News from Ukraine Conflict

[Staggerwing]

Interesting article from March on the topic of a nuclear armed Poland

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303824204579421660993452026?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702303824204579421660993452026.html

The article is paywalled. Any chance of quoting some or all of it here if it doesn't violate any Big Media Goonsquad rules?

[mirth]

Stupid paywall!!! If you find it through a Google search, it doesn't block you.

How to Put Military Pressure on Russia
NATO now has reason to station nuclear forces in front-line member states.

By JIM THOMAS
Updated March 9, 2014

Russia's seizure of Crimea should be a wake-up call for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The absence of serious thinking about NATO's territorial defense mission—its raison d'être—and the weakness its 28 member nations have shown since the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia have proven catnip for Vladimir Putin.

Most of NATO's European members have spent the past two decades rationalizing how they can spend ever-smaller sums on security. And now the U.S. is cutting its defense expenditures while trying to "pivot" its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. So it isn't surprising that pundits and government officials have tended to emphasize political and economic suasion for dealing with this latest Russian aggression.

Sanctions, skipping the G-8 summit in Sochi, hitting Russian oligarchs in their pocketbooks, isolating Russia in international forums—all of these options are legitimate responses to Mr. Putin's land grab in the sovereign state of Ukraine. But there is also a need to think about military options.

First, NATO should reconsider its so-called Three Nos from the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Three Nos were shorthand for the NATO allies' joint declaration that they had "no intentions, no plans, and no reason" to station nonstrategic nuclear forces in new member states. But NATO left the door open to future deployments if front-line allies were threatened. While NATO still lacks the intention and plans to station nuclear forces in new member states, such as Poland, it now has more than sufficient reason to do so.

A preliminary step should be making the Polish air force's F-16s capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons so that they could participate in NATO's nuclear mission. That should quickly be followed by site surveys to identify suitable locations for potentially storing nuclear weapons on the territory of front-line allies, including Poland, if relations with Russia further deteriorate.

Second, NATO should reinforce its front-line allies with additional conventional force deployments. The time has come for the U.S. and other NATO allies to consider permanently stationing forces in Poland and Romania as well as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to back up their words of strategic solidarity. Their mission should be defensively oriented, establishing what military strategists call "anti-access, area denial" zones. (This might include missile defenses to protect major bases in those countries along with anti-air, anti-armor and anti-ship weapons to counter air, land or naval incursions.

Taking these steps in the Baltic states would reduce Russia's temptation to encroach on their sovereignty in the name of "protecting ethnic Russian populations," a pretext it has used in Ukraine. It would also preclude Russia's option of a quick, Crimea-like operation to establish a fait accompli on the ground before NATO can decide to act.

Third, NATO should make it clear that it would seriously consider a future Ukrainian request for indirect military assistance, especially if Russia escalates the crisis in Crimea or deploys its forces into other eastern Ukrainian provinces. NATO could certainly provide overt nonlethal and humanitarian assistance, while the U.S. might even consider covert lethal aid, as in Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet occupation. This might include short-range precision guided weapons that could be used by resistance forces to attack bases and facilities on Ukrainian territory seized by Russia's forces or its proxies.

It may not be realistic to compel the withdrawal of Russian forces quickly and it is far-fetched to imagine NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it would still be possible to exact a heavy toll on Russia in blood and treasure through a protracted irregular war if it formally annexes Crimea or attempts to occupy other parts of the country.

Fourth, the U.S. and its NATO allies should revisit their self-imposed prohibitions on lethal aid to moderate Syrian opposition groups. In the post-Crimea era, Syria should be viewed through the prism of not only the West's long-term strategic competition with Iran, but also its re-emerging competition with Russia. The defeat of Bashar Assad's murderous regime and with it the potential loss of Russia's naval port at Tartus would represent a heavy tax for Russia's adventurism closer to home.

Lastly, Russia's invasion of Crimea should prompt strategic reappraisals in both Washington and Brussels. The Ukrainian crisis raises fundamental questions about the wisdom of the Obama administration's attempt to "lead from behind" on foreign-policy issues with clear U.S. interests, its pursuit of "global zero" (the elimination of all nuclear weapons world-wide) and most directly its "reset with Russia."

Rather than "reset," the administration would do well to hit the "recall" button on the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, released March 4, which treated Putin's Russia as an afterthought relative to other global threats, and astonishingly advocated another round of bilateral nuclear-arms reductions at a time of heightened tensions.

Leaders in Washington and Europe have allowed NATO's defenses to deteriorate to the point that Mr. Putin seems to think he can act with impunity. It is past time to start rebuilding those defenses, and Mr. Putin's Ukrainian gambit should be the catalyst.

Mr. Thomas is vice president and director of studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.

[Staggerwing]

Thanks!

[GDS_Starfury]

hes trying to trick us into thinking hes more clever then he is with the WSJ subscription.  ;)

[LongBlade]

hes trying to trick us into thinking hes more clever then he is with the WSJ subscription.  ;)

I've noticed that, too. News.google gets you in places you'd otherwise have to pay to go.

[pawelj]

Stupid paywall!!! If you find it through a Google search, it doesn't block you.

How to Put Military Pressure on Russia
NATO now has reason to station nuclear forces in front-line member states.

By JIM THOMAS
Updated March 9, 2014

Russia's seizure of Crimea should be a wake-up call for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The absence of serious thinking about NATO's territorial defense mission—its raison d'être—and the weakness its 28 member nations have shown since the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia have proven catnip for Vladimir Putin.

Most of NATO's European members have spent the past two decades rationalizing how they can spend ever-smaller sums on security. And now the U.S. is cutting its defense expenditures while trying to "pivot" its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. So it isn't surprising that pundits and government officials have tended to emphasize political and economic suasion for dealing with this latest Russian aggression.

Sanctions, skipping the G-8 summit in Sochi, hitting Russian oligarchs in their pocketbooks, isolating Russia in international forums—all of these options are legitimate responses to Mr. Putin's land grab in the sovereign state of Ukraine. But there is also a need to think about military options.

First, NATO should reconsider its so-called Three Nos from the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Three Nos were shorthand for the NATO allies' joint declaration that they had "no intentions, no plans, and no reason" to station nonstrategic nuclear forces in new member states. But NATO left the door open to future deployments if front-line allies were threatened. While NATO still lacks the intention and plans to station nuclear forces in new member states, such as Poland, it now has more than sufficient reason to do so.

A preliminary step should be making the Polish air force's F-16s capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons so that they could participate in NATO's nuclear mission. That should quickly be followed by site surveys to identify suitable locations for potentially storing nuclear weapons on the territory of front-line allies, including Poland, if relations with Russia further deteriorate.

Second, NATO should reinforce its front-line allies with additional conventional force deployments. The time has come for the U.S. and other NATO allies to consider permanently stationing forces in Poland and Romania as well as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to back up their words of strategic solidarity. Their mission should be defensively oriented, establishing what military strategists call "anti-access, area denial" zones. (This might include missile defenses to protect major bases in those countries along with anti-air, anti-armor and anti-ship weapons to counter air, land or naval incursions.

Taking these steps in the Baltic states would reduce Russia's temptation to encroach on their sovereignty in the name of "protecting ethnic Russian populations," a pretext it has used in Ukraine. It would also preclude Russia's option of a quick, Crimea-like operation to establish a fait accompli on the ground before NATO can decide to act.

Third, NATO should make it clear that it would seriously consider a future Ukrainian request for indirect military assistance, especially if Russia escalates the crisis in Crimea or deploys its forces into other eastern Ukrainian provinces. NATO could certainly provide overt nonlethal and humanitarian assistance, while the U.S. might even consider covert lethal aid, as in Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet occupation. This might include short-range precision guided weapons that could be used by resistance forces to attack bases and facilities on Ukrainian territory seized by Russia's forces or its proxies.

It may not be realistic to compel the withdrawal of Russian forces quickly and it is far-fetched to imagine NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it would still be possible to exact a heavy toll on Russia in blood and treasure through a protracted irregular war if it formally annexes Crimea or attempts to occupy other parts of the country.

Fourth, the U.S. and its NATO allies should revisit their self-imposed prohibitions on lethal aid to moderate Syrian opposition groups. In the post-Crimea era, Syria should be viewed through the prism of not only the West's long-term strategic competition with Iran, but also its re-emerging competition with Russia. The defeat of Bashar Assad's murderous regime and with it the potential loss of Russia's naval port at Tartus would represent a heavy tax for Russia's adventurism closer to home.

Lastly, Russia's invasion of Crimea should prompt strategic reappraisals in both Washington and Brussels. The Ukrainian crisis raises fundamental questions about the wisdom of the Obama administration's attempt to "lead from behind" on foreign-policy issues with clear U.S. interests, its pursuit of "global zero" (the elimination of all nuclear weapons world-wide) and most directly its "reset with Russia."

Rather than "reset," the administration would do well to hit the "recall" button on the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, released March 4, which treated Putin's Russia as an afterthought relative to other global threats, and astonishingly advocated another round of bilateral nuclear-arms reductions at a time of heightened tensions.

Leaders in Washington and Europe have allowed NATO's defenses to deteriorate to the point that Mr. Putin seems to think he can act with impunity. It is past time to start rebuilding those defenses, and Mr. Putin's Ukrainian gambit should be the catalyst.

Mr. Thomas is vice president and director of studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.

Obviously WSJ subscription has lapsed at the WH.

[Con]

Obviously WSJ subscription has lapsed at the WH.

Maybe they cancelled it after this

Where Are The Media's Iraq War Boosters 10 Years Later? http://mediamatters.org/research/2013/03/19/where-are-the-medias-iraq-war-boosters-10-years/193117#gigot

Paul Gigot / Wall Street Journal Editorial Page
Position At The Time Of Iraq Invasion: Editorial page editor and vice president of The Wall Street Journal. [WSJ.com, accessed 3/19/13]

Gigot's WSJ Editorial Page Frequently Forwarded Alarmist Claims About Iraq's Nuclear Capabilities. As Media Matters documented, the Journal editorial page, which Gigot has overseen since 2001, frequently hyped the likelihood that Saddam was not far from producing or obtaining a nuclear weapon. [Media Matters, 4/18/06]

WSJ In January 2003: Iraqi National Congress Has "Brought Out Scores Of Defectors And Tons Of Information On Saddam's Weapons Programs." [Media Matters, 6/19/09]

WSJ In February 2003: Coalition Will Find "Nasty Weapons And The Cheering Iraqis ... When It Liberates The Country." [Media Matters, 6/19/09]

Where Is Gigot Now? Gigot is still the editorial page editor for the Journal. He also hosts The Journal Editorial Report for Fox News. [WSJ.com, accessed 3/19/13]

[bayonetbrant]

http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-tv-inadvertently-published-propaganda-about-mh17-that-disproved-the-kremlins-main-theory-2014-10

Russian TV undercutting Kremlin theory about MH17 shootdown

[BanzaiCat]

http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-tv-inadvertently-published-propaganda-about-mh17-that-disproved-the-kremlins-main-theory-2014-10

Russian TV undercutting Kremlin theory about MH17 shootdown

Some reporters and producers are going to disappear into a gulag over this.

[LongBlade]

http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-tv-inadvertently-published-propaganda-about-mh17-that-disproved-the-kremlins-main-theory-2014-10

Russian TV undercutting Kremlin theory about MH17 shootdown

Maybe they're borrowing coverup techniques from the Obama administration?

[Gusington]

No one could just pretend to be as ignorant and clueless.

[pawelj]

No one could just pretend to be as ignorant and clueless.

Don't underestimate the power of ignorance and stupidity.

Still, I don't think any descent and honest person would have doubts about who is responsible for this tragedy - RUSSIA!!!!

[bayonetbrant]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-nato-pays-a-heavy-price-for-giving-russia-too-much-credita-true-achievement-under-threat/2014/10/17/5b3a6f2a-5617-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html

But times change, and the miraculous transformation of a historically unstable region became a humdrum reality. Instead of celebrating this achievement on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is now fashionable to opine that this expansion, and of NATO in particular, was mistaken. This project is incorrectly "remembered" as the result of American "triumphalism" that somehow humiliated Russia by bringing Western institutions into its rickety neighborhood. This thesis is usually based on revisionist history promoted by the current Russian regime — and it is wrong.

For the record: No treaties prohibiting NATO expansion were ever signed with Russia. No promises were broken. Nor did the impetus for NATO expansion come from a "triumphalist" Washington. On the contrary, Poland's first efforts to apply in 1992 were rebuffed. I well remember the angry reaction of the U.S. ambassador to Warsaw at the time. But Poland and others persisted, precisely because they were already seeing signs of the Russian revanchism to come.

When the slow, cautious expansion eventually took place, constant efforts were made to reassure Russia. No NATO bases were placed in the new member states, and until 2013 no exercises were conducted there. A Russia-NATO agreement in 1997 promised no movement of nuclear installations. A NATO-Russia Council was set up in 2002. In response to Russian objections, Ukraine and Georgia were, in fact, denied NATO membership plans in 2008.

Meanwhile, not only was Russia not "humiliated" during this era, it was given de facto "great power" status, along with the Soviet seat on the U.N. Security Council and Soviet embassies. Russia also received Soviet nuclear weapons, some transferred from Ukraine in 1994 in exchange for Russian recognition of Ukraine's borders. Presidents Clinton and Bush both treated their Russian counterparts as fellow "great power" leaders and invited them to join the Group of Eight — although Russia, neither a large economy nor a democracy, did not qualify.

During this period, Russia, unlike Central Europe, never sought to transform itself along European lines. Instead, former KGB officers with a clearly expressed allegiance to the Soviet system took over the state in league with organized crime, seeking to prevent the formation of democratic institutions at home and to undermine them abroad. For the past decade, this kleptocratic clique has also sought to re-create an empire, using everything from cyberattacks on Estonia to military invasions of Georgia and now Ukraine, in open violation of that 1994 agreement — exactly as the Central Europeans feared.

much more to read at the link - it's a very good article

[eyebiter]

.

[Airborne Rifles]

So the USMC is prepositioning heavy armor in Norway again: http://m.theweek.com/article/index/270353/why-is-the-pentagon-stuffing-caves-in-norway-full-of-tanks

Back to he good ol' days looks like.