Russia's War Against Ukraine

[FarAway Sooner]

I think it's hard to know exactly what's going on with Prigo, given the Fog of Russia.

[ArizonaTank]

New contact today from Prigo, supposedly -- reported by Fox News, but I've got the original here: https://t.me/grey_zone/19396

The internet translates it as:

Statement by Yevgeny Prigozhin in response to the manifestations of the people that have been provided in recent days:

"Today we need your support more than ever. Thank you for that.

I want you to understand that our "March of Justice" was aimed at fighting traitors and mobilizing our society. And I think that we have succeeded in a lot of this.

In the near future, I am sure that you will see our next victories at the front. Thanks, guys!"

So what if you held a coup and nobody came?

[Uberhaus]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66023041

Wagner is making money in Africa from mercenary work and exploiting the resources including conflict diamonds and gold. In Mali, the UN and the French have been sent packing and has Wagner to deal with Islamic militants. In the Central African Republic:

The CAR, which has been unstable for decades, is rich in diamonds, gold, oil and uranium.

Wagner has allowed President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who even has the mercenaries as his bodyguards, to shrug off the influence of former colonial power France as the country tries to gain the upper hand against rebel groups - in return for a slice of the resource pie.

So much for throwing off the colonial shackles. But, I guess the French aren't so much for corruption as Wagner, just so long as you ignore the mass killings.

In Sudan, M Invest "owned or controlled by Prigozhin" has set up gold mines. Also in Libya and Mali:

But strategically, Libya creates a gateway for Russia into Africa, strengthens its presence in the Mediterranean and aligns with the Kremlin's backing of Gen Haftar. Wagner mercenaries still remain around key oil facilities in Haftar strongholds in the east and south of the country - and sources have told the BBC there has not been a noticeable change on the ground since Saturday.

Wagner's interest in Mali may be linked to its rich gold reserves - though there is no evidence as yet of its firms operating there - and it is likely to be more strategic, opening up Russia's sphere of influence in West African countries under pressure from so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda groups.

It would be wonderful if Wagner would collapse, however, there is too much prestige and influence in Africa as well as wealth at stake that Russia needs desperately right now for Putin and Prigozhin to continue with personal issues. I'll hazard a guess that Lukashenko would like some of that pie too as well as the potential for if not loyal, mercenary types to protect his regime.

I highly recommend the BBC article, it explains what Wagner is up to in Africa and its importance in generating wealth and political support.  Oh, and it also makes the allegation that Mali bought weapons from Turkey for Russia according to the leaked US documents.

[SirAndrewD]

Good info from the ISW on why the Ukranian counter offensive is anything but a stalemate and bears no connection to grinding WWI style attrition tactics.

As has been mentioned before, the current counteroffensive mirrors more aptly the preliminary phases in the Kherson/Kharkiv offensives last year.  One pertinent bit:

"The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas.

Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[4]

The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable. 

By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[5]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress."

The main gist of this and some other analysis that is not relying as much on Russian media has been that the UAF has largely been largely taking advantage of the Russians active defense, and are gladly allowing the Russians to expend ammo and waste more capable troops on locally destroyed counterattacks followed by careful advances to take the weakened defenses. 

This is mostly a strategy of Ukrainian force conservation, as they've inflicted significantly more casualties on the Russians than they've apparently taken. 

Important to note as well that even Western media is largely estimating Ukrainian losses on Russian sources as they are the only ones advertising it and the NATO MOD's are respecting UAF OPSEC.  We don't know what the UAF has expended with this strategy, but again make sure to note the UAF has made a priority of preserving its fighting strength and not accepting the typical 3:1 attacker loss rate.

Full analysis here:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2023

[Skoop]

Slow methodical advance is probably prudent without local air superiority.  It was always my fear that the Ukrainians would concentrate a blitz formation of thousands of troops only to have them pummeled by Russian air power that has been waiting in the shadows for that moment. 

This slow strangling advance on a broad front puts tons of pressure on the Russians without proving a juicy bombing target.  The Russians can't fight every where on the front at once, eventually they'll crack...may take until September October.

[ArizonaTank]

New RT show: 'The Lives of the Rich and Evil'  ;)

Russian state-run media news documentary doing its best to discredit Prigo with an expose on what was found in his home.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/wigs-guns-and-a-giant-sledgehammer-russian-media-claims-to-show-wagner-mercenary-chief-s-home/ar-AA1dwxup?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=47e1fbe2d0fc45e68a3820165cea843b&ei=22

You really can't make up some of this stuff... 

Of course the irony is that if Russian media did a similar expose on any of the other monsters in Putin's regime, I am sure it would look similar.

Jason mentioned this stuff before, but this article has more pictures.

There were also reportedly some selfies of Prigo wearing disguises...but there is some discussion that these may be fake.

https://www.newsweek.com/prigozhin-photos-wagner-group-raid-mansion-wigs-disguises-1811258

[JasonPratt]

Regarding the attrition of Russian defensive forces in front of the Meli/Maur coastal targets: I saw a report yesterday, though I can't provide a link to it (at work atm, can't find it again yet), indicating that the reserves on Russia's line are about used up, and Ukraine has started moving 30 fresh battalions into position on the line.

[Sir Slash]

So, looks like it's time for Vlad to do another Call-Up?     In Russia when they do a Draft Lottery everybody's number comes-up...always. 

[FarAway Sooner]

They're doing their draft the way the US did the Vietnam Draft, but only moreso.  You target the people least likely to complain and stay away from your key constituencies as much as possible. 

One example:  Draft rates of eligible ages in Moscow have been a fraction of what they've been in other regions.

My sense is that you need to do a call-up and start training troops BEFORE your defenses collapse, and not after.  But little of the Russian decision making since this conflict started has seemed to be sensible or even rational.

[FarAway Sooner]

In other news, lots of hubbub about Biden's decision to release cluster munitions to Ukraine.  While this was a worthwhile topic six or nine months ago and seems to keep with the Biden Administration's efforts to err on the side of caution when it comes arming Ukraine, this announcement raises a different question for me.  Are there any tactical implications, or is this unlikely to make much difference?

It looks like the new cluster munitions that we'll be sending are intended mostly or entirely for the 155mm howitzers.  I'm assuming that Ukrainian stocks of Russian-made and Turkish-provided cluster munitions are running scarce (or are only compatible with Russian-made guns?) and this won't be much of a game changer as we're now stepping in to pick up their slack.  Unless the UAF have always had limited supplies of these?

It would make sense that cluster munitions are more useful for attacking "semi-hard" targets like BMPs or light field fortifications, as opposed to the traditional HE warheads used by the US-made 155mm guns.  Does anybody have any ideas whether this might be the reason why this is getting so much attention?  Or is it simply the humanitarian implications for those who might already feel squeamish about the types of weapons we provide in this conflict?

A quick note on HIMARS use of cluster munitions:
While cluster munitions can be mounted on the HIMARS (and were the original warhead back when it was designed), the US has been providing the "Claymore-like" M31A1 and M31A2 warheads for a while now (in the first few months after Ukraine had HIMARS, they were only using the M31 unitary HE warheads, but that's changed).  So the only reason providing M30 cluster warheads for HIMARS might be a game changer is if we were running out of our M31A1 and M31A2 warheads?  Either way, I don't see this being much of a game-changer for the HIMARS.

[Skoop]

I'm not sure why the CBUs are getting so much airtime either.  Hand em over if they clear out the trenches and minefields sooner.  The ones I drop from my planes in DCS are quite effective, so I'm not surprised that they are highly sought after by the Ukrainians. 

[Uberhaus]

It would be a humanitarian issue.  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66133527

Why are they banned?
More than 100 countries, including the UK, France and Germany, have signed an international treaty - the Convention on Cluster Munitions - that outlaws the use or stockpiling of these weapons due to their indiscriminate effect on civilian populations.

Children are particularly prone to injury as the bomblets can resemble a small toy left in a residential or farmland area and are often picked up out of curiosity.

Human rights groups have described cluster munitions as "abhorrent" and even a war crime.

Even with or without sending DP ICMs to Ukraine, mines and other explosives will be killing for a long time.  If we use Egypt for comparison, according to https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/106/Landmines-in-Egypt?lang=en-us landmines from the Arab-Israeli wars and the Second World War have injured or kllled nearly 8000 people in the 25 years before 2009.  Can't find info on recent incidents.

Unfortunately, DP ICMs do not self-destruct like FASCAM.

[GDS_Starfury]

the claymore type warheads have a single burst pattern.  while very effective theyll always have that pattern and the rockets arent cheap.  cluster munitions have a carpeting burst patters so shrapnel is flying in every which direction so its much better at blanketing things like trenches and vehicle formations.  not only do they cost a
lot less, we're not going to use them anymore anyway.  I think they'll have a pretty big effect.

[GDS_Starfury]

I'm not sure why the CBUs are getting so much airtime either.  Hand em over if they clear out the trenches and minefields sooner.  The ones I drop from my planes in DCS are quite effective, so I'm not surprised that they are highly sought after by the Ukrainians. 

I dont see the UkAF doing many low passes over the front lines to drop these.
however.... JDAMCBU's could become a thing. 

[FarAway Sooner]

the claymore type warheads have a single burst pattern.  while very effective theyll always have that pattern and the rockets arent cheap.  cluster munitions have a carpeting burst patters so shrapnel is flying in every which direction so its much better at blanketing things like trenches and vehicle formations.  not only do they cost a
lot less, we're not going to use them anymore anyway.  I think they'll have a pretty big effect.

That does make sense to me, I guess.  The more random/distributed burst pattern means that you'll really need to be hiding under something solid, as opposed to sheltering behind a thick wall and hoping the burst pattern from the tungsten balls originates somewhere on the opposite side of the wall.

Of course, the tungsten ball warhead is somewhat unique to the HIMARS.  If there's any similar shell used by the 155mm howitzers, I couldn't find it in the Font of All Wisdom.  Which gets me back to my original supposition:  Will the introduction of these make a difference versus the similar shells they were getting from their own inventories and from Turkey previously?