Trouble in Mosul

[Airborne Rifles]

Looks like the Syrians took care of at least two of those ISIS jets:  http://m.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29720384

The jets were bombed as they landed on the runway of the Jarrah air base in the eastern Aleppo countryside, Mr Zoubi told Syrian TV late on Tuesday. The air force was searching for the third jet, he added.

Probably with a whole lot of collateral damage on the same people we are trying to help over there.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

Jihadis get a tough day at the office.
http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/slideshow?articleId=USRTR4BE1D#a=13

Damn, that's gotta hurt.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

Interesting bit of history.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/24/sykes-picot-drew-lines-in-the-middle-easts-sand-that-blood-is-washing-away/

[LongBlade]

Interesting bit of history.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/24/sykes-picot-drew-lines-in-the-middle-easts-sand-that-blood-is-washing-away/

I was aware of it and the consequences, though not the name(s) of those responsible.

It comes as no surprise that straight, even lines are artificial and are kept as borders under the most orderly of circumstances. The moment order breaks down, natural geography will interact with national and ethnic forces to realign that neat geometry into more realistic (and defensible), if less attractive and bloodier, boundaries.

[bayonetbrant]

Life inside Raqqa in Syria

http://www.raqqa-sl.com/?p=2654

Women walk past their bodies without acknowledging their impaled heads on fences for fear of being killed themselves. Elsewhere hate preachers urge children to disobey their parents and join the terror group. Raqqa has remained an ISIS stronghold since the group took control of the city last year. Residents have been subjected to an unrelenting torrent of horror, with many too poor to flee across the border to Turkey. Despite American and Arab forces bombing the city, fighters remain jubilant and have taken control of the population's homes and resources. See the horrific photos after the cut...

[bayonetbrant]

http://www.special-ops.org/british-sas-delta-forces-saved-kobane-jihadists/

Kobane, not only did not fall, but in next few days the fighters from Islamic State were evicted from all city neighbors under their control. In the air was a question – What happened? And answer for that mystery is revealed this weekend.

The British troops called in several air strikes, killing dozens of IS fighters and halting their advance towards Kobane, just inside the Syrian border.

In one attack, SAS guided warplanes into an area where IS fi ghters were massing for an attack The US jets dropped several 500lb bombs into the area, killing and injuring dozens of fighters.

In another strike the SAS pinpointed the location of a large convoy of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and ammo trucks heading towards the area. An SAS team hiding in the surrounding hills directed two US combat planes into the area.

The pilots then swooped on the convoy, destroying the vehicles with missiles and bombs. One source last night said: "The SAS deployed to the area around Kobane a couple of weeks ago and have done themselves proud.

"The US pilots think they are absolutely great. They have manoeuvred themselves into some great positions so they can call in air strikes against IS militants.

"They have done this at no small risk to themselves. If their positions had been identified by IS they would have been lucky to escape with their lives. "The conditions for the British soldiers have been very testing."

"Their role in the battle for Kobane probably saved hundreds of lives"
One source
"It's been extremely hot, they were living on meagre rations and had to be sparing with water.

"But their role in the battle for Kobane probably saved hundreds of lives." The SAS have mainly been active in Iraq over the last two months but some members of the elite unit were sent into Syria when Kobane looked as though it might fall into IS hands.

Sources added that US Delta Force troops and the SAS were able to cut off flanking assaults by IS militants trying to encircle the town.

"Every time the jihadis tried a move, the guys would zap them. It was brilliant," a US source added. Last week footage emerged of a devastating Western air strike on IS thugs who had planted their flag on a hilltop overlooking Kobane.

[LongBlade]

^ Awesome. Go SAS!

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

22 Regiment is Da Bomb.

[bayonetbrant]

US General writing about Iraq and ISIS

In Iraq, US verging on insanity

As a senior commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, I lost 80 soldiers. Despite their sacrifices, and those of thousands more, all we have to show for it are two failed wars. This fact eats at me every day, and Veterans Day is tougher than most.

As veterans, we tell ourselves it was all worth it. The grim butchery of war hovers out of sight and out of mind, an unwelcome guest at the dignified ceremonies. Instead, we talk of devotion to duty and noble sacrifice. We salute the soldiers at Omaha Beach, the sailors at Leyte Gulf, the airmen in the skies over Berlin and the Marines at the Chosin Reservoir, and we're not wrong to do so. The military thrives on tales of valor. In our volunteer armed forces, such stirring examples keep bringing young men and women through the recruiters' door. As we used to say in the First Cavalry Division, they want to "live the legend." In the military, we love our legends.

Here's a legend that's going around these days. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and toppled a dictator. We botched the follow-through, and a vicious insurgency erupted. Four years later, we surged in fresh troops, adopted improved counterinsurgency tactics and won the war. And then dithering American politicians squandered the gains. It's a compelling story. But it's just that – a story.

The surge in Iraq did not "win" anything. It bought time. It allowed us to kill some more bad guys and feel better about ourselves. But in the end, shackled to a corrupt, sectarian government in Baghdad and hobbled by our fellow Americans' unwillingness to commit to a fight lasting decades, the surge just forestalled today's stalemate. Like a handful of aspirin gobbled by a fevered patient, the surge cooled the symptoms. But the underlying disease didn't go away. The remnants of al-Qaida in Iraq and the Sunni insurgents we battled for more than eight years simply re-emerged this year as the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

The surge legend is soothing, especially for military commanders like me. We can convince ourselves that we did our part, and a few more diplomats or civilian leaders should have done theirs. Similar myths no doubt comforted Americans who fought under the command of Robert E. Lee in the Civil War or William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam. But as a three-star general who spent four years trying to win this thing – and failing – I now know better.

We did not understand the enemy, a guerrilla network embedded in a quarrelsome, suspicious civilian population. We didn't understand our own forces, which are built for rapid, decisive conventional operations, not lingering, ill-defined counterinsurgencies. We're made for Desert Storm, not Vietnam. As a general, I got it wrong. Like my peers, I argued to stay the course, to persist and persist, to "clear/hold/build" even as the "hold" stage stretched for months, and then years, with decades beckoning. We backed ourselves season by season into a long-term counterinsurgency in Iraq, then compounded it by doing likewise in Afghanistan. The American people had never signed up for that.

What went wrong in Iraq and in Afghanistan isn't the stuff of legend. It won't bring people into the recruiting office or ever make for good speeches on Veterans Day. Reserve those honors for the brave men and women who bear the burdens of combat.

That said, those who served deserve an accounting from the generals. What happened? How? And, especially, why? It has to be a public assessment, nonpartisan and not left to the military. (We tend to grade ourselves on the curve.) Something along the lines of the 9/11 Commission is in order. We owe that to our veterans and our fellow citizens.

Such an accounting couldn't be more timely. Today we are hearing some, including those in uniform, argue for a robust ground offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq. Air attacks aren't enough, we're told. Our Kurdish and Iraqi Army allies are weak and incompetent. Only another surge can win the fight against this dire threat. Really? If insanity is defined as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, I think we're there.

As a veteran, and a general who learned hard lessons in two lost campaigns, I'd like to suggest an alternative. Maybe an incomplete and imperfect effort to contain the Islamic State is as good as it gets. Perhaps the best we can or should do is to keep it busy, "degrade" its forces, harry them or kill them, and seek the long game at the lowest possible cost. It's not a solution that is likely to spawn a legend. But in the real world, it just may well give us something better than another defeat.

The New York Times
Daniel P. Bolger, the author of "Why We Lost," retired from the United States Army last year as a lieutenant general.

[LongBlade]

I have long believed that we merely got lucky in Iraq when the chiefs decided to go with us.

There were nowhere near enough troops to properly occupy the country. Our military is a first-class door kicker. We can take down any nation's military. Keeping the ground, however, is a different matter. What is needed is an occupational force capable of terraforming the cultural and political landscape of a nation over the course of a couple of decades. Without the ability and will to do that, we might as well not even try.

[Gusington]

An American Empire?

[LongBlade]

An American Empire?

Not necessary.

While we had troops posted in Germany for decades (and still do in Korea), one can hardly argue we were (are) an imperial power. Once Germany (and Italy and Japan) figured out how to behave in polite society again the training wheels came off.

In fact, it has been quite the opposite of an empire. More the Mouse that Roared than The Raj.

[bayonetbrant]

that said, the Doonesbury storyline when Duke was the Viceroy of Al Amok was pretty hilarious

[Centurion40]

US General writing about Iraq and ISIS

In Iraq, US verging on insanity

As a senior commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, I lost 80 soldiers. Despite their sacrifices, and those of thousands more, all we have to show for it are two failed wars. This fact eats at me every day, and Veterans Day is tougher than most.

As veterans, we tell ourselves it was all worth it. The grim butchery of war hovers out of sight and out of mind, an unwelcome guest at the dignified ceremonies. Instead, we talk of devotion to duty and noble sacrifice. We salute the soldiers at Omaha Beach, the sailors at Leyte Gulf, the airmen in the skies over Berlin and the Marines at the Chosin Reservoir, and we're not wrong to do so. The military thrives on tales of valor. In our volunteer armed forces, such stirring examples keep bringing young men and women through the recruiters' door. As we used to say in the First Cavalry Division, they want to "live the legend." In the military, we love our legends.

Here's a legend that's going around these days. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and toppled a dictator. We botched the follow-through, and a vicious insurgency erupted. Four years later, we surged in fresh troops, adopted improved counterinsurgency tactics and won the war. And then dithering American politicians squandered the gains. It's a compelling story. But it's just that – a story.

The surge in Iraq did not "win" anything. It bought time. It allowed us to kill some more bad guys and feel better about ourselves. But in the end, shackled to a corrupt, sectarian government in Baghdad and hobbled by our fellow Americans' unwillingness to commit to a fight lasting decades, the surge just forestalled today's stalemate. Like a handful of aspirin gobbled by a fevered patient, the surge cooled the symptoms. But the underlying disease didn't go away. The remnants of al-Qaida in Iraq and the Sunni insurgents we battled for more than eight years simply re-emerged this year as the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

The surge legend is soothing, especially for military commanders like me. We can convince ourselves that we did our part, and a few more diplomats or civilian leaders should have done theirs. Similar myths no doubt comforted Americans who fought under the command of Robert E. Lee in the Civil War or William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam. But as a three-star general who spent four years trying to win this thing – and failing – I now know better.

We did not understand the enemy, a guerrilla network embedded in a quarrelsome, suspicious civilian population. We didn't understand our own forces, which are built for rapid, decisive conventional operations, not lingering, ill-defined counterinsurgencies. We're made for Desert Storm, not Vietnam. As a general, I got it wrong. Like my peers, I argued to stay the course, to persist and persist, to "clear/hold/build" even as the "hold" stage stretched for months, and then years, with decades beckoning. We backed ourselves season by season into a long-term counterinsurgency in Iraq, then compounded it by doing likewise in Afghanistan. The American people had never signed up for that.

What went wrong in Iraq and in Afghanistan isn't the stuff of legend. It won't bring people into the recruiting office or ever make for good speeches on Veterans Day. Reserve those honors for the brave men and women who bear the burdens of combat.

That said, those who served deserve an accounting from the generals. What happened? How? And, especially, why? It has to be a public assessment, nonpartisan and not left to the military. (We tend to grade ourselves on the curve.) Something along the lines of the 9/11 Commission is in order. We owe that to our veterans and our fellow citizens.

Such an accounting couldn't be more timely. Today we are hearing some, including those in uniform, argue for a robust ground offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq. Air attacks aren't enough, we're told. Our Kurdish and Iraqi Army allies are weak and incompetent. Only another surge can win the fight against this dire threat. Really? If insanity is defined as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, I think we're there.

As a veteran, and a general who learned hard lessons in two lost campaigns, I'd like to suggest an alternative. Maybe an incomplete and imperfect effort to contain the Islamic State is as good as it gets. Perhaps the best we can or should do is to keep it busy, "degrade" its forces, harry them or kill them, and seek the long game at the lowest possible cost. It's not a solution that is likely to spawn a legend. But in the real world, it just may well give us something better than another defeat.

The New York Times
Daniel P. Bolger, the author of "Why We Lost," retired from the United States Army last year as a lieutenant general.

Thanks for the post.

[bayonetbrant]