance. 

[Dimitris]

The Phoenix's didn't have to have a great kill ratio.  If they could disrupt the bombers from firing as a group and force them to stagger their fire, it would give the ship defenses a better chance.

Yes.

This is exactly what all the folks banging about the SA-2's poor Pk in VN (or the AIM-7's for that matter) don't grasp.