News from Ukraine Conflict

[bayonetbrant]

Can we call what happened in Afghanistan a victory?

I don't know - did we ever define a mission against which we can compare our relative level of success?

No, we didn't. And retreating on a time schedule set up for the enemies' convenience snatched whatever defeat we wanted to avoid from the jaws of whatever "victory" we may have accomplished.

http://grognews.blogspot.com/2011/03/mission-in-afghanistan.html

[Airborne Rifles]

The question of victory in Afghanistan seems moot to me in the current discussion. What is relevant is that NATO members stuck with the mission for more than a decade. Just as an example, the Dutch maintained a third of their army over there for close to ten years!

From the U.S. side, we're prepositioning equipment in in the Baltics (and now Norway, again) and rotating units through there to train. I think our commitment is strong as well.

On a different subject, and I know that this may not be popular, the Russians actually have legitimate interests in Ukraine, however thuggishly and inappropriately they are going about pursuing them. 70 years ago parts of Russia had just been liberated from armies sent from the rest of Europe who had killed 20 MILLION Russians. Now, the Russians weren't saints themselves, but you can imagine the impact on their national psyche, especially because it had just happened first 25 years previously. And they have been saying since the end of the Cold War that they wouldn't tolerate the advance of NATO to their borders, meaning Ukraine and Belarus, so the current conflict shouldn't come as a real surprise once Ukraine started getting too cozy with the west for moscow's liking. Again, not justifying, just explaining their perspective.

And on another note, there have been people In this discussion who have suggested the Ukraine deport rebels/ethnic Russians from eastern Ukraine as part of a solution to the conflict. If the Russians did that I imagine there would be a lot of accusations of ethnic cleansing, etc. Don't forget that Ukraine is fertile ground for Russian meddling because they are such a disfunctional, corrupt state themselves, one that is so disfunctional that It has a significant population of people who are willing to fight and die to break away from it.

Better to understand your enemy and his motivations then to simply dismiss them.

[bayonetbrant]

There is a very valid scenario that one can discuss for the voluminous Russian meddling in the near abroad, from their perspective.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

The question of victory in Afghanistan seems moot to me in the current discussion. What is relevant is that NATO members stuck with the mission for more than a decade. Just as an example, the Dutch maintained a third of their army over there for close to ten years!

From the U.S. side, we're prepositioning equipment in in the Baltics (and now Norway, again) and rotating units through there to train. I think our commitment is strong as well.

On a different subject, and I know that this may not be popular, the Russians actually have legitimate interests in Ukraine, however thuggishly and inappropriately they are going about pursuing them. 70 years ago parts of Russia had just been liberated from armies sent from the rest of Europe who had killed 20 MILLION Russians. Now, the Russians weren't saints themselves, but you can imagine the impact on their national psyche, especially because it had just happened first 25 years previously. And they have been saying since the end of the Cold War that they wouldn't tolerate the advance of NATO to their borders, meaning Ukraine and Belarus, so the current conflict shouldn't come as a real surprise once Ukraine started getting too cozy with the west for moscow's liking. Again, not justifying, just explaining their perspective.

And on another note, there have been people In this discussion who have suggested the Ukraine deport rebels/ethnic Russians from eastern Ukraine as part of a solution to the conflict. If the Russians did that I imagine there would be a lot of accusations of ethnic cleansing, etc. Don't forget that Ukraine is fertile ground for Russian meddling because they are such a disfunctional, corrupt state themselves, one that is so disfunctional that It has a significant population of people who are willing to fight and die to break away from it.

Better to understand your enemy and his motivations then to simply dismiss them.

They could have offered to purchase the region with gas delivered to the rest of the country. They chose to try to take it by force.

[Airborne Rifles]

They could have offered to purchase the region with gas delivered to the rest of the country.

How do you suppose that would have gone over in Kiev? Before all this started, I mean.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

Flat out NO. In the current situation, maybe.

[bayonetbrant]

from the archvies (2008) but still has a lot of applicability
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33872&no_cache=1

As anticipated (see EDM, July 11, August 4) Moscow has initiated an offensive military operation by proxy against Georgia in South Ossetia. Although the blow had been expected in upper Abkhazia and may yet materialize there, Russia shifted the direction of attack to the South Ossetian front.
The brazen attacks during the night of August 7 to 8 in South Ossetia left Tbilisi with no choice but to respond. Continuing Georgian restraint would have resulted in irreparable human, territorial, and political losses. Moscow's military and propaganda operation bears the hallmarks of its blitzkriegs in Transnistria in 1992 and Abkhazia in 1993. Georgia's defensive response in South Ossetia since August 8 is legally within the country's rights under international law and militarily commensurate with the attacks.



Russia usually stages military incidents in Georgia in August, while European officials take their vacations. This year, however, the operations are systematic, lengthier, and considerably higher on the ladder of escalation than in previous years. After concentrating supplementary forces in Abkhazia during the spring and expanding its military infrastructure there in early summer, Moscow switched on the escalation process in South Ossetia.



On July 3 an assassination attempt targeted Dmitry Sanakoyev, head of the Tbilisi-backed interim administration of South Ossetia, which controls at least one third of the region's territory. The blast injured Sanakoyev's bodyguards. On July 9 Moscow demonstratively acknowledged that four Russian Air Force planes had flown a mission over South Ossetia. That action sought to deter Georgia from flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), thus blinding Tbilisi to Russian and proxy military movements in the area. A series of roadside bomb blasts targeted Georgian police patrols. During the second half of July and the first days of August, Russian-commanded Ossetian troops under the authority of Russian-led South Ossetian authorities fired repeatedly at Georgian-controlled villages, forcing Georgian police to fire back defensively.



Meanwhile, Russia's state-controlled media orchestrated a war scare, accusing Georgia of intentions to attack. In the North Caucasus and Russia proper, Cossack chieftains on government payroll threatened to send "volunteers" to fight against Georgia. The North Ossetian authorities, apparently aware of Moscow's plans, showed nervousness at the prospect of becoming embroiled in a major military operation by proxy to their south.



The goals behind Moscow's operation are threefold, each with its own time frame. The immediate goal is to re-establish the authority of Russian-controlled negotiating and "peacekeeping" formats. By firing on Georgian positions unremittingly and escalating the intensity of the fire with every passing day, Moscow hopes to force Georgia to turn to those Russian-controlled formats to relieve the pressure. Furthermore, Moscow wants to force Tbilisi to acknowledge a leading Russian role as "guarantor" of an eventual political settlement.



Moscow's next goal, on a timeframe overlapping with the first, is to capture Georgian-controlled villages in South Ossetia. The pattern of attacks since August 6 indicate the intent to reduce the Sanakoyev administration's territory to insignificance or even remove it from South Ossetia altogether. If successful, this undertaking may well be replicated in upper Abkhazia by Russian and proxy forces attempting to evict authorities loyal to Tbilisi.



The strategic political goal is to dissuade NATO from approving a membership action plan (MAP) for Georgia at the alliance's December 2008 or April 2009 meetings. More immediately, Moscow seeks to derail the North Atlantic Council's assessment visit to Georgia, scheduled for September, or at least to influence the visit's assessment about Georgia's eligibility for a MAP. Since NATO's "Russia-Firsters" insist that unresolved conflicts disqualify Georgia from a MAP, Russia seeks to demonstrate that those conflicts are indeed unresolved. NATO's failure to approve a Georgian MAP at the April 2008 summit emboldened Russia to escalate military operations against Georgia.



Moscow also seeks to bleed Georgia economically through protracted military operations. Russia can not tolerate the successful economic performance of a Western-oriented government on Russia's border. Aware, furthermore, that Georgia's government is accountable to public opinion, Moscow seeks to force the government to choose between yielding at the risk of a domestic backlash or, alternatively, fighting back in a costly confrontation



Resemblances with the Russian interventions in the early 1990s in Transnistria and Abkhazia are unmistakable. In that scenario, the Russian media create a hysterical, brink-of-war atmosphere, portraying the small country targeted for attack as a dangerous aggressor. Russian-armed proxy troops, already in place on the target country's territory, attack localities and seats of authority. Cossacks and North Caucasus "volunteers" are sent in. Russian officials can claim that the attackers act on their own, outside Moscow's control. Russian military intelligence coordinates the operation, while air and ground forces provide cover and would intervene directly if the target country defends itself. In the final stage of this scenario, Russian "peacekeepers" perpetuate the gains achieved on the ground. Throughout the crisis, most Western governments are confused and react irrelevantly by urging restraint on "both sides," ultimately tolerating the Russian faits accomplis.



That scenario started unfolding in South Ossetia in late July. By August 6 and 7, heavily armed proxy troops opened fire on Georgian villages, while the secessionist authorities refused to talk with Tbilisi. The attacking forces began destroying the transmission antennae of Georgian mobile telephone systems. Arms and paramilitary groups poured in from Russia to South Ossetia through the Russian-controlled Roki tunnel. Russian officials in Georgia claimed that the attacking forces were out of Russia's control. Officials in Moscow, meanwhile, justified the attacks directly and indirectly by accusing Georgia of aggression (Interfax, Itar-Tass, Russian Television, August 4-7).



At 7:00 P.M. local time on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke live on national television, announcing a unilateral ceasefire and asking the other side also to cease hostilities. In highly conciliatory words, Saakashvili called for talks "in any format"; reaffirmed the long-standing offer of full autonomy for South Ossetia; proposed that Russia should guarantee that solution; offered a general amnesty; and pleaded for international intercession to stop the hostilities (Rustavi-2 TV, August 7).



Following Saakashvili's address, attacks on Georgian villages intensified. The village of Avnevi was almost completely destroyed, Tamarasheni and Prisi shelled, and the police station in Kurta, seat of the Sanakoyev administration, smashed by artillery fire. Civilians began fleeing the villages.



These attacks forced Tbilisi to take defensive action. By 10:30 P.M. local time on August 7 the Georgians returned fire. During the night, Georgian forces including armored columns began advancing toward Tskhinvali, the secessionist authorities' administrative center. These Georgian actions have halted the repetition of a 1992-1993 type scenario in 2008.

[OJsDad]

Does the US still have POMCUS sites in Europe, or did those get abandoned at the end of the Cold War.

[bayonetbrant]

can't find any good current info on them, but only had about 90s to look around online before work started pulling at me again



edit: here's an article from 2011 at GlobalSecurity that lists a handful of sites, but not what's in them

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/srsae.htm

[Staggerwing]

Weren't most of them raided for the gear that went to Iraq?

[BanzaiCat]

The S&P lowered Russia's credit rating to "junk" status a couple of days ago.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-26/russia-credit-rating-cut-to-junk-by-s-p-for-first-time-in-decade

[Centurion40]

I heard on the CBC news that the cost of groceries and mortgages have almost doubled in Russia over the past year.  :o

If I was Russian, I'd be pissed and I'd blame the national leadership.

[JasonPratt]

^^ Not that it would do you the slightest bit of good. ;)


But seriously, that level of social despair explains A LOT of the horrible things people put up with (and even cooperatively help foster) from their leaders and governments in countries all over the world throughout history, including today.

[bayonetbrant]

If I was Russian, I'd be pissed and I'd blame the national leadership.

If you were Russian, you'd be pissed and blaming "the west" just like all other Russians since the 1740s.

[LongBlade]

If I was Russian, I'd be pissed and I'd blame the national leadership.

If you were Russian, you'd be pissed and blaming "the west" just like all other Russians since the 1740s.

Ah, 1739. What a great year!